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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between the state and mining capital in South Africa 
since the beginning of gold mining. It provides a historical analysis centered around the 
notion that neither state nor capital have been able to dominate each other wholly but 
retained their respective relative strength and independence. By applying a qualitative 
approach, this thesis seeks to determine whether this notion still holds true today, how the 
relationship between the state and mining capital has evolved over time and by what 
factors was it determined. I suggest that structurally the nature of the state-capital 
relationship continues to endure fifteen years after apartheid.  
Accordingly the thesis is organized in terms of two critical junctures, one in the 1920s 
and one in the long 1970s when the balance of power between the state and mining 
capital experienced a number of shifts. Recent developments in post-apartheid South 
Africa seem, as of now at least, to represent more of a continuation of the shift that 
materialized in the long 1970s rather than a new conjuncture of its own or one in the 
making. Contrasting these findings with the adamant calls of the ANCYL for a 
nationalization of mines indicates that nationalization as the ANCYL foresees it does not 
seem to be informed by a historical understanding of the mining capital-state relations 
and that it is ceteris paribus unlikely to materialize.  
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Opsomming
Die tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen die staat en mynbou kapitaal in Suid-Afrika 
sedert die begin van die goudwedloop. Op grond van ’n historiese oorsig word daar aan 
die hand gedoen dat nòg die staat nóg mynbou kapitaal mekaar oorheers het en dat 
hierdie tendens vyftien jaar na apartheid steeds voortduur. 
 
Die magsbalans tussen die staat en kapitaal word egter gekenmerk deur twee 
uiteenlopende periodes, naamlik die Twintiger jare en die langdurige Sewentigs. 
Verwikkelinge in post-apartheid Suid-Afrika suggereer ’n voortsetting van die dinamika 
van die Sewentigs. Volgens onlangse uitlatings deur die ANC Jeugliga blyk dit asof die 
beweging nie bewus is van die kompleksiteit van hierdie historiese verhouding nie en dat 
dit dus hoogs onwaarskynlik is dat nasionalisering in terme van ANC Jeugliga beleid die 
lig sal sien. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The relationship between the mining industry and the state in South Africa has indeed 
been a contentious issue for a long time already. This stems naturally from the prominent 
place the industry occupies in the economic history of the country and from the related 
acrimonious debate around its role in the exploitation of land and labor, of which 
diverging and conflicting readings of the relationship between mining capital and the 
state in a historical perspective bear witness. 
In July 2009 the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) initiated a 
debate which has since been pursued with varying degrees of intensity and ideological 
fervor. The proposal put forward by the Youth League is to nationalize the mines in the 
first instance and then extend nationalization to other strategic sectors of the economy 
and possibly beyond. The general idea behind nationalization as construed by the 
ANCYL is that through democratic, open and decisive legislation by the parliament, the 
democratic government's ownership and control of mining activities ensures the 
restoration of the national mineral wealth to and for the benefit of the people as a whole. 
The straightforward and unambiguous stance received wide media coverage and sparked 
an intense debate. While initially, the debate remained shallow and received little earnest 
responses particularly from the African National Congress (ANC) itself (apart from the 
indispensable dissociation), it has since gathered momentum on its own and is one year 
later widely regarded as a necessary discussion, which should not be stifled from the 
outset.  
 The ANCYL depicts the nationalization of mines as the panacea to the many real 
and perceived problems associated with the current political economic state of the mining 
industry. The challenges entail namely ‘democratising the commanding heights of the 
economy, [... a] thorough transformation of state-owned enterprises […] to the benefit of 
the people as a whole, […] help build strategic capacity of the state to unlock resources 
for more inclusive development and growth and a growth path that does not overly rely 
on the export of primary commodities and the import of almost all consumer goods and 
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services, […] public ownership between 51 and 100 per cent, [… possibly] expropriation 
without compensation, [… but] no bail out [of] indebted capitalists’ (ANCYL, 2010b: 2-
3). A nationalization of the mining industry of such kind poses fundamental questions 
about the relationship between the state and capital, including the practicability of the 
above measures.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Responses to the nationalization debate have included the publishing of an 'Idiot's Guide 
to Nationalisation' (Louw, 2010) that wishes to clarify that nationalization is ‘a process 
whereby people who don’t produce wealth confiscate wealth from those who do, by 
buying their assets and transferring them to people who have a proven propensity to turn 
formerly productive assets into ones that are net wealth consumers’ as well as 'capitalist 
class bogey'-calls for the ‘smashing [of] the bourgeois state machinery and replacing it 
with a socialist planned economy [as] the only genuine road to socialism in South Africa’ 
(van Wyk, 2010). Between these more radical and polemic extremes, an increasingly 
intensifying debate has evolved around the political and economic consequences of 
nationalization of particularly the mining sector. Given its historically significant, indeed 
essential, role in the process of growth and development of the South African economy as 
a whole it is crucial to contextualize this debate in a broader historical context. 
Yudelmann (1984: 7) has argued that unlike the early situations of the advanced industrial 
states, ‘neither the state nor capital could effectively dominate the other in South Africa’. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether this notion is still valid today in the 
mining sector, how it has evolved since the 1920s/1930s and what it means for the 
current nationalization of mines debate. Therefore, the research questions which guide 
this thesis read as follows: 
1) Is the notion, that neither the state nor mining capital can effectively dominate 
each other in South Africa, still valid today? 
 
2) How has this relationship evolved over time and by what factors was it 
determined? 
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1.3 Aims and Significance 
Beyond answering its research questions this thesis pursues two further goals hoping to 
inform the present by analyzing the past and adding to a more balanced account of state-
business relations in the South African mining sector and the current nationalization 
debate. On the one hand, the relationship between mining capital and the state has 
changed over time in a number of ways for a variety of reasons and it is the author’s 
conviction that the complexity of the current politico-economic configuration of this 
relationship can be better appreciated against the backdrop of a thorough historical 
analysis. On the other hand, this thesis aims to contribute to the current nationalization 
debate which has evolved in the first half of 2010 into a more nuanced and technical 
discussion after a rather polemic and ideological take-off phase from mid- to late-2009.  
 It is the combination of these two further aims that provides the rationale behind 
the significance of this study. The relationship between mining capital and the state has 
always occupied a prominent place in South African economic history particularly until 
1994. Simultaneously to the liberal-radical debate (see below), the intensity of the 
discussion has since decreased considerably (with the notable exception of Fine and 
Rustomjee’s (1996) political economy on the South African industrialization and 
minerals-energy complex), but picked up momentum again in the last few years, most 
notably in the context of the mining charter in particular and Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) programs in general and temporarily climaxed in the 
nationalization of mines debate sparked by the ANCYL. Even though some work has 
been conducted lately on the state’s capacity to regulate mining capital in the age of 
globalization (Iheduru, 2008), on the relationship between the state and capital (Handley, 
2008) and how it relates to pro-poor growth (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010), little attention 
has been given to the historic patterns of the state-mining capital relations and how they 
have evolved since 1994. Addressing this lack of analysis is particularly useful in the 
context of the current nationalization of mines debate.  
This thesis tries to fill this gap and aims to contribute to a broader historical 
understanding of the relationship between mining capital and the state; an informed 
assessment of where it stands today; and a balanced evaluation of possible future 
developments in the mining capital-state relations. 
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1.4 Literature Review and Analytical Approach 
The study of the relations between state and business is hardly a new one but has 
remained, despite an ever growing body of empirical work, theoretically diffuse. 
Lindblom remarked that ‘certain questions about governmental-market relations are at the 
core of both political science and economics, no less for planned systems than for market 
system’ (1977: 7). Already Adam Smith's inquiry on the wealth of the nations was in part 
a theory on how to optimally organize the relations between the state and markets. 
Likewise, Marx elaborated on the role of the state in the advancement of capitalism. A 
great deal of the difficulty associated with the theoretical clarity in the field has since 
been contending views on both the state as well as business. In the following I will focus 
on the more recent studies conducted on state business relations in general in order to 
provide in a second step an overview of the major arguments with regard to the South 
African state business relations. This will also encompass a brief review on the liberal-
radical debate. Even though the debate lasted only for a short period of time and has 
ceased to be of practical importance it is still of immense historical interest, most notably 
to the question at hand. This thesis touches upon numerous and very different aspects of 
the state business relations in the South African mining sector across a rather large time 
span. In turn, the following literature review will be mainly directed at the general study 
of state business relations. As such it also differs from a more conventional literature 
review in a thesis in the sense that the arguments of each writer on a specific topic cannot 
be reviewed here for the sheer lack of space1. Instead the focus will be more on locating 
the thesis in the broader field rather than contrasting different notions for each factor in 
each period.  
 Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider (1997: 36-62) have developed a typology of 
five theoretical approaches to study state business relations. The approaches differ 
primarily in their conceptualization of the private sector understood as either capital, 
sector, firm, association or network. The first approach which sees business as capital or a 
factor of production develops models on a macro level. It focuses on structural 
constraints posed by private ownership and control by inquiring into the political 
consequences of the fact that most investment decisions are made by private entities or 
                                                 
1 See below for examples. 
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individuals responding to market signals as well as to expectations about the course of 
future government action. This approach therefore treats business as a rather homogenous 
unit of analysis. The sectoral analysis in contrast employs a much less homogenous view 
of business and looks at how politics, policies and growth are affected by the distribution 
of economic activity and the different sectoral interests. In this view, the state is 
constrained by the contending interests of different economic sectors. Thirdly, business 
conceptualized on the level of analysis of the firm aims at examining the political 
consequences of the characteristics of corporate structure including size, internal 
organization, ownership, patterns of financing, etc. A less structural and more game-
theoretical view understands business in terms of its political organizations (associations, 
parties, think tanks) or the institutions that mediate business interest. Finally, the network 
view of business looks at the role of individual managers and owners and their interaction 
with government through informal networks of personal relationships rather than formal, 
institutional channels. 
 Similarly, Chingaipe and Leftwich (2007: 12) assert that there is ‘no standard way 
of approaching the study of SBRs [state business relations]’. According to Leftwich 
(2009: 5), these approaches all offer ‘useful insights into the key political issue from a 
developmental or growth point of view’. Consequently, state business relations are 
constituted both within and between the state and business and expressed both in formal 
as well as informal institutional terms. As such, state business relations ‘cannot be had to 
order, but are the product of on-going political negotiation and reconstruction as the 
relative power of each side undergoes (often slow) transformation in the context of both 
local national and international circumstances – political, social and economic’ (ibid). 
The primary concern in this 'meta'-approach is to figure out whether, how and why the 
different institutional configurations have come about, what keeps them in place and what 
possible sources of change there may be. Quite obviously, this requires a careful 
historical analysis to which there are again many approaches, most notably the one 
understood loosely as historical institutionalism.  
 Historical institutionalism attends to the ‘power-distributional features of 
institutions and how they distribute advantages and serve the interest of those with 
power’ (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007: 15). Historical institutionalists are generally 
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interested in long-term processes that evolve over a lengthy period of time rather than a 
mere snapshot at a particular moment in time. Equally important is the relative power of 
both formal and informal arrangements and how they interact with each other. The 
interests, ideologies and agents driving these processes of shaping, maintaining and 
changing institutions are likewise of central importance as they are seen more as an 
outcome of power struggles between groups and interests rather than as functional 
equilibriums enabling individuals or groups to capture the benefits of cooperation, in 
essence stressing conflict over cooperation. Historical institutionalists are naturally also 
interested in the process leading up to these arrangements which, once institutionalized, 
are maintained and sustained by both formal and/or informal coalitions. In addition, 
institutions can be maintained, undermined or change as a result of the way in which 
organized interests interact with them and/or as a result of contingent socio-economic, 
political or even natural events. All in all, historical institutionalism requires an in-depth 
historical and analytical study of the field the results of which ‘can never be captured in 
the elegant parsimony of the mathematical equation. Rather, it demands detailed 
qualitative and interpretative methods, for history and historical change cannot be written 
in numbers’ (Leftwich, 2009: 6).  
 Other analytical approaches do not share the same rigor and have indeed 
attempted to measure the impact of different state business relations on growth in 
numerical terms. Te Velde (2008: 33) tested a new measurement of the effects of state 
business relations on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and found that the employed 
composite state business relations indicator was associated with faster growth rates, 
correlated well with other governance indicators as well as more operational investment 
climate data. The four factors that provide effective state business relations include 1) the 
way the private sector is organized vis-à-vis the public sector, 2) the way the public sector 
is organized vis-à-vis the private sector, 3) the practice and institutionalization of state 
business relations, 4) the avoidance of harmful collusive behavior. Te Velde (ibid) 
concludes that there is need for firstly, more data, notably the impact of state business 
relations on economic performance taking into account other causes of growth and 
secondly, further detailed description of state-business relations across Sub-Sahara 
African countries over time.  
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 Thus, the study of state business relations has been and continues to be an 
ontologically and epistemologically extremely heterogeneous field with alternate 
approaches being best suited to address the different sub-questions at hand. The problem 
statement and research question as noted above lend themselves to be examined by a 
broader historical and qualitative approach.  
 The discussion on state business relations in South Africa has been a hotly 
debated subject matter for several decades. The debate centered most prominently around 
the role of the apartheid state in the advancement of capitalism. Conventional political 
economists, referred to in South Africa as 'liberals', essentially argued that the South 
African state's interference in the economy had a retarding and distorting impact on 
economic development and growth. Horwitz (1967: 12) noted that ‘the polity has always 
sought its ideal and ideology – the white man's supremacy. The network of economic 
development had to follow accordingly’. In this sense, the private business sector was 
seen as ‘shackled by outworn feudal and racial consideration’ (Samuels, 1955: 16). The 
opposing argument was forwarded by radical structuralists and advanced the notion that 
South African economic growth was based on the purportedly highly functional nature of 
state and that there were indeed no central contradictions between political developments 
and the requirement of capital accumulation. In other words, the radicals maintained that 
the interests of the capitalist, capitalism and the apartheid state were in many ways 
closely related and intertwined, if not outright congruent. Johnstone (1976: 215) argued 
that ‘there has been something highly functional and causally significant about the 
relationship between the economic system and the system of racial domination’ and that 
the racial system should be conceptualized as ‘generated and determined by the economic 
system of which it formed a part’.  
 These were the two most fundamental positions in the so-called liberal-radical 
debate. While the overwhelming majority of both liberals and radical would subscribe the 
respective notions, there occurred nonetheless considerable difference within both camps. 
For example there was a huge debate amongst liberals as to whether black wages were 
too high or too low in relation to both human needs and productivity (Nattrass, 1991: 
660). The radicals on the other hand were for instance inconclusive whether South Africa 
could be more accurately described as a politico-economic system incorporating a reserve 
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and a capitalist mode of production (Wolpe, 1972), as a single capitalist system 
(Williams, 1975), or as a peripheral capitalist system in the world economy (Erwin and 
Webster, 1978). Either way, the debate between liberals and radicals concerned a broad 
array of issues including ‘distribution (between blacks and whites, wages and profits), 
capital accumulation, and how the path of economic growth was shaped (positively or 
negatively) by the institutions of apartheid’ (Nattrass, 1991: 666) and the role of business 
in the fight against apartheid. Furthermore, the two camps were also divided over 
methodological questions as the radicals accused the dominant neo-classical marginalist 
methodology of being unsuited for answering questions about the economic development 
of South Africa and the liberals blamed the radicals for a too narrow functionalist 
methodology and a lack of empirical evidence (ibid: 662-676).  
 The debate between liberals and radicals has really only taken off in the 1970s 
when radical thinkers reviewed the Oxford History of South Africa (Wilson and 
Thompson, 1969-1971), which drew on a number of liberal political, social and economic 
historiography and in turn provided both impetus and a target for the development of a 
radical critique. With fundamental reform and power sharing on the horizon by the early 
1990s, the debate became less ideological and it seemed like a middle ground seemed 
possible despite the occasional orthodox free market and old-style socialist calls. Nattrass 
(1994: 517) asserted that the debate has evolved to a point that the original liberal radical 
debate has by the mid-1990s become of ‘little more than historical interest’. Instead, the 
economic debate began to revolve around what is ‘practical and feasible’ as most thinkers 
‘accept that interventionist industrial policy can work’ but that the question is ‘whether it 
will work in South Africa’ (ibid: 532).  
1.5 Methodology and Scope 
The process of research chosen for this thesis is a qualitative analysis and as such comes 
invariably with a certain amount of subjectivity. This is particularly evident where some 
aspects are treated as an orphan or fall out of focus almost entirely. It could be argued that 
a lack of attention for example is given to the exclusion of non-whites in the first period, 
the ruling governments after the Pact and before the National Party governments or much 
of the political developments in the 1980s with the state of emergency and the change of 
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leadership in the National Party (NP) for instance. On the other hand, a number of aspects 
that are focused upon might be judged as receiving too much attention and at times going 
too far back in time. A historical analysis is not an exact science but the selection as and 
the weighting of the different points is chosen to the best of knowledge and assessment.  
The approach applied to the research question at hand has furthermore been 
informed by historical institutionalism in the sense that special attention is being given to 
the big diachronic processes that have evolved over time rather than one-time snapshots 
at particular moments. The underlying idea is to identify critical junctures in the 
development of state business relations in the South African mining sector.  
The sources employed are overwhelmingly secondary sources, most notably in 
relation to chapter two and three, while chapter four contains primary sources as well. 
This heavy reliance on secondary sources stems from the nature of the research question 
which spans after all a considerable lengthy period of time and is tailored towards a 
description, interpretation and understanding of the state-mining capital relationship. The 
research material consists of a number of different sources including books, magazines, 
essays, journal articles, statistics, statements of politicians and business leaders, 
interviews, websites and reports.  
 This thesis is focusing on the mining capital-state relationship because the 
nationalization debate initiated by the ANCYL is overwhelmingly about nationalizing the 
mining industry. Where deemed appropriate and useful for a better understanding, the 
analysis is extended to include aspects of the relationship between the state and capital in 
general as well. 
 The time period is divided into three broader eras demarcated by two critical 
junctures.  While the first juncture in the 1920s is straightforward in terms of its temporal 
location, the long 1970s require more elaboration. Most aspects of the state-business 
relations covered in the third chapter experienced, some to a lesser and some to a greater 
degree, fundamental changes. While most aspects materialized in the 1970s, some did so 
only by the mid-/late1980s. Therefore the second juncture discussed in chapter three 
spans a longer period than the first one to include the 1970s and the mid-/late1980s, for 
the sake of convenience labeled the ‘long 1970s’.  
The framework within which the different aspects of state-business relations are 
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being discussed follows an adapted and blended approach of Lipton (1985) and 
Yudelmann (1984). In here seminal work on capitalism and apartheid, Lipton discusses 
the changes of interests within the white oligarchy (including agricultural, mining and 
manufacturing capital and white labor) and the changing balance of the political struggle. 
Yudelmann’s treatises on the state, capital and the incorporation of organized labor on the 
South African gold mines cover a narrower time frame. In turn, this allows him a more 
detailed account of the interrelationship between state, capital and labor, which he 
organized in more chronologically defined sections.  
 The research purpose of this thesis is descriptive and as such aims to identify and 
categorize the main characteristics of the relationship between mining capital and the 
state. Answering the research question thus reveals where the relationship has come from, 
whether it has changed and where it stands today. This in turn also defines the limitations 
of this paper as the amount of discovering and measuring causal relations remains 
limited.  
1.6 Chapter Outline 
The second chapter looks at how the relationship between the state and mining capital 
evolved since the beginning of mining. While the main thrust is on gold mining since 
1886, references will be made to diamond mining as well since some of the characteristic 
features already emerged in the wake of the discovery of diamonds around Kimberley 
twenty years earlier. The main focus will be on the mining industry itself and by what 
factors it was structured, the division between mining and non-mining capital, the 
organization of labor in terms of both horizontal and vertical control as well as 
development within the state, most notably the Afrikaans-English cleavage. The 
conclusion at the end recapitulates the major points being made in the chapter and argues 
that during the 1920s a shift of power from mining to non-mining interests occurred.  
 The third chapter continues along much the same lines as chapter two by focusing 
on primarily mining related aspects such as the economics of mining which experienced a 
fundamental change with the abolition of the internationally fixed gold price in the wake 
of the Nixon shock and the growing convergence between the previously antagonistic 
factions of capital. Furthermore, the section on labor related issues addresses namely the 
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color bar, which was finally abolished in 1986 amidst fierce (white) union protests and 
the continuance of the migrant labor system. Last but not least, state related aspects such 
as the expansion of apartheid and its costs, the changing Afrikaans-English cleavage and 
the growing opposition to the apartheid state are being discussed. While most factors 
covered in this chapter experienced, some to a lesser and some to a greater degree, 
fundamental changes in the 1970s, some materialized only by the mid-/late1980s but 
were nonetheless already becoming apparent in the 1970s (at least in retrospect). The 
conclusion shows that the long 1970s mark a turnaround shift in the state-mining capital 
relations in favor of the mining industry.  
 The fourth chapter covers the post-apartheid period since 1994 until today and 
completes the mining related aspects by focusing on the role of mining in the South 
African economy today, the crucial processes of corporate restructuring and offshore 
listings, the new mineral mix2, the rise of BEE and the implementation of the mining 
charter. On labor related issues, the features of the post-apartheid labor system will be 
discussed as the excess demand for low-wage labor was replaced by a shortage of skilled 
labor, the migrant labor system was preserved and new patterns of exclusion arose. 
Additionally, the impact of trade unions in the tripartite alliance (Cosatu, ANC and 
SACP) as well as in corporatist structures will be assessed. Last but not least, the section 
on mainly state related aspects covers the ending of inner-white cleavages (as far as the 
state-mining business relationship is concerned), the rise of the ANC, macro-economic 
policies and the debate on the nationalization of mines. 
 The fifth and concluding chapter recalls the research question and restates the 
conclusions derived from each of the three preceding chapters 2-4. It will be shown that 
the central characteristic of state business relations remained intact but evolved over time 
as the balance of power between the state and mining capital has shifted in the 1920s and 
the long 1970s. After recalling the recent developments in post-apartheid South Africa, 
the nationalization debate will be contextualized in the historical background of state-
mining capital relations. It will then be argued that nationalization of the ANCYL kind is 
not informed to a great extent by a historical understanding of the mining capital-state 
                                                 
2 Mining mix refers to the composite mix of minerals being extracted in a given country, analogous to the  
energy mix. 
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relations and that as a result such a concept of nationalization is ceteris paribus highly 
unlikely to materialize.  
 Each chapter follows the same structure by focusing on the changing dynamics 
related to capital, labor and the state.  
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2 The 1920s conjuncture 
This chapter assesses the relationship between mining capital and the state from the 
inception of mining in South Africa until the 1920s. While the discovery of diamonds in 
1867 started the process of industrialization it was not until the discovery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand in 1886 that really took the country onto the next stage. The focus will 
therefore be on gold. The beginning of gold mining in the late 1880s happened at a time 
when South Africa was not yet unified but consisted of four colonies, two British (the 
Cape and Natal) and two Boer republics (the Orange Free State and Transvaal). Prior to 
Union, legislation and regulations varied thus regionally even though they generally 
followed similar patterns and consequently after Union, political power was much more 
centralized. Unless otherwise noted, regulations prior to Union refer to those of the state 
of Transvaal. Owed to the centrality of both the color bar and the migrant labor system, 
labor issues will be covered right after an introduction into the economics of early mining 
and a discussion of the tension between mining and non-mining capital, followed by a 
discussion on how it impacted the state.  
 The main point of this chapter – drawing on these three factors - suggests that the 
1920s marked a shift in the relation between mining capital and the state. It shows that 
neither of the two was able to dominate each other wholly but that the overall balance of 
power changed at the expense of the mining industry. This assessment rests largely on the 
two findings that the struggle over the color bar was resolved against the interests of the 
mining houses and that the political ascension of the Afrikaner nationalists led to a shift 
of political power from mining to non-mining capital. 
2.1 Capital 
This section on mining capital covers firstly the economics of early mining capital in 
South Africa with its characteristic geological features, the nature of gold and its unique 
function in international financial markets as well as the crucial role of huge capital and 
labor requirements to South Africa’s early industrialization. Secondly, the tensions 
between non-mining and mining capital will be highlighted with regards to the respective 
economic sectors and policy preferences.  
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2.1.1 The economics of early mining  
Africans and by the 1860s whites alike, had been extracting small amounts of copper, 
iron and gold in various parts of southern Africa for over a millennium. The first mineral 
boom of wide-ranging and long-term significance was the discovery of diamonds in and 
around Kimberley. By 1872, 20'000 whites and 30'000 blacks converged in the area 
compared to 5'000 people, black and white, by late 1870 (Thompson, 1990: 114). This 
amounts to a tenfold increase of the total population over a period of not even two years. 
The four locations in which diamonds had crystallized, so-called (volcanic) pipes that 
would become mines, were divided up into a very large number of claims (470 in the 
'Kimberley mine' alone) which at one time were split up among 1'600 owners (Ross, 
1999: 54-55). As the deepening of the anarchic and chaotic excavations progressed, over 
half of the mines became unworkable due to collapsing roadways, mounds of earth and 
floodings (Thompson, 1990: 116). The consolidation of the small claims into larger 
companies was driven by a small number of individuals, most notably Barney Barnato, 
Alfred Beit and Cecil Rhodes and culminated in the establishment of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines in 1888 which acquired a monopoly of the diamond production in 
the area (ibid: 116-117). As gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, many of 
those with successful investments in diamonds were well placed to shift over into gold-
mining and indeed quickly won significant levels of ownership (Handley, 2008: 32).  
 The significance of the mineral discoveries for the development of the South 
African economy can hardly be understated. It was in a sense the conditio sine qua no as 
both gold and diamonds provided the wealth that ‘transformed South Africa from an 
undeveloped, largely subsistence economy into the most industrialized, modern state in 
Africa’ (Lipton, 1985: 111). The gold industry was the engine of growth, the major 
foreign exchange earner, employer of growing significance and a major contributor to 
government revenues. By 1930, the total value of minerals produced in South Africa 
made up £59 million, of which £54 million alone was coming from mainly gold but also 
diamonds while coal accounted for most of the rest (Jones and Müller, 1992: 59-60). The 
South African gold mines expanded production from an annualized average output of 
0.13 million fine ounces in the period from 1885-89, to 6.3 (million fine ounces) between 
1905-09, to 8.14 in 1920-21 and to 11.04 in 1930-32 (Feinstein, 2005: 105). The first 
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available estimates of the national income in 1911 show that gold made up almost 20 
percent of the entire GDP and in the period from 1920 to 1939 oscillated between 12 and 
18 percent (ibid: 107). In terms of annual average exports, gold contributed between 33 
and 53 percent to exports on a value basis between 1910 and 1930 (ibid: 102). For 
comparison, the value of diamond exports amounted to 8.7 percent in 1910, 6.3 in 1920 
and 3.2 in 1930 (Jones and Müller, 1992: 48). Through taxation and import duties on 
essential mining equipment the state has profited enormously from the mineral 
revolution: state revenue from gold mining amounted to 7 percent of total state revenue in 
1911, 8 percent in 1921 and 5.8 percent in 1930 (Yudelman, 1984: 241). Within a very 
short period of time since the opening of the mines the demand for labor increased 
enormously. By 1892 some 25'000 Africans were employed on the Rand and by the end 
of the decade this number increased to almost 100'000 (Ross, 1999: 66). The grand total 
of labor (black and white) on the mines totaled 174'000 in 1911 and 226'000 in 1931 
(Lipton, 1985: 385). Because of its dominant and pioneering role, the mines exerted a 
profound impact on the socio-economic organization of the South African society in 
general and in particular with regards to labor relations most notably in terms of the job 
bar, migrant labor and the compound system. These institutional forms in turn were 
shaped by the peculiar economics of gold mining.  
 Gold mining in South Africa was structured by three distinct factors relating to the 
geological characteristics of gold on the Rand, the price of gold and the high overhead 
costs (Handley, 2008: 34). First, the geology of the Rand mines contained ‘low-grade ore, 
thinly and unevenly spread along a wide surface and at great depth’ (Lipton, 1985: 110). 
The gold was not easily accessible like the alluvial deposits in California and Australia 
but occurred as tiny particles embedded in huge quantities of hard rock in reefs that 
extended at an angle from the surface to depths of several hundred and even thousand 
meters. The outcrops of the reefs were quickly exhausted and from the early 1890s on 
replaced by deep-level mining, which was employed in over half the mines by 1913 and 
reached levels of between 600 and 1'200 meters below surface (Feinstein, 2005: 101). 
This made the process of extracting gold a lengthy and costly one, requiring huge 
amounts of capital and labor. Second, gold was not just another commodity after all it 
played a unique role in international finance as the world's money supply was based on it. 
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The mining houses were operating in a market with a (theoretically) unlimited demand at 
a fixed price. In turn, the profits to be made were directly related to the cost of production 
and the easiest to cut was labor cost. Since the South African pound (the rand was only 
introduced in 1961) was historically linked to the British pound and the vast majority of 
South Africa's gold was sold in London (in 1914 Britain effectively stopped and in 1919 
officially prohibited the export of gold), the movements of the British pound were of 
some significance (Jones and Müller, 1992: 54). Following the First World War (WWI), 
Britain allowed the sterling to float and only returned to the gold standard in 1925 at a 
fixed price of 4.25 pounds per ounce, giving the gold mines a temporary boost (Feinstein, 
2005: 94). Third, the opening of new mines and the continuing development of existing 
mines required huge investments. These high overhead costs further increased the already 
high cost sensitivity of the industry because it was impossible to pass on the increasing 
costs to costumers via higher prices. Furthermore, the enormous demand for capital led to 
the domination of the industry by a few giant companies.  
 These so-called mining 'houses' were not competing over customers or market-
share, due to the indefinite demand and a fixed price, but could  instead cooperate in a 
number of areas, most notably labor costs, technical advances and best practices (ibid: 
104). The first gold house was established within a year of the discovery by Hermann 
Eckstein, nicknamed 'The Corner House' (later Rand Mines and now Randgold and 
Exploration Limited) (Jones and Müller, 1992: 50). He was followed by Rhodes (and 
Rudd) with Consolidated Gold Fields, the Barnato brothers with Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Company (JCI), the General Mining and Finance Corporation 
as well as Goerz (which later became Union Corporation) (ibid). Ernest Oppenheimer 
founded Anglo American Corporation (AAC) in 1917 and in 1933 the group of seven was 
completed by AngloTransvaal Consolidated Investment. The modern Chamber of Mines 
(COM), the mining industry association, was established in 1889 to promote and protect 
the interests of the mining industry, disseminate statistical information and lobby for 
favorable legislative measures (Chamber of Mines, 2010). The group organization had 
great advantages as it relieved the mining houses of much administrative work, presented 
economies of scale through cooperative sourcing and kept them abreast with the latest 
technological developments (Jones and Müller, 1992: 50). The houses also worked 
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together in order to reduce costs such as shaft sinking, rock drilling and mine 
administration. The MacArthur-Forrest process, providing a cost-effective solution to the 
extraction of gold out of low-grade ore, is an example where such technical advances 
quickly diffused and allowed the entire industry to become highly efficient (Feinstein, 
2005: 102-103).  
2.1.2 Mining and non-mining capital 
According to Davies et al. (1976: 8), the 1922 Rand Rebellion created the conditions 
which represented the political and ideological crisis point that undermined the dominant 
position of mining capital. In turn, in 1924 national capital (as opposed to international 
capital) was able to achieve a hegemonic position in an ‘alliance with the new petty 
bourgeoisie and […] strata of white and black wage earning classes’ (ibid: 9). Thus, the 
development of South African capital can be divided into the pre-1924 period of 
international capital which was engaged in mining and the post-1924 period (until 1948) 
of national capital engaged in manufacturing and agriculture (Bozzoli, 1978: 43). The 
labels international and national are alternatively referred to as 'local', 'metropolitan', 
'foreign' and 'imperial' and are not primarily based on passport, residence, birthplace or 
other characteristics of the owners. Bienefeld and Innes (1976: 38) conceptualize the dual 
nature of capital as emanating from the ‘social-political forces which guarantee the legal 
and institutional conditions necessary for the reproduction of capital’ as well as based on 
the nature of ‘the inducement necessary for capital to be invested’. The latter refers to the 
distinction between externally and internally oriented economic activities. In the first 
decades of mining in South Africa, mining capital has been the textbook example of 
international capital insofar as its overriding interest was maximum extraction of 
internationally tradeable commodities at minimum input (in terms of international 
purchasing power) (ibid: 35). Nonetheless, it is possible to theoretically conceive 
externally oriented capital to be locally based. At the beginning of mining however, 
mining capital was indeed international both in terms of its social base as well as its 
outlook. The division of different fractions of capital along these lines coincided in the 
period under consideration with the ethnic division between Afrikaner and English 
capital.  
 Historically, ethnic identifications within the white settler community have 
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emerged relatively fast. The split between Afrikaners and Englishmen can be traced back 
to the early centuries of white colonization in South Africa. Thompson (1990: 112) argues 
that ‘most of the descendants of the seventeenth and eighteenth century settlers identified 
themselves as Afrikaners, with their social distinctive language, religious affiliation, 
historical consciousness and social network, whereas nearly all of the nineteenth century 
white immigrants (most of whom came from Britain), kept aloof from Afrikaners, 
despised their language and culture, and underestimated their achievements’. The 
differences were not just ethnic and cultural but were additionally rooted in different 
occupations and classes as well. At the beginning of mining activities, most Afrikaners 
worked and lived in a rural environment while most English speaking immigrants were 
townspeople (Handley, 2008: 32).  
 In contrast to much of the rest of the African continent, early forms of capitalist 
development took place in South Africa in the form of surplus extraction through rent as 
black South Africans were dispossessed of their land (Morris, 1982: 44). However, it was 
not until the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the Rand that really ignited 
the development of a capitalist class in the process of which Afrikaners and Africans were 
marginalized from the beginning unlike the Europeans who concentrated the ‘ownership 
of the numerous and overlapping diamond claims at an early stage’ in their hands 
(Greenberg, 1980: 37). By the late 1870s, the tiny claims had developed into huge open 
pits making the use of heavy and expensive machinery necessary for further mining. 
Individual claimholders gave way to companies which were able to raise the necessary 
capital. Many who profited in the diamond mining were well placed to proceed onto the 
goldfields of the Rand and to quickly secure significant levels of ownership over what 
would become profitable gold-mining companies. The significant levels of required 
capital and technical expertise could not be met by the local supply. Except for a few 
diamond magnates aside there was little local capital to be had and thus much of the 
financing came from overseas (Handley, 2008: 33). Consequently, the new gold-mining 
industry was dominated by foreigners, also called 'uitlanders'. Indeed, in the early 1890s 
no Afrikaner held any financial interest in a mine (Clark, 1994: 19). Likewise, the service 
industry which grew around the gold mines was dominated by foreigners who were better 
capitalized and educated so that ‘by the mid-1890s […] most Afrikaners and African 
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enterprises were being crushed out of business by industrial enterprises run by the mining 
companies’ (Thompson, 1990: 121-122). According to Murray (1982: 129) less than 15 
percent of shares were held in South Africa. This also reflects British investments, which 
rose from £16m in 1879 to £34m in 1884 and £351m in 1911 (Bienefeld and Innes, 1976: 
40). All in all, the development towards international capital both in terms of the social-
political base and the externally oriented outlook established the economic dominance of 
English-speaking capitalists in South Africa. Clark (1994: 12) concludes that this 
constituted the origins for conflicts over economic power along ethnic lines.  
 In addition to the ethnic dimension it is possible to identify the economic 
foundation of political positions taken by various sections of capital in South Africa 
following the above introduced distinction between international and national capital. In 
its efforts to extract the greatest amount of international purchasing power from minerals 
by way of expending the least possible locally, mining capital found itself in opposition 
to national, non-mining, interests which ‘pressed very hard to appropriate a share of that 
purchasing power’ (Bienefeld and Innes, 1976: 45). Initially non-mining capital was able 
to profit from the foreign exchange earning mining industry directly by servicing the 
mining industry with food and other consumption needs and indirectly by organizing 
import and trade of goods required by the mining industry. However, these were 
relatively minor gains compared to the wealth produced by the mines and soon demands 
arose to ‘tax or otherwise retain a further portion of this international purchasing power in 
order to bring about a greater flow of commodities to South Africa, and in order to give 
more of the power to command such commodities to the non-mining community’ (ibid: 
42). The whole range of measures aimed at fostering local industrialization went beyond 
a mere redistribution of profits and included ‘ISCOR3, railway rating policies, 
agricultural subsidization, differential taxation of the gold-mining industry and 
protection’ (Kaplan, 1976: 73). These were fiercely contested by ‘gold mining and import 
oriented commercial capitals’ (international capital) on the one hand and ‘industrial and 
agricultural capitals’ (national capital) on the other hand (ibid).  
 The conflicting interests of the different sections of capital had been a 
                                                 
3 Iron and Steel Cooperation, a formerly South African parastatal, established by the Iron and Steel Industry 
Act of 1928 and now owned by Arcelor-Mittal. 
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contributing factor to the Anglo-Boer War after which British control (supporting 
international capital) was expanded. Little changed for the dominant English-speaking 
business class who ‘dominated the twentieth century political economy of South Africa as 
they had the nineteenth’ after Union in 1910 (Marks and Trapido, 1987: 2-3). Despite lip 
services to the principle of protectionism, the new government of the Union had left 
manufacturers largely disillusioned (Bozzoli, 1975: 200). During WWI, the 
manufacturing industry was making significant progress. The number of factories rose 
from roughly 4000 to almost 7000 between 1915/16 and 1919/20 and employment grew 
by 73% (Kaplan, 1976: 74). Industrial production rose from £22m in 1910/11 to 40£ in 
1915/16 and £60m in 1917/18, while the contribution of manufacturing over the same 
period to the national income rose from 7 percent to 10 percent (Bienefeld and Innes, 
1976: 46). The boom period during the war was followed by a severe slump as normal 
trading pattern resumed and the industrial countries refilled the spaces they had left 
during the war. Even though the principle of protectionism gained ground and 
manufacturing interests had become powerful, it was not yet powerful enough and by 
1922 again expressed feelings of disillusionment about the gap between governmental 
rhetoric and action arguing that ‘an influential section of the cabinet is opposed to 
protection’ (Bozzoli, 1975: 211). According to Bienefeld and Innes (1976: 44) the ‘whole 
decade of the twenties was characterized by struggles between mining and non-mining 
interests’ and it was not until 1924 that the balance tilted towards non-mining interests, 
when they seized control of the state and strengthened protectionist measures. Bozzoli 
(1975: 203) sees the main reason behind this shift of power in the decline of financial 
domination of British imperialism after WWI, which meant the gradual removal of a 
major force opposing protectionist measure in countries like South Africa.  
 The other capitalist sector which is usually pictured in opposition to mining 
capital over a number of policies was the agricultural sector. As Morris (1976: 293) puts 
it, ‘capitalist agriculture in the 20th century emerged […] from a 'semi-feudal' system’. In 
the pre-industrial era, the agricultural sector (at least the most successful part of it) 
employed field slaves whose emancipation between 1834 and 1838, together with 
military conquest of African polities between 1832 and 1879, added large numbers to the 
rural labor force (Trapido, 1971: 314). Nonetheless, numerous laws and regulations 
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passed by the various South African governments had prevented the development of a 
free labor market and indeed preserved feudal features, such as a tied to the land labor 
force on white farms and a black sector that was kept in an undeveloped state, well into 
the 20th century despite the transition of agriculture into a capitalist system (Lipton, 1985: 
85).  
2.2 Labor  
Given the fact that the price of gold was fixed and that most capital goods had to be 
imported, the only way for mining houses to directly influence profitability was through 
reduction of labor costs. As a result, labor relations became crucial for mining interests. 
Mining capital supported measures that ensured a constant flow of cheap and unskilled 
black labor. On the other hand, protection and entrenchment of white labor's privileges 
ran counter their interests of reducing labor costs. Thus, labor policies of the time were 
only partially (albeit in a crucial instance) in the line of mining capital's interests. Lipton 
(1985) divides the extensive system of control over black labor and privileging white 
labor into: a) controls over movement/horizontal controls; b) controls over the allocation 
of jobs/vertical controls; c) other measures restricting workers' rights (ibid: 18). 
Horizontal controls were based on the conviction that black labor should be allowed in 
towns solely to cater for the needs of whites. They encompassed the migrant labor system 
from the black reserves (Bantustans) and foreign countries to the mines as well as the 
associated land and pass laws. Vertical controls describe the job (color) bar which 
reserved specific (skilled) jobs for whites only and/or provided a binding employment 
ratio of white to black workers. The other measures of controlling and restricting workers' 
rights were highlighted in the compound system of housing the African migrant workers. 
It originated at the Kimberley diamond mines and was aimed at reducing the risk of theft. 
The system was soon and most notably on the Witwatersrand extended to ensure efficient 
controlling and screening of the work force. Along those lines, the following pages will 
elaborate on the horizontal controls, the vertical controls and the compound system.   
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2.2.1 Vertical controls - the job color bar 
2.2.1.1 Origins 
The first statutory color bar was established in Transvaal in 1883 and came about as a 
result of a complex set of reasons. Katz (1999: 97) identifies safety, race and class 
reasons as the main drivers whose exact proportionate impact on the emergence of the 
color bar is impossible to determine or quantify. 
 In 1892 the Transvaal government appointed Joseph Adolf Klimke as the State 
Mining Engineer. Part of his duties was to draw up mining resolutions which would 
enhance safety in mines both on the surface and underground as well as protecting the 
lives of the mineworkers. The first available figures in 1893 on mine related accidents 
revealed disastrous proportions in international comparisons and legitimized Klimke's 
efforts to introduce safety regulations. Katz (1999: 84) shows that Klimke singled out the 
use of dynamite in combination with the employment of black labor and their handling of 
dynamite as the principal cause of accidents. Arguing that Africans needed to be 
protected from themselves, their incompetence and their ignorance, Klimke drew up the 
draft regulation single-handedly without consulting the mining community. The amended 
bill came into force in September 1883 and ‘introduced long-overdue safety measures 
and the first explicit colour bar, which stipulated that no African, Asian or Coloured 
might prepare charges, load drill holes or set fire to fuses’ (Simons and Simons, 1969: 
55). The other industrial color bar, as laid down in amended regulations of 1896, 
concerned the certification of winding engine drivers, a job reserved for white workers 
only. Similar to the regulations related to blasting, the engine drivers safety regulations 
were legitimized on safety grounds and underpinned by racist deliberations ‘in that it held 
Africans to be child-like and inferior to whites’ (Katz, 1999: 84). The difference with 
these amendments was that they were initiated by the Transvaal Engine Drivers' 
Association which wanted the work to be executed by certified workmen and its 
members only (Katz, 1999: 90). At the same time the amended regulation of 1896 
dropped the earlier explicit racial provision of the blasting regulation while leaving it on a 
de facto basis intact. 
 Actual mining work and the supervision and operation of machinery were the two 
general spheres of skilled labor in the mines. Skilled work was initially confined to white 
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labor, simply because the only supply of skilled labor was white. In the long run though, 
unskilled and, in due time, semi-skilled and even skilled white labor was placed in a 
‘situation of extreme structural insecurity’ characterized by ‘proletarianisation’4 of white 
labor and the ‘ultra-exploitability’5 of black labor (Johnstone, 1976: 57-64). Nonetheless 
the real competition for white labor in the 1890s was not ‘ultra-exploitable’ black migrant 
labor but ‘informally-trained, long-service Africans, Indians, and Coloureds’ (Katz, 1999: 
73) and the competition at that time was felt (if justifiably or not is in the end of little 
difference) mainly by the lower two grades of firemen and stationary engine drivers. 
Thus, white labor was in favor of a statutory color bar on various grounds. It increased 
first of all job security for the un-skilled and semi-skilled strata of white labor in the 
medium term against (future) competition of cheaper non-white workers and secondly, 
strengthened their bargaining position vis-à-vis the employers. 
 The mining magnates shared the underlying racist views towards non-whites and 
social Darwinist beliefs in the biological superiority of whites. Indeed, Katz (1999: 79-
83) illustrates that the support for the racial ordering of production on the mines was 
supported by American engineers and managers who, at the time, were key in the Rand 
management structure. Their fostering of the racial division of labor was inspired by their 
experience in the El Callao mine in Venezuela and their values, notably a commitment to 
white superiority. On a principal level, the mining houses were unhappy about the color 
bar which they perceived as unduly interference in private business matters, namely the 
competence of the employer to employ the worker of his choice and his remuneration 
(Katz, 1999: 91). However, the few reservations they had were more of theoretical nature, 
not least because they saw the certification of only whites as competent workers merely 
as regularizing ‘the status quo’ and reinforcing ‘their own cultural - and racist - 
preferences’ (Katz, 1999: 96).  
                                                 
4 In this line of argument, white labor is seen as fully proletarianized working year-round as opposed to 
black labor who retained some means of subsistence and economic independence in the reserve areas. Thus 
white labor is perceived as structurally more dependent on wage labor. 
5 Extra-exploitability of black labor increases the structural insecurity of white labor by providing a large 
supply of cheap and unskilled labor, thereby offering employers the opportunity to replace expensive white 
labor with cheap black labor.  
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2.2.1.2 Evolution  
The principal divisions over the job color bar thus became already apparent in the 
formative years of gold mining even though they didn't occupy the center stage yet. This 
would change over the course of the years with the entrenchment and extension of the 
color bar on the one hand and the little scope mining capital structurally enjoyed in 
increasing profitability on the other hand. 
 The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 had a disastrous effect on the Johannesburg 
goldfields. The war disrupted production and when it came to an end, the mines found 
themselves desperately short of unskilled labor. Among the many reasons, Wilson (1972: 
4) explicitly cites the reduction of wages (thus making railway work, road building, farm 
work and other jobs more attractive) and the deplorable working conditions as 
disincentives for African labor to return to the mines in sufficient numbers. In order to fill 
this gap, Chinese labor was intermittently imported between 1904 and 1910. This was 
only possible for the mining houses at the cost of buying off white labor with a number of 
concessions. These included restrictions on the use of the imported labor, namely its 
confinement to compounds, compulsory repatriation upon the termination of the contract 
and ‘above all the prohibition of the employment of Chinese in an enumerated list of 
capacities, which obviated the risk of their ever competing with skilled or semi-skilled 
whites’ (Denoon, 1967: 490). The Chinese were excluded from over fifty separate skilled 
trades and occupations which, though applicable to Chinese labor only (and not to 
African labor), represented a considerable broadening of the color bar (Feinstein, 2005: 
75).  
 Upon rising labor costs (partially caused by the beginning repatriation of the 
Chinese labor), the mining houses retrenched workers, reduced wages and implicitly 
threatened to replace white with African labor. This deterioration of working conditions 
for white workers led to the first major strike on the Rand lasting from May to July 1907 
(Yudelman, 1984: 72-73). In the meantime, the state had become increasingly aware of 
the acute problems associated with white (in particular Afrikaner) unemployment which 
it attempted to alleviate through reduced wages. Furthermore, the state was concerned 
about its revenues from profitable mining and largely followed the demands of the 
mining houses, leading Yudelmann (1982: 257) to describe this relationship as a 
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‘marriage’. Despite these setbacks, white labor was able to cause the government to insist 
on ‘a definite ratio in mining of 'civilised labour' to indentured natives’ (Walker and 
Weinbren, 1961: 24). Thus, Wilson (1972: 8) argues that overall, the white miners on the 
Rand were able to ‘entrench themselves firmly in their position of privilege’ as the labor 
aristocracy. 
 One year after the Union was formed in 1910, the new South African parliament 
addressed the concerns of white skilled labor to preserve their vested privileges. The 
Mines and Works Act of 1911 regulated the ‘working and inspections of mines, work, and 
machinery’ and, of particular importance with regards to the color bar, ‘gave the Minister 
of Mines power to frame regulations, particularly for the safety of mining operations’ 
(Feinstein, 2005: 75). The act was not discriminatory per se but through regulations of 
Smuts, then Minister of Mines, the color bars on the mines were clarified and extended 
(Alexander, 2000: 10). These regulations were supported and opposed by white labor and 
mining capital respectively for reasons highlighted above. Yudelmann (1984: 88) shows 
that the color bar regulations were only some of many other disputes (such as wages, 
working hours, Sunday work) between capital and labor and not even the major one. This 
corroborates the fact that the color bar has not been on top of the white labor's agenda so 
far. However, the ever growing racial division, particularly in material terms (the cultural 
cleavages having been firmly established for a long time), was ‘reflected in, and probably 
boosted by’ (Alexander, 2000: 10) the industrial conflicts over the next fifteen years. 
During the 1913 and 1914 strikes, the color bar became especially important as an 
‘extremely potent political symbol’ (Yudelman, 1984: 145).  
 Developments during WWI would once and for all cause color bar regulations to 
gain center stage. Up until then, the color bar had stood on two pillars. Firstly, the 
discriminatory regulations provided for by the Mines and Works Act of 1911 (usually 
referred to as the statutory, or legislative, color bar) protected about two-thirds of white 
miners in about 35 skilled occupations (Johnstone, 1976: 70). Secondly, the customary 
color bar (protecting another 20 less skilled occupations) reserved jobs for whites mainly 
on historical, cultural and racist grounds and was a purely informal agreement between 
capital and labor. During the war and owing to the fact that many miners had joined the 
armed forces (thus once again leading to a shortage of labor supply), the mining 
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companies began to erode the essence of the customary color bar by elevating non-white 
qualified workers into jobs formerly occupied by whites (Yudelman, 1984: 146). 
Simultaneously, and re-enforcing the advancement of black labor, technological 
innovations furthered job fragmentation and mechanization (sometimes also referred to as 
deskilling) which in turn increased the competition for whites by blacks. On the 
insistence of the white unions, the color bar regulations were buttressed by the Status 
Quo Agreement between capital and white labor, reluctantly agreed to by the mining 
houses (Lipton, 1985: 112). The agreement listed 19 occupations reserved for whites 
(Walshe, 1970: 75) and froze the black to white ratio average in the industry to 7.4 to 1 
(Hazlett, 2008).  
2.2.1.3 Consolidation 
After WWI, the combined impact of the postwar recession, accompanied by a general rise 
of the price level (creating stagflation), and a significant fall of the gold price exacerbated 
the continuing cost crisis in the mining industry (Yudelman, 1984: 165). From October 
1919 to December 1921 the gold price fell by 30% (Alexander, 2000: 11) while the 
working costs had risen by 30% from 1915 to 1920 (Lipton, 1985: 113). Against this 
backdrop, the Chamber of Mines announced  a plan in December 1921 to shed two 
thousand white workers in semi-skilled occupations and replace them with Africans 
(Hazlett, 2008), in essence denouncing the Status Quo Agreement by increasing the black 
to white ratio. The ensuing strike started on January 10, 1922 and lasted until March 16, 
1922 (Alexander, 2000: 11). The Rand Rebellion, as it became later known, was crushed 
by the state with seven thousand troops, including tanks, artillery, and air support and 
reportedly causing 250 casualties (Hazlett, 2008). The South African Party government 
permitted the mining industry to erode the color bar and increase the ratio of black to 
white workers. In addition, in 1923, the Chamber of Mines successfully challenged the 
legality of the statutory color bar in the courts, which declared the Mines and Works Act 
ultra vires (Lipton, 1985). As a result, the black white ratio, oscillating between 8-9 to 1 
between 1910-1918, rose to 11.4 Africans to 1 white and was back at 8.8 only in 1929 
(Yudelman, 1984: 191). A third of white workers lost their jobs, while the others had their 
wages reduced, and overall working costs decreased again by almost 20% compared to 
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the immediate pre-crisis costs (Lipton, 1985: 114). Alexander (2000: 11) shows that the 
government, in an attempt to appease white labor, introduced the Apprenticeship Act of 
1923 which set educational qualifications for apprenticeships in numerous trades, thereby 
giving white workers a secure position.6 A rising job bar and less employment at reduced 
wages: labor clearly lost the battle. 
 However, labor did not lose the war. To the contrary, as Wilson (1972: 11) 
highlights, the rebellion ‘entrenched the colour bar more firmly than ever before not only 
in the mines but in the economy as a whole’. In the landmark 1924 election, the previous 
government, headed by Smuts, was tossed out in a ‘'white backlash' over the suppression 
of the Rand Rebellion’ (Hazlett, 2008). The newly elected, so-called Pact government 
between the National Party (representing the interests of rural Afrikaners, small property 
owners and unskilled, urban Afrikaner workers) and the Labour Party (mainly supported 
by the poorer strata of urban, English speaking immigrants) pursued more extensively 
and systematically the so-called ‘civilized labor’ policy, consistently favoring white over 
black labor. The events of 1922-24 also led the mine owners to realize ‘that the job bar 
was 'simply not an agenda item', and acquiesced in it’ (Lipton, 1985: 115). The color bar 
was reestablished and more firmly entrenched in the Amendment to the Mines and Works 
Act of 1926. Until the mid 1970s, the job bar was never again ‘successfully contested 
since the interests of white labour predominated in the deliberations of successive 
parliamentary administrations’ (Dollery, 1990: 120).  
2.2.2 Horizontal controls – the migrant labor system 
According to Levy (1982: 49) the workforce on the gold mines had been ‘transient and 
migrant rather than permanent and proletarianized’ from the outset. The same certainly 
accounts for the labor force on the diamond fields, where the first migrant workers sought 
employment, as well. Migrant labor as such predates the discovery of gold and diamond 
but both qualitatively and quantitatively, mining would put migrant labor on an entirely 
new level by organizing it systematically.  
                                                 
6 The principal legislative outcome of the Rand Rebellion was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924  
which established industrial councils, consisting of representatives of labor and capital, as the main 
mechanism of preventing future potential labor disputes (Alexander, 2000: 11). However, given its relative 
minor direct impact on the color bar it is not being elaborated on any further here. For references see 
Alexander (2000), Feinstein (2005), Johnstone (1976), Lipton (1984), Wilson (1972), Yudelmann (1984).  
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2.2.2.1 Foundations 
Labor shortages have been a recurrent theme in South African history and migrant labor 
existed well before the emergence of mining. Before the discovery of diamonds in 
Kimberley wage labor without colonial coercion was pursued for example on farms and 
public work. The motivations to earn cash were manifold and included bride-wealth, 
agricultural equipment (e.g. ploughs) and guns. Nonetheless, labor was chronically short, 
especially so at the beginning of mining (Prothero, 1974: 384). Between 1871 and 1875 
each year between 50'000 and 80'00 Africans arrived at and left the mines in Kimberley 
respectively (Turrell, 1987: 19). On the Rand, the first shaft was sunk in 1888 and by 
1895 some 51'000 African miners were employed. This number would increase to some 
97'000 in 1899 (Hanson, 1996: 163) and 224'000 in 1920 (Jeeves, 1985: 266). Despite 
these substantial flows, the industry's need for cheap labor was hardly ever met. During 
the first few years of gold mining, the mine owners experienced their greatest labor 
shortages and ‘encountered serious resistance to recruitment, and a high level of 
desertions by those migrants who reached the mines’ (Levy, 1982: 34). Given their 
subjection to an internationally set gold price, relatively high white labor wages (due to 
the color bar), high equipment and stores costs, unfavorable tariffs and taxes as well as 
diminishing returns in the low grade ore, the mine owners had little influence over costs 
outside their relations with black labor (Lipton, 1985: 119) .  
This made the efficient and effective management of labor all the more important. 
Introducing and extending a system of migrant labor thus served two main goals for the 
mining industry. On the on hand, it secured a steady supply of unskilled labor and on the 
other hand, reduced the cost of African wages. Despite recurring and concerted efforts on 
the part of the mining industry to centralize and control the labor market, recruiting 
remained an ‘unstable, expensive, conflict-ridden enterprise’ (Jeeves, 1985: 13) until the 
1920s. Before that, the situation was characterized by competition over labor between the 
mines, a lack of control over the labor market due to the strength of independent 
recruiters and contractors as well as competition with other forms of employment, most 
notably farms and households. Independent recruiters dominated the recruitment of the 
South African labor market and had vested interests in a competitive environment putting 
them in opposition to the mining houses which were, though initially not unanimously, 
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working towards a centralized, monopsonistic labor recruitment system (Denoon, 1967: 
482). The independent recruiters were operating on an individually small scale and 
remained largely unregulated throughout the 1890s. First legislation to control and 
supervise the anarchical situation was introduced in the Cape in 1899 and in Transvaal in 
1907. However, it would take a while until the state(s) had the capacity to actually 
enforce the rules (Jeeves, 1985: 18).  
The mining houses, eager to centralize and control this crucial aspect of the labor 
market were facing at once internal division as well as opposition from the farmers (ibid: 
15). The Chamber of Mines, established in 1889, was assigned the task of promoting and 
protecting the mining interests, including the delicate coordination of labor policies. 
However, during the 1890s there was much less coordination than competition. The 
cheapest and easiest recruiting took place on the spot in the form of poaching on the 
mines of competing mining houses. Pass laws in 1896 were intended to curb the 
‘stealing’ of workers but were not very effective (Jeeves, 1985: 43). Growing awareness 
on the part of the Chamber of Mines with regards to sub-optimal outcomes of the existing 
configuration of recruitment led the Chamber to establish its own recruiting organization, 
the Rand Native Labour Association (Wilson, 1972: 3). On the mines, headhunting for 
mineworkers continued unabated and in 1900 the mining magnates asked the Transvaal 
government to take charge of labor recruitment as a state enterprise, but the proposal was 
turned down (Denoon, 1967: 482). Consequently, the industry reorganized its recruiting 
efforts in the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). In the first decade of 
the 20th century, the WNLA was outperformed in South Africa by the independent 
recruiters but succeeded abroad (especially in Mozambique, being the only body allowed 
to recruit in the country). By 1907 all of the mining groups had either established their 
own recruiting departments or accepted contracts from one of the independent providers 
(Jeeves, 1985: 19). It was not until 1912 with the establishment of the Native Recruiting 
Corporation (NRC) that the Chamber of Mines began slowly to get hold of the local labor 
market and started to exert more and more control.7 The ‘construction of a centralized 
                                                 
7 The recruiting organization was divided along geographical lines. The WNLA was assigned to recruit in 
areas north of South Africa and the NRC was responsible within South Africa and in Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland, the former High Commission Territories.  
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recruiting system under the control of the Chamber of Mines’ was finally completed eight 
years later in 1920 (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 9).  
2.2.2.2 Foreign migrant labor 
The severe shortage of labor just after the Anglo-Boer war was relieved by indentured 
Chinese labor and, in response to the repatriation of Chinese labor after 1907, by tapping 
new labor reserves after 1905 particularly in the Eastern Cape and the tropical areas of 
Central Africa. The increasing reliance on foreign labor was further exacerbated by 
legislative acts of the Union which prohibited the mines to recruit in rural white regions 
of South Africa and thus forcing the mines to expand recruitment outside South Africa 
(Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 7).  
 The black labor force at large, in other words both blacks from within and without 
South Africa, was transient and migratory. For a number of reasons (including the 
competition for South African black labor with white agriculture, comparably low wages, 
substandard working conditions and alternative employment opportunities for black 
South Africans) the supply of domestic labor was insufficient and thus foreign labor 
became instrumental in the development of mining. As early as 1889 the sheer numbers 
point out this crucial role of foreign labor, particularly from Mozambique, who 
constituted 58 percent of the black labor force in that year (Katzenellenbogen, 1982: 38). 
Throughout the 1890s the portion of Mozambican labor oscillated between one-half and 
three-fifth of the total African workforce. In 1905 Mozambican labor still accounted for 
almost three quarters of the total workforce (Roberts, 1986: 505). As the mining houses 
successfully and with the assistance of the state diversified their geographical sources of 
labor recruitment over the next three two decades, this portion declined. In 1911, the total 
of foreign African migrant workers stood at 104'000 out of 174'000 black workers, 
representing 60 percent (Lipton, 1985: 385). By 1920 this number declined but still 
amounted to an impressive 49 percent of foreign Africans out of a total African workforce 
of 212'000 (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 232). The composition in this year 
shows the continuing importance of Mozambican labor which made up 36 percent of the 
total African workforce (the other 13 percent coming from High Commission Territories 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) (ibid).  
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 A highly perplexing footnote in the context of the periodically recurring cry for 
labor in the history of mining is the simultaneous cut of African wages. Indeed, average 
African real wages (in 1970 prices) dropped from 1911 to 1951 by 17 percent and was 
back on par with the 1911 wage rate only in the early 1970s (Lipton, 1980). Clearly an 
increase in wages would have resulted in more labor being supplied to whoever paid the 
best wages. However, the mining houses (and farmers) alike based their arguments with 
respect to black labor on the ‘backward-sloping supply curve’. It was argued that 
Africans were aiming at a specific, individually predefined amount of income and that the 
work period would reflect the time necessary for each worker to earn the means 
necessary to meet the pre-planned target (for example two guns, one bride-wealth and 
three ploughs). In other words, increased wages were said to reduce the amount of time 
necessary to work for the desired target income and therefore cause the supply of labor to 
decline. Unsurprisingly, later empirical research has confirmed that blacks do respond to 
economic incentives as well (Lipton, 1985: 121) but at the time the model of a backward-
sloping supply curve was very useful for employers to legitimize the downward pressure 
on wages. The flipside of eliminating the single most important element of forces that 
would have ‘pulled’ labor (voluntarily) to the mines (higher wages), of course 
necessitated a marked tightening of the instruments and tools that ‘pushed’ labor 
(coercively) to the mines.  
2.2.2.3 Legislation, function and the compound system 
The long-term viability of the migrant labor system within South Africa was ensured by 
legal provisions of the state. Given that the ‘pull’-forces were not generating the desired 
supply of labor, mine owners were looking for other ways to force Africans to work for 
them. Consequently, the mining industry supported restrictions on black land ownership 
as well as taxes (such as the infamous hut tax) to force blacks to work for cash wages 
(Lipton, 1985: 119).   
The first major piece of legislation of the Union8, the Natives Land Act of 1913, 
                                                 
8 The introduction of the Glen Grey Act of 1894 in the Cape, which had a similar direction of impact, was a 
historic precedence not least because the assertion that black men were lazy legitimized forcing them to 
work for whites while at the same time it excused the employers' inability to ‘create productive relations 
with their African employees’ (Hanson, 1996: 165). 
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was indeed concerned with exactly this problem. This act created two categories of land 
by making a clear legal distinction between white (farming) land and African Reserves 
and stipulating that no land could be moved from one category into the other (Ross, 1999: 
88). Additionally, Africans were no longer allowed to purchase land within white areas 
(and, for what it was worth, vice versa) nor make use of white land in any other form than 
labor, thereby effectively outlawing share-cropping (ibid). The land ascribed to the 
reserves (later known as Bantustans) represented a mere 7 percent of the total land (ibid). 
Even though extended to 13 percent in 1926, it was sufficient to achieve its aim to restrict 
‘land utilisation by Africans so as to increase labour utilisation of Africans’ (Horwitz, 
1967: 47). Thus as much as the Land Act had an economic background it was also based 
on political factors in the form of ‘resistance to giving up further land and white fears of 
being 'swamped' by greater African urbanization’ (Lipton, 2007: 43) and a feeling of 
cultural-civilizational superiority. Mine owners were also in favor of influx control which 
was administered by numerous pass laws and the ones introduced in Transvaal in 1895 
were indeed drafted by the Chamber of Mines (Lipton, 1985: 120). However, these laws 
also had a downside for the mining magnates since they tied down labor on the farms 
from where they could not legally be recruited and where the wages were even lower 
than in the mines (ibid). 
 Apart from increasing the pressure on Africans to engage in wage-earning 
activities, the migrant systems enabled the mine owners to pay lower wages because, as 
Buroway (1976) argues, the processes of ‘renewal and maintenance’ are institutionally 
differentiated and physically separated. In a capitalist economy, the labor force must 
receive a minimal subsistence wage in order to maintain itself and to be renewed as 
vacancies must be filled. The South African migrant labor system was characterized by a 
dual dependence of the labor force upon employment in the ‘regular’ economy (in casu 
mining) and the subsistence farming in the reserves. The cost of renewal were thereby 
externalized by the employers and shifted to the reserves. This in turn enabled the mines 
to pay lower wages and created a ‘reserve army of labour’ (Legassick and Wolpe, 1967: 
88). There is no doubt about the support and indeed request of the mining industry for a 
migrant labor system and that it certainly presented an opportunity to lower African 
wages to below subsistence levels. At the same time, Lipton (2007: 43) hints at the fact 
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that the migrant labor system and its retention over a long period ‘increased the 
opportunity costs of Africans by providing them with alternatives to mine work’. This, as 
well as preferential access of farmers to African labor markets led to a continually high 
reliance on foreign migrants (see above). Thus, all in all the migrant labor system within 
South Africa in general and the 1913 Land Act and the pass laws in particular were 
supported by mine owners but white farmers were their main beneficiaries.  
 All-male compounds first housed black migrant workers during the first major 
recession on the Kimberley diamond fields in 1884-85 and were initially introduced as a 
measure against theft and illicit trading of diamonds (Beinart, 2001: 30). An attempt to 
extend the compound housing system to white workers failed. The system was then 
transferred to the gold mines on the Rand where its other major function came to the fore 
more clearly, not least because theft of low-grade gold rock was scarcely a problem. The 
compounds were a prime instrument of controlling and disciplining the huge labor force 
(Lipton, 1985: 125). Additionally, housing and food could be provided economically 
while at the same time the forming of a common proletarian identity and solidarity was 
countered by housing different tribal groups separately as well as due to the high turnover 
rate (Levy, 1982: 38-43). On the other hand, the high turnover rate was also a major cost 
driver because it necessitated high and wasteful expenses for recruitment, transport and 
training. According to Lipton (1985: 126), this was made tolerable by ‘the efficient and 
ingenious system of recruitment and training, ruthless economy and discipline, and 
skilful management’.  
 Indeed, there is no ‘natural’, compelling reason why the migrant labor system and 
the all-male compounds (excluding the workers' families) was the most profitable for the 
mining industry in purely economic terms. From its inception in 1926, the Zambian 
copper industry for example pursued a different strategy by permitting wives and children 
to live together with their workers (Parpart, 1986: 36). In the South African mining 
industry this was not the case and it remains open to speculate how much this was owed 
to the interests of the mining houses and how much to racist political and cultural beliefs 
and fear of black urbanization and stabilization.  
 
34 
 
2.3 The state of the union 
The modern state of South Africa in its current territorial boundaries came about as a 
consolidation of the previously separate colonies of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State in the Union of South Africa in 1910. This section focuses mainly on 
the two decades after Union, which are characterized by the often antagonistic 
relationship between white national (namely rural and working Afrikaners) and white 
‘imperial’ (mainly English capitalists) interests. The political struggle over power 
continued to be an exclusively white affair leaving non-whites a passive minor role, if 
any role at all, to play. Last but certainly not least, the period coincides with a 
strengthening of state capacity and a broadening of its competencies. Attempts to unify 
South Africa were undertaken before but it was the discovery of gold that would act as 
the catalyst. A brief description of the events leading up to Union will thus be provided in 
the first instance followed by the two decades after Union. 
2.3.1 Before Union 
During the 1830s and 1840s parts of the Afrikaner community from the Cape Province 
migrated east- and northeastwards. In 1814 the British had annexed the Cape Colony for 
good and as a result the Boers lost their dominant position. Imposition of British rule, 
anglicization policies, restrictive laws on slavery and its subsequent abolition as well as 
discontent over the handling of border conflicts with the Xhosa people enforced the 
growing grievances of Afrikaners against the British. The Great Trek, as this migration 
came to be known, eventually led to the establishment of a number of Boer Republics, 
most notably Natalia, which in 1843 became the British Natal, the Orange Free State in 
1854 and the Transvaal, or South African Republic, in 1853, which was annexed in 1877 
by the British as well. Following victories over the Zulus and Pedis, the Afrikaners of the 
Transvaal declared independence in 1880 and won the ensuing First Anglo-Boer War. 
(Kinder, 2006: 375) 
 The Great Trek was to become one of the two seminal events in 19th century 
Afrikaner history (Renders, 2004: 170), the other one being the (Second) Anglo-Boer 
war. The British response to Afrikaner expansion was at times passive, ignoring it, and at 
other times, when British interests were perceived to be touched on or threatened, more 
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active, exercising control (Barber, 1999: 10). In a general sense, the Boers' striving for 
independence can be regarded to be at odds with the British claim to imperialism in 
southern Africa, staked out by themselves as their sphere of influence. The British 
perceived the possibility of rival European powers securing a foothold in the region via 
the Boer republics and instability from conflicts over land and cattle between Africans 
and Boers as the main threats emanating from independent, non-British polities (ibid:10).  
 With the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley, the British were quick to secure 
their claims against Afrikaner claims, heralding tensions that built up after the discovery 
of gold on the Rand in 1886, leading to the Jameson Raid and culminating in the Second 
Anglo-Boer War from 1899-1902. The Jameson Raid was conducted by Leander Starr 
Jameson, chief of the colonial administration in Rhodesia, and his Rhodesian and 
Bechuanaland policemen. The raid lasted from December 29, 1895 till January 2, 1896 
and failed. The intentions were to topple Kruger and his Boer Republic by triggering an 
uprising of the predominantly British and German expatriates, the uitlanders, who had 
less political and economic rights than the Afrikaner citizens. The failed raid was 
prominently backed by leading political and economic personalities of the Cape and the 
Transvaal including Rhodes (who subsequently lost his office as prime minister of the 
Colony), senior employees of some mining houses (including Beit, Phillips and 
Fitzpatrick) and with the, at least tacit, knowledge of the Chamberlain government in 
London (Smith, 1990: 32). 
 The failure to gain improved rights for the disenfranchised uitlanders was used in 
1899 as a pretext for war and after exchanging ultimatums, the South African War 
between the British Empire on the one and the two Boer Republics Transvaal and Orange 
Free State on the other hand broke out on October 12, 1899. The complex set of causes 
behind the war, disallows a reduction to either political or economic reasons. While the 
discovery of gold was certainly a necessary precondition and control over it a major 
concern for the British, there is no apparent reason why a friendly regime would not have 
sufficed British and mining capital interests to secure the supply of gold similar to 
configurations with gold rich territories in California and Canada (ibid: 59). Smith (1990: 
37) also shows that the ‘Randlords’ remained politically very passive prior to the 
outbreak of the war (unlike before the Jameson Raid) and that ‘finally and reluctantly, 
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they acquiesced in a war which they felt was not of their making and which they were 
powerless to prevent’. The war must also be assessed against the backdrop of European 
19th century imperialism and the ensuing scramble for Africa. Geopolitically, Southern 
Africa risked becoming realigned towards Afrikaner republics antagonistic to Britain and 
sympathetic to British rivals, notably Germany's South-West Africa and Portuguese 
Mozambique (Henshaw, 1998: 542). As a result, British prestige might have very well 
taken a dip, being seen as weak and ineffective in Southern Africa, and possibly (in 
consequence of domino theory thinking) throughout the world. The mind set mentality in 
international affairs at the time saw the use of military force as a normal contingency of 
politics and colonial wars as a logical corollary of empires (Smith, 1990: 55). The Anglo-
Saxon belief in cultural superiority and pride in the empire corresponded to the 
Afrikaners' conviction of the righteousness of their cause to fight for independence and to 
have God on their side (ibid: 55). The war ended with the Peace of Vereeniging on May 
31, 1902, whereby the British re-established and secured their pre-eminence over 
Southern Africa. It put the Boer republics as colonies under British sovereignty, promised 
self-government (effectuated for the Transvaal in 1906 and the Orange Free State in 
1907), introduced Dutch as an official language and left contentious issues, such as 
property rights of Afrikaners, Black enfranchisement and land taxes untouched (dtv-Atlas 
der Weltgeschichte: 381). After lengthy negotiations about its exact form, the Union of 
South Africa was constituted in 1910 as a ‘racially exclusive, British-influenced 
parliamentary system’ (Beinart, 2001: 78) in a unitary state replacing the regional 
parliaments with provincial councils.  
2.3.2 After Union 
It is an interesting fact that all Prime Ministers of the Union until 1948 were Boer 
generals who had once fought against the British (Macdonald, 1953: 143). On the one 
hand, these men were willing to work together with Great Britain and their fellow 
English speaking South African citizens. Under Louis Botha, Prime Minister from 1910 
to 1919, South Africa fought on the side of Britain during WWI, Jan Smuts followed a 
similar policy during the Second World War (WWII) and even the ardent Nationalist 
Hertzog once declared ‘I believe in the British Empire to the extent that it benefits South 
Africa. But when its interests are at variance with those of South Africa, I am opposed to 
37 
 
it’ (quoted in MacDonald: 143). At the same time, it reflects the major political cleavage 
of the early years of the Union, the division among whites between the Afrikaner and 
English communities. According to Smuts, quoted in Magubane (1996: 279), the two 
fundamental problems were the ‘consolidation of the white race into a homogenous 
nationality on the one hand and on the other, their relations to the ‘coloured classes’’. It 
was not very difficult to find a working compromise on the relations between whites and 
non-whites. The question of reconciliation between English and Afrikaners was a much 
more delicate issue eventually leading to a split amongst latter.  
 The ruling South African Party (SAP) was a coalition of the Transvaal's Het Volk, 
led by Botha and Smuts, and the Free State's Orangia Unie, led by Hertzog and had a 
mainly Afrikaans and agricultural base while being at the same time the traditional 
supporter of the mines and included Anglophone politicians (Lipton, 1985: 258). The 
opposition party was represented primarily by the Unionist party (UP) which consisted 
overwhelmingly of British people and had its strongest bases in Natal, Cape Town, 
Eastern Cape and in the mining area around Johannesburg (Macdonald, 1953: 144). 
Mining also nourished a small Labour Party (SALP) that was supported mainly by 
English-speaking workers and had a strong base in the poorer sections of this community 
(Feinstein, 2005: 82). In the 1910 election the SAP won 66, the UP 38, the SALP 4 and 
independents 13 seats out of 121 seats (African Election Database, 2010).  
 Smuts was convinced of the need for the white communities to close their ranks 
for otherwise its position would ‘soon become untenable in the face of overwhelming 
majority of prolific barbarism’ (quoted in Magubane, 1996: 279). This policy of 
conciliation between the whites, which also aimed at overcoming the division between 
national (Afrikaner) and imperial (English) interests, was the main reason for the 
breakaway of the more nationalist faction, the National Party (NP), led by Hertzog in 
1914. The nationalists were dedicated to the so-called ‘two streams’ policy, that posited 
the elevation of the more numerous Afrikaners, who were still mainly farmer and urban 
workers on par with the less numerous but economically dominant English-speaking 
South Africans (Carter, 1955: 142). The National Party represented the interests of small 
property owners, rural Afrikaners and (mostly unskilled) urban Afrikaans workers 
(Feinstein, 2005: 82). The division between moderate and nationalist Afrikaners went 
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beyond different degrees of national fervor. They also related to economic interests and 
demographic characteristics. In the Orange Free State and the Cape the Afrikaners 
comprised the majority (90 per cent in the Free State) while in the Transvaal they 
accounted for only 32 per cent of the voters, thereby forcing the SAP to consider English 
interests more than Hertzog and the Cape nationalists would have liked (Lipton, 1985: 
259). In Transvaal, the SAP was also supported by wealthier maize farmers (constituting 
the so-called maize-gold alliance with the mines) and the less well-off farmers 
particularly in Northern Transvaal endorsing the NP (Morrel, 1988: 619). In general, 
Hertzog's agricultural base, especially in the Cape, profited less from imperial 
preferences than the sugar farmers in Natal and they were more inclined to freer trading 
policies especially with Germany (Lipton, 1985: 259).  
Policy towards the mining industry was another source of division. According to 
Clark (1994: 39), by the end of WWI, minerals ‘accounted for nearly three-quarters of the 
country's exports, which in turn provided nearly half of South Africa's national income’. 
The economic policies of the SAP-led governments were characterized by their sympathy 
for the needs of the mining industry, particularly in the areas of labor and trade policies. 
By the early 1920s South Africa still had no real industrial policy and the government 
remained anti-protectionist in outlook (Handley, 2008: 37). This is not to say the mines 
had it all their way, indeed Lipton (Lipton, 1985: 259-260) shows that the taxes of 42 per 
cent on profits in 1920 were high compared to 23 per cent in Rhodesia, 18 per cent in 
Australia and 14 per cent in the USA and the differential railway rates were biased 
against the mines and in favor of agriculture.  
 When South Africa entered WWI on the side of the Allies, the British government 
requested the Union to undertake military actions against German South-West Africa. 
Botha's government agreed and the parliament approved of it but the decision was not 
received very well by a number of Boer generals. The Commander-in-Chief of the Union 
Defence Force, General Christiaan Beyers resigned and wrote: ‘It is sad that the war is 
being waged against the 'barbarism' of the Germans. We have forgiven but not forgotten 
all the barbarities committed in our own country during the South African War’ (Bunting, 
1964). Only a few weeks after the parliament's approval, armed rebellion broke out on 
the northern frontier of the Cape under the leadership of Maritz (after whom the rebellion 
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was named) and quickly spread to the northern Free State and the Transvaal. The 
rebellion was easily quelled by the overwhelming force of the regular army and a lack of 
proper organization and supplies on the part of the rebels (Davenport, 1963: 74). 
Regardless of whether the rebellion was reflecting a genuine attempt to reconstitute 
independent republics or mere isolated and spontaneous outbursts of discontent to the 
government's decision to invade South-West Africa, it exemplifies the Afrikaans-British 
cleavage very clearly. 
 In the 1915 election, one year after the party political split amongst Afrikaners, 
the new National Party garnered 27 seats out of 130 (29 per cent), coming third after the 
South African Party with 54 seats (37%) and the Unionist Party with 40 seats but before 
the distant Labour Party with 3 seats and 6 independent seats (African Election Database, 
2010). The SAP thus lost its majority and became increasingly reliant in the parliament 
on the Unionists, which it absorbed in 1921 and as a consequence regained absolute 
majority (Yudelman, 1984: 21). Lipton (1985: 260) argues that the ensuing changing 
power base and policies of Smuts (who took over leadership in 1919 after the death of 
Botha) mirror a shift of power to mining and imperial interests in the years 1920 to 1924. 
This is reflected by Smuts’ support of the 1922 Rand Rebellion over the job color bar, as 
well as implementing further measures aimed at reducing mining costs such as reduction 
of mining taxes, railway rates and import duties on food, while not imposing levies on 
manufactured goods and cutting poor relief (paid for by mining taxes) (Lipton, 1985: 
260). On all of these issues, the mining industry's interests were in direct contradiction to 
the farmers (on food prices), manufacturers (on protectionist measures and free trade) and 
white workers (on the color bar and higher levels of state aid). However, there was little 
room to maneuver for Smuts. He needed the Unionists who brought along generous 
contributions to the party, the support of the English press and English votes. In addition, 
the contribution of the mines to national income, amounting to 21% in 1920, was the 
major source of government revenue and foreign exchange (ibid: 261). His position 
became politically unsustainable as a result of this heavy leaning towards English 
interests in general and mining in particular, which were in direct contradiction with 
those of the majority of the electorate. As a consequence, in 1924 the South African Party 
was defeated at the polls by a coalition of the National and the Labour Party, winning 81 
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of 134 seats (63 for the National party and 18 for the Labour Party) (African Election 
Database, 2010). The two seemingly disparate parties gained a majority of the seats and 
combined to form the Pact government (Feinstein, 2005: 82).  
 The rise to power of the Pact Government has been widely cited as one of the two 
turning points in modern South African history (the other one being the election of the 
National Party government in 1948) (Yudelman, 1984: 23). Apart from the above 
discussed repercussions, it generally also led to a shift away from laissez faire principles 
towards a higher degree of state involvement. On the other hand, Handley (2008: 39) 
shows that the new government’s increased involvement should not be overstated. Eskom 
was already created under Smuts in 1923 and state involvement is as much defined by 
what a state does and what it doesn’t do, in casu namely nationalization, which was 
perceived to be neither economically feasible nor politically desirable. Real change did 
occur with regard to increased protectionist measures supported by white unions, white 
farmers and small manufacturers but opposed by commerce and the mining industry. The 
latter was also in opposition to the parastatal iron and steel corporation, Iscor, which was 
established in 1928 but began production only in the early 1930s (Lipton, 1985: 265). In 
general the range of these policies reallocated the costs away from white agriculture, 
labor and manufacturers to the mining industry. 
 The change in government reflects the growing assertiveness of Afrikaners which 
can be seen most clearly in political and cultural policies. Dutch, the second official 
language of the Union was replaced by Afrikaans in 1925 and bilingualism was required 
for state sector employees, slightly favoring Afrikaners over English who were not 
always as perfectly bilingual as the Afrikaners (ibid: 266). The republic’s own anthem 
(Die Stem van Suid-Afrika) was first sung publicly in 1928 at the official hoisting of the 
national flag (Prinsevlag), even though it would only be accepted as the official anthem 
in 1952. 
2.3.2.1 The non-whites 
The group of non-whites included the coloureds (mainly from the Cape), the Indians 
(from Natal) and the ethnically diverse blacks. Their common political characteristic was 
their marginalized and consequently weak role in the political system, based on virtual 
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exclusion. In all of the four colonies/republics, the whites had established their 
supremacy over non-whites in principle but to different degrees well before Union. The 
Act of the Union in 1910 allowed varying provincial electoral systems which in the case 
of the Cape Colony provided a limited franchise for blacks (until 1936) and coloureds 
while outside the Cape, the franchise was restricted to white men (Worden, 2000: 79-80). 
The non-whites politically weak position was amplified by economical weakness. As 
shown above, the color bar provided the necessary legal framework to lock non-whites in 
unskilled, low paying jobs and the blacks were dispossessed of their land, most notably in 
the Land Act of 1913. Conceptualizing ‘blacks’ as a group is somewhat misleading as it 
implies a degree of unity which was not at all given. There was no unified black nation in 
South Africa but the blacks were separated by different languages, cultures and political 
systems. Indeed, they had been at war with each other directly, most notably during the 
Mfecane, and indirectly through their involvement in the wars between the British and the 
Boers. Among Africans, class division in general and the rural-urban cleavage in 
particular were also major obstacles for a unified African voice. The establishment of the 
ANC (then still the South African Native National Congress, SANNC) in 1912 for 
instance was largely driven by a small urban elite, united by their political exclusion.     
2.4 Conclusion 
The mining industry played a pivotal role in the socio-economic organization of early 
modern South African society. The mining industry itself was determined to a large 
extent by the huge amounts of capital and labor that was required for the extraction of the 
geologically not readily accessible gold. In combination with a globally fixed gold price, 
the easiest and indeed almost exclusive place for cost reduction was labor, which made an 
efficient and effective management thereof even more crucial.  
The two single most important areas of labor policy were the vertical and 
horizontal controls. The color bar was initially not hotly contested by the mining 
magnates who indeed shared its underlying racist assumptions Furthermore, at its 
inception the color bar merely regularized the prevailing division of the labor force 
between skilled and non-skilled workers along racial lines. However, the artificially 
increased labor cost added to the already high tension between white labor and 
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employers, leading to the Rand Rebellion. The strike was resolved in favor of the 
employers but later reversed to the point that the color bar, now also legally consolidated, 
was simply not an agenda item anymore. Migrant labor had been a characteristic of 
mining since the beginning of mining as had labor shortages. This was largely due to the 
lack of attractiveness to work in the mines. The mining houses rejected a strengthening of 
the ‘pull’ forces to attract more workers through higher wages and better working 
conditions on the basis of a (later falsified) ‘backward sloping (labor) supply curve’. In 
turn the ‘push’ forces were augmented, notably through land restriction and taxes, forcing 
(black) labor to work on the mines and elsewhere. This secured the mining industry black 
wages below subsistence level, leading to criticism of ‘super-exploitation’. To what 
extent the migrant labor system was economically beneficial for the mine owners and at 
which stage opportunity and other costs associated with the system exceeded the benefits 
remains unclear. The mining industry, spearheaded by its Chamber of Mines, succeeded 
in controlling the recruitment of African labor by the early 1920s, a business field which 
up until then had been in the hands of independent contractors.  
 During the period covered in this chapter, capital can be divided into national 
(overwhelmingly non-mining) and international (overwhelmingly mining) capital based 
on their respective social base and the nature of their  inducement, necessary for capital to 
be invested, which in the latter case was the accumulation of international purchasing 
power. This cleavage overlapped with the ethnic division between Afrikaner and 
Englishmen that also contributed, amongst other reasons, to the Anglo-Boer war which 
secured British domination. Even though the first governments after Union were led by 
Afrikaners, they were widely perceived by nationalist Afrikaners as cozying up too much 
to English interests. After splitting away from the governing party in 1914, the National 
Party in coalition with the Labour Party was able to win the election in 1924, form the so-
called Pact government and pursue more South Africa-first policies of protectionism and 
state intervention in favor of internally oriented capital (whereby South Africa was 
conceptualized as white and preferentially Afrikaans).  
 The notion that the 1920s mark a shift in the relation between mining capital and 
state therefore rests largely on the two (partially interlinked) arguments that firstly, 
mining capital lost the war against the color bar and secondly, the political ascension of 
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the nationalists led to a shift of power from mining to non-mining capital. While these 
developments indicate a loss of power on the part of mining capital, its high degree of 
concentration and homogeneity prevented its domination by the state.  
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3 The long 1970s conjuncture 
This chapter covers the period from the 1920s until the 1970s and in some instances 
beyond. The main reason behind this extension of the 1970s into the ‘long 1970s’ stems 
from the fact that those developments that did not culminate in structural changes in the 
1970s were at least already evident but took a few more years to materialize. One such 
example would be the color bar, which became increasingly contested already in the late 
1960s/early 1970s but was only given up in 1986. The most notable instance was the 
political changes where the tendencies which were to lead to the abandonment of 
apartheid were already evident in the late 1970s but which took more than a decade to 
fully actualize with the introduction of majority rule in 1994. However, most of the 
fundamental changes covered in this chapter fall within a timeframe ranging from the 
1970s to the late 1980s, or the ‘long 1970s’. The structure of this chapter follows the one 
from the previous period, elaborating firstly on mining capital related aspects, followed 
by labor and state issues and a conclusion.  
The main point of this chapter suggests that the long 1970s represent a shift in the 
balance of power in favor of the mining industry while leaving the basic notion that both 
state and mining capital are not able to dominate each other wholly intact. The reasons 
for this shift are to be found both in instances directly related to the mining industry and 
in others located at a more general level. The dismantling of major apartheid economic 
policies in general and the abandonment of the job color bar in particular are indicative 
thereof. Furthermore, the mining industry was able to keep the migrant labor system in 
place despite a major development towards internalization9  and the growing convergence 
of attitudes towards the proper role of the state among Afrikaans and English South 
Africans (notably capitalists) and provided a stronger basis more generally for the 
advancement of business friendly legislation. 
3.1 Capital 
This part assesses the developments within the capitalist sections of South African society 
as well as the changing economics of mining. In both regards, the 1970s mark an 
                                                 
9 Internalization refers to the replacement of foreign black labor by South African black labor.  
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important break with the past. The previously dominating division between Afrikaner and 
English capital had been declining in the wake of a successful industrialization and 
continuous economic growth. The changes in the economics of mining included most 
notably the abolition of the gold standard in the context of the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system and the related expansion of production, the declining importance of gold 
in the South African mining industry in combination with a diversification of the sourced 
minerals and thirdly, mechanization.  
3.1.1 The economics of mining 
3.1.1.1 Rising gold price and expanding production 
As a result of the Great Depression in the late 1920/early 1930s, Britain abandoned the 
gold standard in 1931. This in turn forced other countries, most notably autonomous 
members of the Commonwealth, including South Africa, to decide between aligning their 
currencies with the British pound in the sterling area or fixing them on some other basis. 
Given South Africa's heavy dependence on Britain as a source of capital for the South 
African economy in general, and particularly for the highly capital-intensive gold mining 
industry, as a market for agricultural exports and due to Britain's determination to sustain 
the sterling area for wider political and strategic reasons, South Africa became a member 
of the British currency block area from 1933 (until the disintegration of the area itself in 
the 1970s) (Henshaw, 1996: 201).   
 While the South African pound, and after 1961 the South African rand, was 
therefore effectively linked to the British pound, the gold price became fixed at 35 US 
dollars in 1934 and did not rise until 1970 (Lipton, 1985: 111). The duality of a fixed gold 
price and a local currency pegged to the British pound meant that exchange rate 
movements could and indeed did result in higher returns received by the mines. The two 
substantial price rises in 1932 and 1949 significantly stimulated the expansion of gold 
production. They furthermore eased the effects of the wartime and post-WWII 
inflationary pressure and rapidly rising working costs, which in turn increased the ability 
of the mining industry to start new mines (Jones and Müller, 1992: 155).  
After the British retreat from the gold standard in 1931, and under growing 
internal pressure from mining, agriculture and manufacturing, the government deviated 
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from its initial stance of staying on the gold standard at the end of 1932 (Henshaw, 1996: 
205). This came as a welcome windfall to the mining industry as the devaluation of the 
South African pound in terms of gold to the same level as the pound sterling resulted in 
price rise of gold in US dollar by almost fifty per cent (Jones and Müller, 1992: 152). The 
fixed price of gold at 35 US dollars shortly thereafter in 1934 represented yet another 
increase equivalent to 67 per cent when compared to the level prior to the late 1932 
devaluation (ibid). This rise had numerous positive effects in terms of taxes, employment, 
foreign exchange, stimulation of economic activities directly and indirectly related to 
mining, higher dividends but most importantly it provided the much needed impetus for 
the expansion of mining in general and gold mining in particular. It also allowed to 
extend the life span of existing mines as previously uneconomic ore reserves turned 
profitable, to reopen marginal mines that had been closed and to develop 13 new mines 
by 1935 (ibid: 153).  
 While the US dollar price remained fixed, the sterling price of gold rose steadily 
albeit slowly until the next major increase in 1949. In September 1949, the British and 
South African pounds were simultaneously devalued which resulted in a threefold 
increase to 248s 3d an ounce of gold compared to the early 1932 level of 85s (ibid: 
155).10 Prolonged and expensive exploration activities had been undertaken since the 
departure from the gold standard at the end of 1932 and by 1939 goldfields in the Orange 
Free State had been discovered which were to become the country's richest reserves 
(Feinstein, 2005: 166). Delayed by WWII, the development of these mines started in 
1946 and the first gold was produced in 1951. By the end of the 1950s 22 new mines had 
begun production on the Free State fields, which produced an impressive 60 per cent of 
total South African gold output and contributed 79 per cent to the working profit (ibid). 
Within the context of gold mining expansion into the Free State which was severely 
undeveloped and lacked basic amenities such as roads, railway, airports, electricity and 
water, Anglo American played the leading role and as a result became the dominant house 
on the new fields and in the country as a whole (Jones and Müller, 1992: 157). 
 Over the course of the 1960s, production of gold declined on some fields such as 
the old Central and East Rand fields but were more than offset by increases on other 
                                                 
10 Before decimalization in 1971, one pound consisted of 20 shillings (s) and each shilling of 12 pence.   
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fields in the Free State and on the Far West Rand (ibid: 258). By 1970 production peaked 
at its all time record level of 32 million fine ounces of gold from 80 million tons of ore 
treated (Feinstein, 2005: 205). In subsequent years the tonnage of ore milled would 
steadily increase while at the same time the amount of gold produced would slowly but 
continuously decline. In 1977 gold output totaled 22.5 million fine ounces from 76.7 
million tons of ore milled compared to 21.6 million fine ounces from 113.8 millions of 
milled ore eight years later (ibid: 206). Furthermore, gold mines came once again under 
financial pressure as the costs of production had been spiraling upwards while the gold 
price only rose slowly and indirectly through British and South African pound 
devaluations. Indeed, by the early 1970s many mines only survived with government 
assistance while others depended on profits from uranium as a by-product of gold 
production or concentrated on production of higher grades of ore which could be mined 
at cheaper rates (ibid: 203). Relief came with the international retreat from the Bretton 
Woods system in the 1970s. The first and for the gold mines most important step came in 
1971 when the United States suspended her practice to trade gold at $35 per fine ounce. 
The immediate effect on the gold price was less marked because of the concomitant 
depreciation of the US dollar (Jones and Müller, 1992: 260). Over the mid-term however, 
the dollar price of gold rose rapidly and reached almost $200 by 1978 (Feinstein, 2005: 
204). By 1976 all major currencies were floating, the official price of gold was abolished 
and gold was internationally demonetized. As a result, gold no longer served as either a 
medium of exchange or a standard of value and the gold price became determined by 
market forces (ibid: 203-204).     
3.1.1.2 Declining share of gold and diversification of mining 
At the same time as gold production expanded significantly from the 1920s onward and 
peaked in 1970 (only interrupted by WWII), the share of gold compared to other mining 
output declined. After a temporary increase in gold sales as a portion of total mining sales 
from 76 per cent in 1930 to 91 per cent in 1940 it continually declined to 63 per cent in 
1960 and 53 per cent in 1970 (Jones and Müller, 1992: 161, 273). This process was 
stopped and temporarily reversed in the 1970s and early 1980s by the rising gold price 
which more than neutralized the declining gold output and in consequence obscured to 
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some extent the growing importance of other minerals.  
 Among the other minerals, diamonds had the longest tradition and continued to 
prosper in the postwar period when it profited from an unprecedented strong demand for 
gemstones. Between 1950 and 1970 diamond production roughly quadrupled but 
nevertheless remained relatively unimportant contributing only between 3 and 5 per cent 
of the total value of mineral production (Feinstein, 2005: 171). Coal on the other hand 
was much more crucial for industrial development. Little coal was exported before the 
1970s. Most (roughly 60 per cent) was used for power generation and, due to large 
reserves of coal and price controls, the price of coal was low by international standards 
(Jones and Müller, 1992: 268). The contribution of coal to the total value of mining 
output increased from 6 per cent in 1960 to 20 per cent in 1985 and became the second 
most important mineral (ibid: 271). Together with gold it contributed 79 per cent to total 
mining output in 1985. Technological breakthroughs leading to new beneficiation 
techniques in the 1960s, increased demand for coal as a result of the oil crises in the 
1970s and improved transport infrastructure such as the electrified railway line from the 
coalfields of Witbank to the enlarged Richard's Bay harbor secured coal its newly 
acquired status as a large earner of foreign exchange (ibid: 268-269).  
 The other significant development in the diversification of the mining industry 
was the rise in the contribution of minerals other than gold, coal and diamonds from 14 
per cent of the value of total sales in 1950 to 35 per cent in 1970 (Feinstein, 2005: 172). 
Among the other minerals, copper was initially the most important mineral whose value 
temporarily overtook that of coal by 1970. Further minerals included the platinum group 
metals, asbestos, iron ore, manganese ore, vanadium, antimony, chrome ore, phosphates, 
tin and others, whose contribution were relatively small but quite often ranked high in 
terms of their share of world production (Jones and Müller, 1992: 275). Over the course 
of the 1980s, the platinum group metals (pgm; notably platinum, palladium and rhodium) 
replaced copper as the single most important contributor to the value of the other 
minerals (other than gold, coal and diamond that is) and overtook coal as the second 
largest foreign exchange earner (Feinstein, 2005: 211).  
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3.1.1.3 Mechanization and increased productivity 
Aided by the widespread use of electricity instead of steam power, significant advances 
in the mechanization of both underground and on the surface operations were made in the 
post-WWII decades. These technological improvements include mechanical scrapers to 
clear broken rock from the rock face, equipment for loading and lifting the ore, 
locomotives in place of laborers to move underground wagons and pneumatically 
operated machinery replacing hand tools (Feinstein, 2005: 168). Notwithstanding, labor 
productivity (measured by the amount of ore treated per person employed) remained 
static until the 1960s, when the delayed effect of mechanization materialized and more 
efficient use of the workforce was achieved thus raising productivity from 159 tons per 
worker in 1945 to 193 in 1970 (ibid: 170). These productivity gains in combination with 
continued resistance to any significant improvements in real wages for African miners 
resulted in a roughly threefold increase of working profits over the same period (ibid) 
 Rapidly rising African wages in the context of the internalization of the workforce 
in the 1970s intensified the incentives to mechanize and aggravated the shortage of 
skilled and semi-skilled labor that had already arisen earlier as an implication of 
mechanization (Lipton, 1985: 117).  
3.1.2 Mining and non-mining capital 
As shown above, the early division between mining and non-mining capital was 
overlapped by an ethnic and cultural cleavage between Afrikaans and English speaking 
whites. The growth in manufacturing, the diversification of mining capital into non-
mining activities and vice versa as well as the socio-economic upward movement of a 
large part of Afrikaans society, all contributed to a significant degree of merging of these 
previously antagonistic forces. These developments were made possible first and 
foremost because of continuing economic growth after the Great Depression in the late 
1920s/early 1930s until the early 1970s. After the worldwide-recession in the wake of the 
first oil-crisis, South Africa was able to temporarily return to growth but descended into 
decline almost throughout the entire 1980s in terms of average GDP per capita (Marx, 
1992: 665-667). While it is hard to quantify the actual impact of state intervention in the 
period under consideration the state's success in securing the Afrikaans speaking white 
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population a greater share of the economic pie is undisputed. Therefore, the point can be 
made that with regard to the successful transformative measures aimed at increasing the 
Afrikaners’ share of the economy, the Nationalist apartheid government became the 
victim of its own success as it undercut the appeal of Afrikaner nationalism to its base 
which in turn increasingly developed a more market-oriented view similar to those of the 
English.  
At the origin of the growing overlap of Afrikaner and English capitals' interests 
was the growth of the industrial sector. This sector's11 contribution to GDP rose from 12.4 
per cent in 1928, to 23.3 per cent in 1948 and to 30.8 per cent in 1970 (Feinstein, 2005: 
129, 144). The role of manufacturing in particular was important. The share of 
manufacturing (and construction, which contributed between one-sixth to one-seventh to 
this share) increased from a mere 5 per cent in 1911 to 27 per cent in 1970 (Lipton, 1985: 
380). Simultaneously, ever more people were being employed in the second sector. 
Manufacturing alone increased its workforce by factor of ten over the course of fifty 
years. The absolute number rose from a total of 132'000 workers in 1924/25 to 1'307'000 
in 1975 (Jones and Müller, 1992: 67, 172, 301).  
 As shown in the previous chapter, the 1920s were characterized by a struggle 
between mining and non-mining capital which in turn favored the latter at least in the 
political arena with the seizure of the state by non-mining interest in the Pact 
government. Protective measures such as tariff barriers, the establishment of the 
parastatal iron and steel corporation ISCOR (though production only started in 1934) and 
expanding infrastructure were subsequently strengthened (Bienefeld and Innes, 1976: 
46). During the 1920s, industrial output continued to grow strongly until the Great 
Depression of 1929. From 1929 to 1932 industrial output (minus 19 per cent in terms of 
value and nominal terms) and employment (minus 12 per cent of the total workforce) 
declined heftily (Feinstein, 2005: 122). The main proximate causes of the recovery from 
the depression were the above discussed concomitant currency devaluation, increase of 
the gold price in the early 1930s and the resulting expansion of gold production (Jones 
and Müller, 1992: 167). The subsequent boom was supported by the inward-oriented 
program of industrialization put in place in 1925 by the Pact - and continued by the 
                                                 
11 In addition to manufacturing this included construction, electricity, gas and water.   
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Union government after 1933 - as well as an increased (though still comparatively small) 
local market (Schneider, 2000: 417). In 1939, manufacturing output had tripled and the 
number of (white) jobs doubled compared to 1925 (ibid). The Second World War 
provided yet another very strong stimulus for industrial development and this time South 
Africa was better positioned to capitalize on the opportunity than it had been in WWI. 
Manufacturing output doubled between 1939 and 1949 and the industry was transformed 
by introducing large-scale, standardized mass production. It also diversified beyond 
jobbing12 and maintenance work by the production of goods such as armored vehicles, 
trucks, weapons and the establishment of a heavy industry spearheaded by ISCOR 
(Feinstein, 2005: 123). In the post-war era GDP growth per capita continued unabated at 
an annualized rate of 2.2 per cent from 1950 to 1973 (compared with 1.3 per cent 
between 1913 and 1950) (ibid: 145). The recession that followed the first oil shock in 
1973 marks the turning point in the growth trajectory in apartheid South Africa. From 
1973 to 1983 (measured at constant prices) GDP per capita stagnated and even started to 
decline after 1983 (by a 1.2 per cent per annum in the period until 1994) (ibid). 
 The significance of this with respect to state-mining capital relations lies in the 
extent to which the measures taken by the state altered the ownership structure of the 
means of production and how this affected the nature of state-capital relations in general. 
By 1948 Afrikaners were controlling 25 per cent of commerce, 6 per cent of industry and 
finance and only 1 per cent of mining (ibid). The great majority of these businesses were 
small, at times family operations, or cooperatives established to purchase agricultural 
supplies and market farm produce (Feinstein, 2005: 178). In order to address these inner-
white economic differences (per capita income of Afrikaners was half that of English-
speaking South Africans in 1946), the government pursued a three-pronged strategy to 
secure the success of 'volkskapitalisme' (literally ‘peoples' capitalism’): new 
discriminatory laws were added, the bureaucracy and parastatal sector was expanded and 
a variety of social-security programs introduced to uplift the poor white population and 
redistribute wealth (Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990: 12). Naturally such a strategy 
required a greater degree of state intervention. As the National Party came to power on 
‘an 'anti-capitalist' platform, whose proclaimed apartheid policy promised drastic state 
                                                 
12 Jobbing work refers to piece production as opposed to mass production.  
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intervention in the functioning of the labour and other markets, and the strict state 
regulation of all sectors of the economy’ (O'Meara, 1996: 80), the English business 
community was rather worried about the prospects. It didn't turn out as bad for the 
English as was feared because the government succeeded in its 'Afrikaner first'-policies 
while not harming the capital interests at large (ibid: 81). The redistributive effects did 
not reverse English economic dominance even though it increased the Afrikaner 
economic share in selected sectors: by 1975 18 per cent in mining (compared to 1 per 
cent in 1948), 15 per cent in manufacturing (6), 25 per cent in finance (6) and as the 
exception to the rule 16 per cent in trade and commerce (25; though still an increase if 
compared to the 8 per cent share in 1938/39) (Giliomee, 2003: 543). Overall, the 
Afrikaners’ share rose from 6 per cent in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1975 (or 45 per cent if 
one includes the state corporations) (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 29). The expansion 
into the mining and industrial sectors (in the agricultural sector, the Afrikaner share has 
stayed above 80 per cent over the same period) was spearheaded by two financial 
institutions, most notably Sanlam and to a lesser extent Volkskas (People's Treasury) 
(ibid). The former acquired, through its subsidiary Federale Mynbou (Federal Mining – 
Fedmyn), a substantial part in a leading mining house from Anglo American in 1963 
(Feinstein, 2005: 179).  
The declining differentials between Afrikaans and English speaking whites can 
also be seen in the urbanization rates and the occupational structure. In 1936 only 48 per 
cent of Afrikaners were urbanized compared to 88 per cent of English speakers; by 1974, 
the former's share increased to 88 per cent (compared to 95 per cent of urban English 
speakers) (Lipton, 1985: 389). With regards to the occupational structure: in 1936, 28 per 
cent of the Afrikaners were employed in white collar jobs, 32 per cent in blue collar jobs 
and 41 per cent in agriculture (the corresponding numbers for the English are not 
available for that year). These numbers also changed significantly until 1974 when 65 per 
cent of Afrikaners were working in white collar positions, 27 per cent being employed in 
blue collar jobs and only 8 per cent in agriculture (ibid). This upward socioeconomic 
movement of an entire group was reflected in virtually any other social, political, cultural 
or economic indicator and it is estimated that by 1971 20 to 30 per cent of the South 
African economy was controlled by Afrikaner capital (Handley, 2008: 45).  
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In turn, the diversification of mining capital across the entire domestic economic 
spectrum (and not directly related to their core business) also contributed to this merging 
of interests. This was on the one hand a response to the economics of mining and the 
need of the original mining houses to secure ‘reliable sources of finance and backward 
linkages into manufacturing to secure machinery etc.’ (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 28), 
and on the other hand exacerbated by exchange controls. The result was an unusually 
high concentration of capital across both mining and non-mining sectors. Anglo 
American for instance controlled 53.6 per cent of the Johannesburg Securities and Stock 
Exchange (JSE)  market capitalization and the top five corporations (AAC, Sanlam, SA 
Mutual, Rembrandt and Directors) together 88.3 per cent by 1985 (McGregor quoted in 
Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 28). 
 The repercussions with respect to the state-capital relations were less obvious as 
the 'Afrikaners first' policies were continued throughout the 1970s and the English still 
relatively excluded from government. Nonetheless, this level of capital concentration 
remained significant. Due to the above outlined diversification of many capitalists' 
interests but also because of increasing mechanization in all sectors and growing capital-
intensity (resulting in evolving preferences vis-à-vis labor market policies), the views 
among Afrikaans and English capitalists began to converge and unite them in their 
opposition towards apartheid measures whose costs to do business were judged to have 
become higher than the potential gains (ibid: 227). Afrikaner businessmen began to 
develop a distinct sense of their interests as businesspeople more so than as Afrikaners. 
Even though a survey among senior business leaders from the late 1960s revealed that 
differences between the two groups still existed, more than 70 per cent attached little 
significance to their ethnic background (Adam, 1971: 80-94). By 1972, the position of the 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Afrikaner board of commerce) became ‘indistinguishable’ 
from its English counterparts espousing classic free market and anti-state intervention 
tenets (Greenberg, 1980: 190). Business was equally united first in its worries about 
international isolation and boycotts as well as later, by the late 1960s, in its calls for 
changes which would ‘help our friends in the West to help us’ (Gerber, quoted in Lipton, 
1985: 232). 
 Thus, by the 1970s capital was much more consolidated as large swathes of the 
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economic assets were concentrated in few conglomerates. The cleavage between English 
and Afrikaners had subsided significantly as the latter have moved upward in socio-
economic terms in general and their respective business communities in particular 
became virtually indistinguishable.  
3.2 Labor 
This section continues the journey started in the second chapter and tracks the 
development of the two single most important elements of control over (black) labor: the 
color bar (vertical controls) and the migrant labor system (horizontal controls). 
3.2.1 Color bar 
As shown in the second chapter, the color bar had become an undisputable matter of fact 
by the mid-1920s. The period up to the 1970s saw its continuation as well as extension 
and tightening under the post-1948 governments. Beginning in the 1960s however, the 
dysfunctional elements of the color bar labor policies grew and its constraints became 
more evident. A continued maintenance of the economically costly provisions was 
beginning to be more widely opposed and led to the eventual abandonment of the color 
bar in the mining industry in August 1987.  
3.2.1.1 Continuation and extension 
The discriminatory 'civilized' labor policies of the Pact government from 1924 to 1933 
were to be continued by the successive governments between 1934 and 1948. The 1924 
Industrial Conciliation Act provided for the recognition and registration of trade unions of 
skilled labor and explicitly excluded in its definition of employees 'pass bearers', i.e. 
African men (and after the extension of passes to them, African  women) (Lipton, 1985: 
19). This gave white workers a key role in determining the occupational structure, access 
to training, and wages. Furthermore, the Act provided for the establishment of industrial 
councils (comprised of registered unions and employers) which enabled white workers to 
exclude non-whites by setting minimum wages for non-whites at levels at which it 
became unprofitable to employ non-whites (Feinstein, 2005: 87). In industries in which 
workers and employers were not organized, a three-man wage board, established by the 
Wages Act of 1925, regulated wages and conditions of work (Lipton, 1985: 19). In their 
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difficult task to improve wages and working conditions for white workers while at the 
same time preventing employers from replacing them with black labor, both acts had to 
be amended several time but ‘backed up by pressure on private employers exercised by 
the government through the tariff system, and by wider cultural pressures to conform 
exerted by the white society as a whole […] the legislation finally succeeded in its 
primary aim’ (Feinstein, 2005: 87). 
 The devaluations of 1933 and 1949, the opening of the rich OFS goldfields, the 
exploitation of uranium as a by-product and major savings in the costs of white labor 
saved the mines from another cost crisis despite the constraints on profits by the need to 
accommodate the interests of the white working class (Lipton, 1984: 116; Crush, Jeeves 
and Yudelmann, 1991: 82). After the National Party (NP) took over from the United Party 
in 1948, the 1950s saw an extension of the color bar in the mining industry and its 
entrenchment in the 1956 revision of the Mines and Works Amendment Act (Crush, 
Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 83). In the state sector, hundreds of blacks were dismissed 
and replaced by whites at higher wages, while in the private sector the NP supported the 
job bar by tightening it on the mines and extending the statutory job bar to manufacturing 
and commerce as well (Lipton, 1985: 24).  
 As a result, the ratio of black and white labor employed in the gold mines 
narrowed while the income gap between the two widened. In 1920, for each white 
worker, there were 7.9 black workers employed. As shown above, this ratio increased in 
the aftermath of the Rand rebellion to a high of 11.4 in 1922 but continuously decreased 
thereafter to 8.8 in 1929, 8.11 in 1940 and to 6 in 1953 (Yudelmann, 1984: 191; Crush, 
Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 83). Conversely, the income gap between black and white 
mine workers increased: in 1921, whites earned 15 times more than blacks, a factor that 
first decreased to 11.3 in 1930 and 12.1 in 1940 but increased again to 14.6 in 1951, 16.9 
in 1961 and a to a staggering 20.9 in 1971 (Lipton, 1985: 388).13  
                                                 
13 The African wages on which these ratios are based did not include payment in kind, which formed a high 
proportion of remuneration (48% in 1977). Changes therein obviously affected total remuneration and in 
turn changed the ratio as well.  
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3.2.1.2 Pressure and resistance 
By the 1960s, mounting costs and a growing shortage of white workers for protected, 
skilled jobs were pressing on the mines. Faced with increasing difficulties to obtain the 
required number of skilled white workers, occasional attempts to erode the restrictions 
posed by the color bar with respect to the employment of African miners in skilled or 
semi-skilled jobs, were always defeated by the white trade unions with the support of the 
government (Feinstein, 2005: 168).   
 In 1964-1965, the Chamber of Mines embarked on an experiment to relax the 
color bar. In twelve mines, selected black, so-called 'boss boys' were given additional 
responsibility in return for slightly more money. While this act may have been merely a 
first step in a conscious, thoroughgoing restructuring of the color bar, its immediate effect 
was marginal as the promoted black workers would only do a small amount of work 
formally reserved for white miners. Indeed, there a clandestine development in this 
direction had evolved for some time. As a result of skill shortages and productivity 
demands, white miners required their black coworkers to do part of their work for them, a 
situation, the Chamber and the Mine Workers Union (MWU) tried to formalize and 
extend in negotiations in which a package of concessions from both sides was made and 
sanctioned by the government. The initial support however faded as opponents grew in 
number, building on dissatisfaction among the rank and file of the union, and intensified 
their opposition in violence and wildcat strikes by early 1965. Due to the political 
sensitivity of the white mine workers' privileges, political pressure was mounting as well 
and by mid-1966 the dispute had become a national issue until finally the authorities put 
an end to the exercise. The elections in the divided union in the same year saw the voting 
out of the incumbent union leader who had supported the experiment and installed a more 
militant faction. As a whole, the mining industry pressure on the color bar had produced 
reverse results as it aroused the hostility of and politicized the MWU without reforming 
the discriminatory and costly labor policies. (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 85-88) 
 Nonetheless, disputes around the color bar continued throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s, most notably with regards to the application of the color bar in mines which 
wholly or partly lay in the Bantustans. In either case, the government eventually caved in 
to the persistent union pressure against any breach of the color bar (ibid: 90).  
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 The Chamber of Mines had therefore come to believe by the early 1970s that the 
main obstacles to the abolition or at least reform of the color bar were the mining unions 
rather than the government. Cooke, a former senior Chamber official, stated in 1971 that 
‘basically it is the opposition put up by the trade unions which is the restricting factor. 
The government has been very reasonable with the mining industry in these matters’ 
(quoted in Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 91). Indeed, the government had 
liberalized its labor policy to a certain extent by the late 1960s for urban employers, 
though not the mining houses. The so-called 'floating' job bar provided for the 
fragmentation and/or reclassification of traditionally white jobs while at the same time 
black advancement was still severely constrained as there were a number of qualifications 
that accompanied the 'floating' job bar (Lipton, 1985: 33). These were thus merely 
earliest and faintest signs of changes in labor policies related to the color bar.  
3.2.1.3 Erosion and abolition 
As early as 1955 Harry Oppenheimer, then deputy chairman of the Anglo American 
Cooperation, discussed the limits of the restrictive labor legislation both in political and 
economic terms (Oppenheimer, 1956). While he conceded that it is the only way for 
white workers to retain proper security, he also emphasized the need to pursue reforms 
similar to those achieved on the Zambian copper belt, where 24 categories of jobs 
previously done by Europeans had been handed over to Africans in agreement with the 
white unions. The argumentation though went further, and was repeated during the 
experiment mentioned above, in that an expansion of mining (and of the economy more 
generally) depended on a relaxation of the job bar. However, as shown above, the mine 
owners did not get it their way for quite a while. 
 The rise of the gold price beginning in the early 1970s took off some of the 
pressure on the mines. Nonetheless, after the mid-1970s negotiations between the 
Chamber and the unions didn't yield the desired results, the industry tried to find other 
ways, mainly by way of new technologies and production techniques (Crush, Jeeves and 
Yudelmann, 1991: 94) 
 In 1977, two major commissions were established to look into all aspects of labor 
relations including trade union rights (the Wiehahn commission) and to consider other 
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aspects of the use of labor, most notably influx control and stabilization (the Riekert 
commission). The Wiehahn commission concluded in its report that the existence of 
statutory job reservation was ‘immensely injurious to sound race relations’, that it 
imposed restrictions ‘on the very category of workers [...] whose better training and 
utilisation are a sine qua non for the future economic growth and stability of the 
Republic’, and that it could ‘only be seen as an impractical and inadequate measure’ that 
was ‘no longer tenable’ (quoted in Feinstein, 2005: 241). In the final report on the mining 
industry, published only after the 1981 elections due to political reasons, the major 
recommendations struck directly against the militant MWU as it recommended official 
recognition of black unions and their formal registration under the industrial conciliation 
legislation (provided certain criteria were met) as well as the abandonment of the color 
bar (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 96).  
 The color bar had been under pressure since the early 1970s particularly in 
manufacturing and was first officially abolished in the army in 1975 when the amended 
military disciplinary code gave blacks in the defense force the same status as whites of 
equal rank (Lipton, 1985: 60). The phasing out of the color bar in the mining industry 
extended well into the 1980s amid fierce opposition by the unions. Progress was slow, in 
1985 some relaxation was achieved when 10 percent of the apprentices employed that 
year were black but in August 1987 parliament finally did away with discriminatory 
policies and abolished the legislative color bar (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 97).   
3.2.2 Migrant labor  
As shown in the previous chapter, the mining industry had been dependent on the migrant 
labor system since the beginning. The long 1970s do not mark a fundamental watershed 
in this regard, as the system was continued beyond the 1970s. Nonetheless, developments 
were becoming evident that signified a change in the system. On the one hand, during the 
mid-1970s the industry began to decrease its reliance on foreign labor for external 
reasons, largely outside its own control. On the other hand, the progressing urbanization 
coupled with changing dynamics in rural survival within South Africa led to an increased 
focus on 'commuter migrancy', allowing for daily or weekly return to the home base from 
the working place. Labor stabilization was legally fully allowed in the early 1980s after it 
had been called for by the industry, most notably the AAC, for quite some time. In the 
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wider system of grand apartheid, such shifts are significant because long-distance, 
contractual migrancy has been at the core of government policy since 1948 (Crush, 
Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 14).  
3.2.2.1 Expansion within confines 
Given the restrictions the mining industry faced in tapping the domestic labor force, and 
the low attractiveness of mine work, the Chamber of Mines began to work vigorously 
towards enlarging its labor supply outside South Africa after 1920. The Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association WNLA successfully recruited foreign labor in Mozambique 
and the British protectorates (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) already by the 1920s. 
After it acquired governmental permission to recruit north of 22° south latitude in 1932 
(previously prohibited for health reasons since 1913), the WNLA began to develop 
transport networks, rest camps, and medical facilities to gain access to the labor pool in 
the new areas (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 37). This so-called ‘tropical’ labor 
pool was mainly drawn from northern Botswana, Southern and Northern Rhodesia (today 
Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively) and, most importantly, Nyasaland (Malawi). The 
number of tropical laborers increased throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s and peaked 
in the mid 1970s when  almost 120'000 came from Malawi alone (Lipton, 1985: 385). In 
1973 the proportion of foreign workers on the mines amounted to 80% (de Vletter, 1987: 
202). The dependence on foreign labor was not accidental and largely a result of low 
wages for black miners, the restricted access to the domestic labor pool and the belief of 
government and the mining industry that a foreign, contract labor system would produce 
a politically docile labor force (Leys, 1975: 207-208). 
 Despite its apparent advantages in terms of labor costs, the heavy reliance on 
foreign labor had major drawbacks for the mines as the events of the mid-1970s showed. 
The disengagement of Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1960s from the migrant labor 
system in the wake of decolonization foreshadowed the potential dangers from an 
excessive dependence on foreign labor that started to actualize in 1974 when an airplane 
crash killed 74 Malawian miners (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 105). Banda, then 
president of Malawi, recalled the migrant workers and by 1975 the Malawian workforce 
had declined from 120'000 to a few hundred (it would later increase again but never to 
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the same levels as in the early 1970s) (ibid). The next upheaval for the industry's foreign 
supply of migrant laborers was set in motion with the overthrowing of the authoritarian 
regime in Portugal in the course of the Carnation Revolution of 1974 and as a 
consequence of which Mozambique and Angola (among others but with no impact on the 
Rand mines) gained independence in 1975. In 1976, the FRELIMO government set up 
new administrative measures which drastically cut the labor flow and resulted in a fall of 
numbers from 115'000 at the beginning of 1976 to 50'000 at the end of the year (ibid: 
110). In anticipation thereof, the Chamber of Mines implemented a contingency plan to 
replace the Mozambican workers with those from the remaining foreign countries and 
from within South Africa (ibid).  
 The territorial extension of the migrant labor system, which had since the 
beginning of mining reached into the neighboring countries and beyond, got underway 
and organized systematically in the 1930s and gradually picked up pace in its delivery of 
ever farther migrant laborers. This expansion came to a halt in the 1970s at a peak of 
almost 80 percent foreign workers but declined thereafter to 48 percent in 1978 and 42 
percent in 1982 (Lipton, 1985: 385).  
3.2.2.2 Internalization without stabilization 
In addition to the declining share of foreign migrant labor, riots on the mines between 
1973 and 1975 also led to the departure of thousands of miners and thereby impacted on 
the degree of internalization as well (Lipton, 1985: 122). Luckily for the mining houses, 
the rise of the gold price facilitated this major change in the sourcing of migrant labor as 
it provided further room to raise African wages. The mines had been increasing those 
even before these events in the early 1970s and by 1973 AAC had abandoned the 
industry-wide cap (so-called 'maximum average') and began to pay wages in excess of 
this maximum. The increase of wages was certainly the most significant factor in the shift 
from foreign to domestic labor as the real African wages trebled between  1970 and 1978 
(ibid: 123). 
 Nonetheless, labor was once again critically short. In 1976 and 1977 the mines 
faced year-end shortages of 60'000-80'000 workers and while in 1972 320'000 recruits 
were needed to maintain the average total work force, by 1976 this number jumped to 
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544'000 (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991: 154). As noted above, the increase in 
wages eased the shortage. Meanwhile, the mines additionally employed various other 
means to control the labor flow among them reemployment guarantees, financial bonuses 
for early return to work, 'stabilization bonuses' for skilled worker upon their return on a 
specified date and leave certificates (issued for temporary paid or unpaid leave) (ibid: 
156). These so-called 'career-mining' measures helped to ease the labor shortage, which 
was already decreasing as declining growth rates and the recession in the mid-1970s 
resulted in increased unemployment and the rural homelands were no longer able to 
provide subsistence incomes for the families of migrant workers (May, 1990: 184). 
Increased poverty and deteriorating agricultural production as well as a relative decline of 
the social and economic costs of living permanently in the urban areas (alongside the 
relaxation of certain influx control measures) accelerated black urbanization to a point 
where these dynamics could not be reversed anymore (ibid).  
 These developments, namely internalization and urbanization, lead to a renewed 
debate on the feasibility of a shift towards a more stabilized work force that is settled 
permanently more or less close to the mines as opposed to migratory workers. The 
stabilization debate had first emerged in the context of the opening of the Free State 
mines (Oppenheimer, 1956). The AAC pressed the government to let it build family 
housing and intended to stabilize, as a first step, 10 percent of the African miners (Lipton, 
1985: 126). The intention was to stabilize the most skilled workers only as their turnover, 
recruitment and training costs were highest. Such a demand was contrary to the intentions 
of Verwoerd's government who extended migratory labor in the context of separate 
development and allowed only 3 percent of South African labor to be stabilized (ibid). 
However, Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann (1991: 169) show that not even by the late 1970s 
had the gold mines come close to the 3 percent limit permitted by the government. Lipton 
(1985: 126) argues that the highly restricting color bar was inversely related to the low 
degree of stabilization as the training required for the skilled jobs would have been too 
expensive in light of the enormous turnover of migratory labor. Other reasons for little 
stabilization include the state's continued wariness in combination with the 'independent 
Bantustan'-policy, the fact that most of the experienced and skilled workers were of 
foreign origin (a group that neither the mining houses nor the government had any 
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intention to stabilize) and the advent of 'career mining', which reduced the pressure for 
immediate stabilization (ibid). Furthermore, the mining industry itself was divided over 
the issue of stabilization, whose costs were perceived to be exorbitantly high and the risks 
and uncertainties of instituting a new system averted by simply adhering to the old 
system (ibid: 129).   
 In a move not directly related to mining, the state repealed the pass laws in the 
Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986 and replaced them with other forms of 
restrictions, aimed at facilitating an 'orderly urbanization' (de Vletter, 1987: 201). At 
once, the government removed most of the legal barriers to family housing and waived 
the old 3 percent rule for workers who lived in black townships (Crush, Jeeves and 
Yudelmann, 1991: 173). Thus, while the legal provisions preventing stabilization were to 
a large extent done away with, the actual migrant labor system with its single-sex 
compounds remained firmly in place.  
3.3 The state of apartheid 
This section addresses the expansion of apartheid and its related costs, the changing 
Afrikaans-English cleavage and the opposition to apartheid.  
3.3.1 The expansion of apartheid and its costs 
In 1948, the National Party (NP) won the election and would stay in power until the 
introduction of majority rule in 1994. The success of the NP reflects a clear shift in 
political opinion, even though it is partly owed to the electoral system. Due to a rural 
bias, working in favor of the NP, the party was able to win 79 out of 150 parliamentary 
seats despite garnering only 41.5 percent of the votes (Ross, 1999: 114). The NP had 
campaigned under the slogan 'apartheid' and quickly assured its hold onto power by 
enfranchising the whites in the mandated territory of South West Africa (today Namibia), 
disenfranchising the coloureds in the Cape Province, gerrymandering and the continued 
rural bias (ibid: 115). As a result, the NP was never in doubt electorally and could follow 
up on its campaign program 'apartheid'. 
 As shown in the previous chapter, the major building blocks of what became 
known as 'apartheid' had already been installed before the NP came to power, most 
notably the job color bar, land policies and pass laws. Nonetheless, a number of key 
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apartheid measures were introduced or extended by the NP after 1948. By 1970, these 
measures encompassed social, economic and political aspects of apartheid (Lipton, 2007: 
48). In 1949-50 prohibitions against mixed marriages and interracial sex were enacted 
and through the Population Registration Act of 1950 everyone was assigned to one of the 
national racial categories (black, white, coloured, Indian) which largely determined the 
individual's social and political rights, educational opportunities and economic status 
(Ross, 1999: 116). The NP also intensified economic apartheid through the extension of 
the job color bar, restrictions on black apprenticeship, training and education which 
contributed to the widening income gap between blacks and whites (Lipton, 2007: 48). 
Apart from the already mentioned measures enacted to ensure continued electoral 
success, the NP also rejected recognition of African trade unions and banned the 
Communist Party of South Africa in 1950, the ANC and the PAC in 1960. This 
strengthening and intensification of the most discriminatory features increased the overall 
political and economic cost considerably and as a consequence were eased throughout the 
1970 until by 1985 ‘practically all socioeconomic aspects of apartheid had been relaxed 
or abolished. But political change was still limited and ambiguous’ (ibid: 50). 
The political costs of the system rose with the radicalization of young blacks and 
the alienation of the black middle class and elite as well as with the growing international 
isolation of South Africa. Lipton (1985: 232) quotes Oppenheimer who warned that 
‘these things [international isolation and sanctions] could move very quickly … [and 
cause] continual trouble and severe difficulties in financing companies and selling 
goods’. The relationship between apartheid and capitalism had been a contentious issue 
as to whether economic growth and prosperity (capitalism) were mutually exclusive, 
compatible or even dependent on white supremacy and racial separation (apartheid). This 
controversy was embedded in the ‘liberal-radical’ debate (Nattrass, 1991: 654). As 
indicated earlier, the truth was somewhere in the middle for the first few decades of 
capitalist development in South Africa and racially discriminatory measures (most 
notably the vertical and horizontal controls of labor) didn't impede overall economic 
growth to an extent that would have necessitated significant reforms. By the 1970s 
however, Feinstein (2005: 250) argues ‘these dysfunctional elements of the relationship 
between apartheid and economic growth thus heavily outweighed those elements which 
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were beneficial for at least some individual capitalists who still relied primarily on 
unskilled, low-wage, African labour’. Apartheid also imposed higher costs on the state 
more directly in its capacity as employer in the state sector. In 1980 34 percent of the 
white, 16 percent of the coloured, 12 percent of the Indian and 14 percent of the black 
workforce were working in the state sector, making the state the largest employer in the 
country (Lipton, 1985: 235). As such it had to face the same pressure on costs that 
emanated from horizontal and vertical job controls as the private sector.  
3.3.2 The changing Afrikaans-English cleavage 
As previously discussed, the views among the different business sectors with regard to 
the costs and benefits of apartheid had been converging and the previous divisions 
between internally and externally oriented capital had to a great extent vanished. Indeed, 
rapid economic growth and ‘Afrikaners first’ policies reshaped the Afrikaans society as a 
whole. By the early 1970s the Afrikaners had moved beyond being a nation of farmers 
and workers with a small petty bourgeoisie. Eight percent were still engaged in 
agriculture while 88 percent were urbanized and only 27 percent were still blue-collar 
workers whereas 65 percent were performing white-collar jobs (although many at a low 
level) (Lipton, 1985: 307). Changes in the class structure were accompanied by changes 
in attitude. The proportion of Afrikaners favoring mixed sports rose from 4 percent in 
1970 to 76 percent in 1978 and those accepting blacks in the same jobs as whites from 62 
to 83 percent (over the same period). The gap between Afrikaners and English had been 
narrowing even though the English were still more liberal with respect to ‘a consistent 
policy of apartheid’ in general, supported by 25 percent as opposed to 78 percent 
Afrikaners (Schlemmer, 1980: 244). The narrowing gap between English and Afrikaans 
views on race indicates that the socio-economic standing, in other words, class, was an 
important factor in shaping attitudes. Other factors that conserved intra-white differences 
with regard to matters on race, included ‘the more systematic indoctrination of separatist 
views among Afrikaners; their embodiment in a system of separate cultural and social 
institutions; the time lags before attitudes adjust to changing circumstances; and 
continuing class differences between Afrikaners and the English, who still dominated the 
private sector outside agriculture, despite the striking Afrikaans gains’ (Lipton, 1985: 
308).  
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Among Afrikaners more generally, the emergence/intensification of diverging 
class interests, lay at the origin of the so-called verligte/verkrampte split. The vanguard of 
the verligte (literally meaning enlightened in Afrikaans) was to be found in the Afrikaans 
press, the universities, the think tanks and quasi-government research institutions (de St 
Jorre, 1976: 176). The verligtes argued that white interest can best be safeguarded by 
controlled change and thereby supported liberal trends in the government. Among other 
things this entailed the elimination of mainly petty apartheid features such as statutory 
segregation (mixed marriages, public facilities, sports) and the abolition of barriers to 
economic efficiency such as job reservation and other racially based constraints on the 
economy (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981: 229). On the 
all-important question of new political arrangements however, the verligtes were as 
abhorred by power-sharing and any form of political integration as the verkramptes 
(literally meaning restricted) and majority rule was out of question (de St Jorre, 1976: 
176). The verkrampte insisted that apartheid was a ‘way of life, a system of laws, a moral 
vision’ (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981: 229) and as 
such required that statutory segregation and strict political separation along ethnic lines 
be conserved. According to this logic, even small changes would have questioned the 
overall legitimacy of apartheid with presumably far-reaching consequences. While the 
reforms of the 1970s were a sign of slightly growing influence of the verligtes, their 
limited nature and the difficulties in implementation assured continuing dominance of the 
verkramptes (Lipton, 1985: 306). As the most basic difference between the two camps 
revolved around the means rather than the ends (both groups were in full agreement of 
the necessity for Afrikaner power and leadership to prevail and continue) the rift and the 
corresponding debates were regarded as irrelevant by the blacks and a growing portion of 
the international community (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 
1981: 229).  
According to Lipton (Lipton, 1985: 309-310) the slowly changing balance of 
power can be seen in the declining power of white agriculture, the erosion of apartheid 
labor policies favored by white labor and growing influence of mining and urban capital. 
The loss of political influence of the farmers can be seen in a number of policies 
including less support for marginal (small and unprofitable) farmers as well as a 
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reduction of concessional freight rates and generally higher costs as a result of industrial 
protection. The declining influence of white labor overall is reflected in the erosion of 
apartheid labor policies. Parallel to the slowly eroding influence of white agriculture and 
labor, the relations between urban and mining capital on the one hand and the state on the 
other hand improved. An area that illuminates the changing power balance was the 
relaxation of ‘petty’ apartheid.   
Despite these tentative changes, policies towards the English and foreign capital 
remained ambiguous. An illustrative incident was a conference of businessmen in 1978 
hosted by PW Botha, a Cape Nationalist of the verligte strain, during which he presented 
the broad outlines of a reformist vision. An observer noted that ‘many businessmen later 
looked back at the meeting with recriminations […because what the] 'rather naïve 
businessmen failed to realise was that we were, in fact, being ‘set up,’ […and that] ‘those 
conferences were nothing more than a forum for the propagation of government 
policies.'‘ (quoted in Handley, 2008: 50). An indication of the continuing attempts to limit 
the growth of English economic power can be seen in the refusal of Iscor to sell 
Samancor (then the West's largest manganese producer) to the highest bidder which was 
AAC, thereby ‘refusing to let the leading English corporation expand into another 
strategic sector’ (Lipton, 1985: 313). Likewise, according to Lipton (ibid: 312), the 
relative exclusion of the English from political power continued unabated, most notably 
in the drafting of the 1977 constitution, which was designed to secure political power in 
Afrikaans rather than simply white hands.  
Thus, by the 1970s, the English-Afrikaans division began to decline as the 
attitudes converge more and more in the process of socio-economically upward moving 
Afrikaners. However, this did neither translate into a significant move away from the 
relatively restricted access to political power for the English nor abandon economic 
favoritism of Afrikaners.  
3.3.3 Opposition to apartheid 
Marginalized non-whites had been playing a negligible role both in the state and in the 
economy as far as decision-making power was concerned. The growing opposition to the 
racially discriminatory system had significantly increased the already high costs of the 
system, most notably and directly in terms of security and political stability. It thereby 
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impacted significantly on the relation between mining capital and the state. Even though 
political power would continue to reside firmly in Afrikaner hands, from the early 1970s 
on, opposition pressure began to impact increasingly on government policy (Lipton, 
1985: 328). The 1970s do not mark a watershed in the relation between the white ruling 
class and the oppressed blacks of such magnitude that would justify the 1970s as the 
crucial turning point in the mining capital-state relationship solely on political matters. 
Indeed, even during the 1980s it was not yet clear to observers where the country was 
heading. In 1984 there ‘was no credible alternative government in sight’ (ibid: 328) and 
de Klerk's government's decision at the end of 1989 to open up negotiations with the 
ANC over a democracy was ‘a bold initiative that took both its own constituency and the 
black extraparliamentary movement by surprise’ (Giliomee, 1995: 87). In retrospect 
however, tendencies which were to lead to the abandonment of apartheid were ‘already 
evident in the late 1970s’ (Ross, 1999: 162).  
Growing internal opposition to the apartheid system since the 1920s had been 
based on several sectors of society dedicated to a broad range of measures ranging from 
peaceful protest to passive resistance and armed revolt. The primary opposition and 
resistance against apartheid were the ANC and its Youth League. The ANC emerged in 
1923 from the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) which was established 
in 1912. In the following years, the ANC pursued a ‘policy of petitioning the British 
Empire and the Union governments, a strategy that was an adaptation to the new 
conditions that the organisation found itself in, with the defeat of armed resistance’ 
(Suttner, 2010: 13). This strategy proved unsuccessful over time and was revised during 
the 1940s when the ‘African Claims’ became the ‘basic policy statement upon which later 
ANC documents were essentially based’ (Walshe, 1970: 278). This document reflected 
past ideals but also supported, together with the party's reorganization under Xuma 
(president of the ANC from 1940 to 1949) and Calata (secretary general of the ANC from 
1936 to 1949), the establishment of the ANCYL in 1944 (Suttner, 2010: 13). The 
formation of the Youth League saw the emergence of a new generation of leaders 
(amongst them Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo) committed to engaging in non-violent and 
disciplined mass action. In 1948 the Youth League drew up the so-called ‘Programme of 
Action’ which was adopted by the ANC one year later and which called for strikes, 
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boycotts and defiance (ANC, 1949). 
As a result, opposition intensified during the 1950s. Against the backdrop of the 
1952 celebrations of Jan van Riebeck's arrival three hundred years ago in Cape Town, the 
so-called ‘Campaign of Defiance against Unjust Laws’ (short ‘Defiance Campaign’) was 
launched by the ANC and the South African Indian Congress. The Defiance Campaign 
proved to be crucial in many regards. For one it led to the election of Luthuli as the ANC 
President-General and of Mandela as the Transvaal President and Deputy National 
President of the ANC later that year. Further, the campaign led to the foundation of the 
London-based Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa and the American Committee on 
Africa in New York, marking the first moments of the international solidarity movement 
with the struggle in South Africa (Reedy, 1987). During the campaign the system of 
apartheid was also brought to the United Nations General Assembly by a coalition of 
thirteen Asian and African states led by India (Reddys, 1985), a prelude to Resolution 
1761 ten years later. Most importantly however, the campaign generated a major boost 
for the struggle against apartheid in general and the ANC in particular whose membership 
rose temporarily from 7'000 to over 100'000 (Karis and Carter, 1977: 427). The campaign 
was carried on into 1953, drew thousands into political activity and led to the arrest of 
more than 8'500 activists. The apartheid regime reacted to the non-violent protests with 
physical violence and enacted laws that provided the legal ground for the long term 
imprisonment of activists.  
The 1950s also saw the establishment of the Congress Alliance, the joint anti-
apartheid movement which included the ANC, the Congress of Democrats (COD), the 
Coloured People's Congress (CPC) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC).14 The 
alliance was instrumental in the development of the Freedom Charter which was adopted 
at the Congress of the People in 1955 and stated the principles of the Congress Alliance. 
The document opens with the famous clause that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it, black and white’ and calls for a non-racial South Africa, democracy, human rights, land 
reform and labor rights (Congress of the People, 1955). As far as economic policy is 
concerned it remained rather ambiguous irrespective of pledges to restore the national 
                                                 
14 The party composition of the Congress Alliance reveals the ethnic division among the opposition which 
remained deep despite its commitment to non-racialism. 
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wealth of the country to the people which seemed to advocate nationalization of the 
country's mineral wealth, its banks, and monopoly industry (ibid). Economic issues might 
have been formulated vague deliberately in order to accommodate the different groups in 
the alliance (Handley, 2008: 58). In either case, the apartheid regime believed to be 
facing distinctly communist tendencies and laid treason charges against 156 activists in 
1956 (Dubow, 2000: 56). The trials lasted until 1961 when all of the remaining (charges 
against 61 had already been dropped in 1958 due to a lack of evidence) defendants were 
found not guilty.  
The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), founded in 1921, and the ANC 
had, despite sharing many objectives, ‘neither uncomplicated nor always harmonious’ 
relations (Handley, 2008: 57). Even though the Communist Party originally supported the 
white workers in the fight for the color bar under the banner ‘Workers of the world, unite 
and fight for a white South Africa!’ (led by the belief that a revolution in South Africa 
would be spearheaded by the white skilled workforce), by 1924 the party began the 
process of ‘Africanising’ the party and organizing black workers (Johanningsmeier, 2004: 
170). By 1930 the party had accepted that white labor was a supporter, not an opponent, 
of apartheid (Lipton, 1985: 183) and adopted an understanding that the advance to 
socialism is dependent on the mass struggle for majority rule in the first instance. The 
party disbanded itself in 1950 after the Suppression of Communism Bill had passed in the 
same year and was only reconstituted underground three years later as the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) (Everatt, 1992: 21). As an illegal organization it was involved 
in the Congress Alliance only through the multiple memberships of its personnel in the 
different organizations rather than as a party on its own.  
Not all members of the ANC were convinced by and happy with the Congress 
Alliance and the resulting Freedom Charter. The radical Africanists opposed the Charter 
which they saw as too conservative and not giving the appropriate attention to African 
power. The growing division between the Africanists who advocated a more pronounced 
pro-black strategy, and the Charterists who supported the non-racial principles of the 
Freedom Charter, led to the break away and formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC) in 1958 (Ross, 1999: 125). The two organizations, the ANC and the PAC, were 
competing with each other over the leadership in the struggle and hoped to bring about 
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change by way of major campaigns, most notably, against the Pass Laws, the most 
despised symbols of apartheid. At the same time, they underestimated the power and 
ruthlessness of the white-run state, all of which eventually led to deadly clashes in 1960 
(ibid: 129).  
The ANC had planned to mount a campaign against the Pass Laws on March 31. 
In an attempt to anticipate the rival organization, the PAC decided to move the date 
forward to March 21. The ensuing large demonstrations were held throughout the Vaal 
region and dispersed by security forces except in the Sharpeville township, where a 
panicking police opened fire on the crowd, killing 69 people (including 8 women and 10 
children) and wounding 180 more (ibid: 129). The Sharpeville massacre, as the clashes 
has since been referred to, led to nationwide strikes, unrest and massive international 
protests. As a consequence, the government proclaimed a state of emergency and banned 
the ANC and the PAC on April 6, 1960. It thereby marks the beginning of a period of 
repression, with greater and lesser intensity, which would last for roughly three decades. 
In turn, the ANC and the PAC were forced into underground and into exile. Another 
offshoot was the foundation of the organizations’ military wings, the Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation, or short MK) and Poqo (Pure) respectively. The struggle 
against the apartheid state would henceforth be, at least partially, an armed struggle. 
According to Dubow (2000: 76-77) the MK played an important role in cementing the 
working relationship between the SACP and the ANC as ‘it was largely through the 
Party's [the SACP’s] intimate links with Moscow that the ANC was provided with vital 
material and military resources’. Both Poqo and MK carried out a number of acts of 
sabotage but were quickly crippled by the government. Most of the ANC leaders were 
arrested at the Lilliesleaf Farm in Johannesburg. In the ensuing Rivonia Trial 1963-1964, 
named after a suburb in Johannesburg were the farm is located, the members of MK were 
tried for treason, sabotage and communist activities and sentenced to prison on Robben 
Island (Ross, 1999: 131).  
The repressive and reactionary responses on the side of the government stood in 
stark contrast to international tendencies, most notably the achievement of independence 
in African colonies. Additionally, the international community was growing impatient 
with regard to the gross human rights violations and in 1962 the United Nations General 
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Assembly passed Resolution 1761 which condemned apartheid and its policies as a 
violation of South Africa's obligations under the UN charter and declared apartheid a 
threat to international peace and security. The resolution also called for a voluntary 
boycott and established the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. (U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution, 17th Session, 1962).  
The crushing of the ANC and the PAC by means of ‘force, arrests, legislative 
restrictions and effective police-information network’ (Hirschmann, 1990: 2) decreased 
organized political resistance significantly but not the general dissatisfaction with the 
institutions of apartheid. Resistance filling the vacuum left by the now banned and 
successfully suppressed liberation organizations emerged from two locations within the 
South African society: the universities and the working classes in the cities (Ross, 1999: 
141-142).  
At black universities (instituted by the apartheid government following the 
doctrine of separate development and education), a growing number of African students 
coalesced around Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The ideas 
behind the movement came from a number of sources, including the exclusive Africanist 
emphasis of the PAC, the American Black Power movement, Liberation and Black 
Theology as well as from writings of Africans such as Nyerere, Kanunda, Nkumah and 
Fanon (Hirschmann, 1990: 3). The intensifying oppression of the ruling party, the 
declining strength of non-racialism and liberalism in general and the perception of the 
white-dominated National Union of South African Students by black students as not 
being able to advance their interests provided the local context for the development of the 
BCM's ideas. The movement, spearheaded by the Black Peoples Convention, founded in 
1972, and the all-black South African Students' Organisation (SASO, a break-away from 
the National Union), founded in 1969, had two prime concerns (Ross, 1999: 141). On the 
one hand it stressed the individuals' responsibility for liberation and the necessity for 
Africans (which in this context includes coloureds and Indians alike) to fight on their own 
and for themselves against apartheid rather than waiting for freedom and equality to be 
given by the whites. This required blacks to overcome division through a conscious 
appreciation of ‘blackness’ coupled with pride and dignity. The centrality of race was 
considered by the BCM activists to be at the heart of the struggle in South Africa 
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(Hirschmann, 1990: 4). On the other hand, the BCM learned from the earlier failure of 
the liberation organizations who acted too hastily in their confrontations with the 
government and who underestimated the power and determinism of the ruling party to 
suppress challenges to their dominance. The emphasis of the BCM was therefore non-
violent and focused on revitalizing black consciousness (hence the name) rather than 
armed struggle (ibid: 5).  
More or less simultaneously but largely independent from the more intellectual 
BCM, the second location of resistance in the form of mainly unskilled workers became 
more vocal in the early 1970s. Against the backdrop of declining (eventually even 
negative) growth rates and an increasing inflation without accompanying wage 
adjustments, the real income of African workers and by consequence their living 
standard, got under pressure. The African unions grew from two unions with 16'000 
members in 1969 to 25 unions with 70'000 members in 1977 (Lipton, 1985: 340) and in 
early 1973, beginning in Durban, a series of strikes broke out with over 60'000 workers 
participating (Ross, 1999: 142). The strikes sped up the revival of the African trade union 
movement, which had suffered a number of setbacks during the 1960s at the hands of the 
apartheid regime (Sithole and Ndlovu, 2006: 187-188). The revitalization of the African 
trade union movement was broad based, including groups such as church bodies, a large 
number of white labor activists, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
leaders, young union recruits and the BCM (ibid: 188-189). The most important impact 
of the Natal strikes in the wider context of opposition to apartheid had been its enabling 
impact upon an environment which provided for the revival of political unionism (Gwala, 
quoted in Sithole and Ndlovu, 2006: 192). 
A major turning point in the struggle against apartheid came in 1976 with the so-
called Soweto Uprising, an event with immense symbolic power. The uprising began as a 
revolt against government plans to teach Afrikaans in black schools but was very quickly 
directed against the whole system of ‘Bantu Education’15. Under the leadership of the 
South African Students' Association, the Black Consciousness organization in secondary 
education, about 15'000 youths clashed with the police, who first tried to disperse the 
                                                 
15 ‘Bantu Education’ was the apartheid educational system whose major provision was to enforce the 
separation of races in all educational institutions while discriminating heavily against non-white and 
privileging white learners.   
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crowd and then opened fire, killing two (Ross, 1999: 142). The photograph of the twelve-
year-old deadly wounded Hector Pieterson went around the world and became a symbol 
of the apartheid government's brutality. The struggle quickly spread across the whole 
country and the protests against the use of Afrikaans in African schools evolved into 
attacks on all apartheid institutions such as urban bantu councils, bantu school boards, 
beer halls and government offices, essentially ‘challenging state power whose 
foundations lie well beyond their [the pupils] social strata’ (Mafeje, 1978: 18). The 
uprising was put down with great harshness with hundreds of blacks killed and over 
thousands wounded, detained, put on trial, tortured and even killed in detention, including 
Steve Biko (Lipton, 1985: 344).  
As indicated above, the activists in the uprising were outside the grasp of the ANC 
and it was up to the BCM to raise awareness and consciousness among black South 
Africans. Nonetheless, the ANC gained most as the riots swelled the numbers of new 
recruits. It was estimated that by 1978, 4'000 students had fled the country to join the 
underground (ibid: 346). While the ANC was not in direct control of the uprising it was 
nonetheless consciously using the turbulence to foster its strategic goal of political 
hegemony (Marks and Trapido, 1992: 8) and did so successfully as the BCM dissipated 
in the late 1970s and was absorbed by the ANC, who in turn was able to establish its 
position as the dominant leader by the late 1970s.  
Thus, by the end of the decade, the major political tendencies which eventually 
led to the abandonment of apartheid were already apparent. Nonetheless, they would only 
materialize after ‘a fitful series of adjustments in the social and economic spheres over 
the next 15 years, deferring formative reforms in the political dimensions until the late 
1980s’ (Marais, 2001: 37). In this sense the negotiations following this ‘lost decade’ and 
the subsequent famous first free elections of South Africa in 1994 mark the ultimate far 
end of the long 1970s as construed in this paper.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In comparison to the previous juncture in the 1920s, the long 1970s saw the culmination 
of a number of trends which strengthened the position of mining capital. On the one hand 
the price of gold was rising despite having been fixed for a long period, due to both 
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currency devaluation and depreciation. On the other hand the abolition of the 
internationally fixed gold price in the wake of the Nixon shock provided yet another 
windfall, as over the mid-term the dollar price of gold rose rapidly. At the same time 
however, gold production also reached its peak as the law of diminishing returns fully set 
in and ever more tons of ore needed to be milled to extract ever less ounces of gold. The 
decline of gold was however offset by other minerals notably coal, diamond, copper and 
later platinum group metals.  
 The color bar remained the problem child of the industry as it was extended and 
intensified under the NP government. Attempts by the COM in the early 1960s failed to 
deliver the desired outcome as it only increased the hostility of the white unions and 
further politicized the issue. Indeed, by the early 1970s, the COM was convinced that the 
main obstacle to reform and possibly abolish the color bar were the unions rather than the 
government itself. Gradual abandonment in other sectors eventually led to a phasing out 
of the racial labor policies in the mining sector amidst fierce (white) union opposition and 
was finally brought to an end in 1987.  
 The migrant labor system, already firmly in place in the 1920s was likewise 
expanded and included by the 1970s most Southern African countries, now also beyond 
the 22° south latitude. By 1973 80% per cent of the total workforce on the mines was of 
foreign origin. This heavy reliance on labor was reversed in the 1970s as a number of 
events and trends led the mining houses to pursue more and more a strategy of 
internalization, that is recruitment of labor from within South Africa. This renewed the 
debate around stabilization. Even though the state prohibited stabilization to exceed 3 per 
cent of the workforce (until this limit was also given up in 1986), the mining houses did 
never even get close to those 3 per cent. This lends some substance to the notion of 
‘super-exploitation’ not least because the allegedly exorbitant costs related to stabilization 
were an explicit argument against it.  
 The division between English and Afrikaner capital and their societies in general 
did not vanish but certainly waned as the Afrikaners made considerable inroads into the 
economic realm. Industrialization, economic growth and diversification of mining capital 
into other sectors and vice versa spurred this declining differential and led to a more 
united stance against policies that were perceived to be against classic free market tenets. 
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This approximation between the two white sections of South Africa however didn’t 
translate into a significant shift away from the informal political exclusion of the English. 
The more important and in this case total exclusion of the other racial groups grew in its 
importance as the political and economic costs of the system rose to a degree by the 
1970s that the dysfunctional elements of the system outweighed those that were 
beneficial to at least individual capitalists.  
 The growing opposition from within as well as from without, a revived trade 
union movement, a changing international environment less inclined to turn a blind eye to 
the human rights violation and an ongoing economic crisis all materialized in the 1970s 
and made the eventual abandonment of apartheid in retrospect a mere matter of time.  
 The long 1970s represent a juncture which worked largely in favor of mining 
capital. This notion rests on the four arguments that firstly, the dismantling of major 
apartheid economic institutions and policies more generally and in particular secondly, 
the job color bar were finally abolished while at the same time thirdly, the migrant labor 
system was kept in place despite the major shift towards internalization, and fourthly, the 
growing convergence among Afrikaner and English (notably capitalists) provided a 
stronger basis more generally for the advancement of market friendly legislation.  
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4 Recent Developments in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa 
This chapter assesses the mining capital-state relationship in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Naturally, any historical analysis that draws nearer to the present becomes more fluid as it 
gets more and more complex to distill the long-term historic from the more short-term 
temporary changes. Over the next few pages, the recent and current developments in the 
three areas covered earlier, namely capital, labor and state will be examined in order to 
illustrate in which direction the pendulum in the mining capital-state relationship has 
been swinging these last 15 to 20 years and whether any forecasting could be derived 
from it. 
 While it is rather problematic to classify the period since 1994 as a new juncture 
or at least one in the making, recent developments in post-apartheid South Africa suggest 
a continuation of the long 1970s instead. The main point of this chapter is that of a 
further shift of the balance of power in favor of mining capital. This notion rests largely 
on three main arguments. First, the processes of corporate restructuring and offshore 
listings reduced the state’s leverage over the mining industry while second, the industry 
was able to conserve and continue the migrant labor system amidst governmental 
attempts to overhaul the system; whilst thirdly, the macro-economic policies in general 
emphasized growth over redistribution.  
4.1 Capital 
This section on mining capital discusses the latest developments in the economics of 
mining by focusing on the role of mining in the South African economy today, the 
structural changes associated with corporate restructuring and offshore listings as well as 
the changing nature of the minerals mix. The second part deals with the structure of 
ownership and control of mining capital in the wake of the BEE regulations.  
77 
 
4.1.1 Economics of mining 
4.1.1.1 The role of mining in the South African economy today  
The mining industry's contribution to South African GDP has fluctuated wildly in the last 
third of the 20th century. After declining to 9 per cent of GDP, the decade of the 1970s 
saw a reversal of this trend, mainly due to the rise of the gold price and other minerals 
such as coal and platinum and the mining's share of GDP rose to 21.5 per cent again in 
1980 (Jones, 2002: 68). As a result of the growth experienced in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors and the contraction in the gold-mining industry, the direct contribution of 
mining declined to 9.7 per cent in 1990 and has since not been able to rise above 10 per 
cent, oscillating between 6.5 per cent in 1997 and 8.7 in 2009 (DME, 2005: 19), 
(StatsSA, 2010a: 12). However, the GDP percentage on its own can be misleading as 
mining contributes significantly more to the economy through its many and diverse 
linkages. The COM (2010: 19) estimates that the multiplier and induced effects (currently 
included in the manufacturing sector) add another 4.5 and 5-6 per cent respectively, 
which would bring the overall contribution of the mining cluster closer to 18 per cent of 
GDP. Even though not the biggest employer in the country anymore, the mining sector 
still accounted for 35 per cent of the market capitalization at the JSE in 2008 and 
provides the state with about 20 per cent of its direct corporate tax receipts (ibid). 
According to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME, 2005: 9), in 2004 mining 
and quarrying contributed roughly 10 per cent to Total Fixed Capital Formation (which 
measures the value of acquisitions of new or existing fixed assets less disposal of fixed 
assets by the business sector, government and households), and accounted for more than a 
third (the COM estimates speak of more than half) of South Africa's total export revenue. 
4.1.1.2 Corporate restructuring and offshore listing 
After years of isolation during the dying years of apartheid, the cocooned and protected 
corporate world in South Africa was transformed quite radically and at an impressive 
pace in the second half of the 1990s. The dominance of the six traditional mining houses 
ceased to exist as such in the sense that they evolved from organizations providing all the 
technical, financial and human capital necessary for mining production into organizations 
with much more streamlined operational structures (Jones, 2002: 93). The most important 
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forces for corporate restructuring and the replacement of the ‘management philosophy of 
production maximization in the 1980s [with] shareholder value maximization in the 
1990s’ (ibid: 90) were the capital market and foreign institutional investors (Malherbe 
and Segal, 2003: 162-163). In turn, the complex system of interlocking ownership 
(usually referred to as the ‘pyramid structure’) was replaced by establishing separate 
profit centers focused on core competencies as well as diversifying and rationalizing non-
related assets to increase global competitiveness (Coakley, 2000: 25.3). The shedding of 
non-core holdings included the consolidation of ownership through minority buy-outs, 
transfer of primary listings abroad (notably London) and the purchase of South African 
mining assets by foreign companies. As a result, the shareholding structure of the mining 
houses changed from being ostensibly controlled by a small number of South African 
families to having a market capitalization owned to over 60 per cent by foreigners in 
2002 (Jones, 2002: 93-94).  
The economic liberalization also provided opportunities for (further) globalizing 
operations which at first took the form of regionalization. From 1991 to 1995, South 
African firms in general (not just mining), increased their investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa by a factor 5 to 25 per cent of total foreign investment in the region (Reno, 1998: 
54-55). Even though South African foreign direct investment in Africa rarely exceeded 10 
per cent of the country’s total outward foreign investment from 1997 to 2007, it has 
shown a tendency to increase since 2001 (Draper, Kiratu and Cézanne, 2010: 6). As 
foreign direct investment from developed countries to Africa has declined amidst the 
recent global financial crisis, the investments from emerging countries have proven more 
resilient with South Africa as the major developing economy investor before China, 
Malaysia and India (UNCTAD, 2010: 35). While these figures reflect South African 
capital in general, the tendency certainly holds for the mining sector equally since many 
local gold mines for instance were ‘close to being worked out’ which was ‘not the case 
for new acquisitions in the rest of Africa’ (Carmody, 2002: 263). Gelb (2005: 201) 
estimates that 15 per cent of projects in 2004 were executed in the mining industry. Given 
the industry’s capital intensity, the percentage in value terms is likely to be considerably 
higher. Indeed, the distribution of foreign direct investment shows a ‘concentration in the 
mining industry in terms of value’ (UNCTAD, 2010: 33) across Africa in general and 
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particularly in Southern Africa where South Africa’s outward African investments have 
been traditionally directed to (Draper, Kiratu and Cézanne, 2010: 6). The second 
globalization strategy of the South African mining conglomerates saw the shifting of 
headquarters and primary stock market listings abroad. This was done mainly to secure 
cheaper access to capital, facilitate foreign expansion, improve global competitiveness 
and reduce currency risk related to the volatility of the Rand (Walters and Prinsloo, 2002: 
61). Furthermore, offshore listings enabled the corporations to unlock shareholder value. 
Stock capitalizations of many companies in advanced economies are above their net asset 
value based on projected future profits. On the other hand, Anglo American's market 
capitalization for example was 22 per cent below its net asset value in 1995 (Carmody, 
2002: 263). By moving to London in 1999 (while retaining a secondary listing in 
Johannesburg), assets became denominated in the stronger pound, increasing asset values 
and share prices and by 2001 (two years after delisting), the value of Anglo's shares was 
37 per cent above its asset value (ibid: 264). Two years earlier than Anglo, in 1997, 
Billiton South Africa had became the first South African company to obtain a primary 
listing on the London Stock Exchange while keeping a secondary listing on the JSE (after 
merging with the Australian BHP  in 2001, the now BHP Billiton has listings in London, 
New York, Sydney and Johannesburg) (ibid: 62).16 None of the companies that relocated 
have terminated any of their operations as a result of their delisting and retained 
secondary listings on the JSE. The South African economy has consequently not been 
excessively sensitive to the relocations in terms of the aggregate size and potential 
growth of the GDP or the JSE market capitalization (Walters and Prinsloo, 2002: 71). 
Nonetheless, empirical studies estimate that the growth of South Africa's gross national 
product17 could have been reduced by about 0.5 per cent in 2000 but became almost 
negligible in 2001 (ibid).  
                                                 
16 Additionally, the diamond mining company De Beers delisted in 2001 which however did not entail a 
new listing on a foreign stock exchange. Rather, the company went private, with Anglo now owning 45 per 
cent, the Oppenheimer family 40 per cent and Debswana 15 per cent. The deal offered Anglo an escape 
from the cross-holdings which would have become subjected to penalties under new exchange rules and 
helped unlocking shareholder value (see above). 
 
17 Measuring the total output of a nation by finding the total income received by the factors of production 
owned by that nation.   
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4.1.1.3 Platinum group metals, coal and gold, the new hierarchy in the minerals mix 
The declining relative importance of gold had begun in the 1970s when production 
peaked and other minerals added diversification to the mix of minerals. The decline of 
gold was temporarily stopped by the price hikes in the 1970s and a constant depreciation 
of the rand. Even though the amount of ore treated increased to 89 million tons in 2000 
(compared to 80 million tons in 1970), the amount of fine gold extracted more than 
halved to 450 tons (compared to 1'000 tons in 1970) and halved again to 220 tons eight 
years later, caused by a downscaling owing to the energy crisis (Jones, 2002: 85; 
Chamber of Mines, 2010: 32). In terms of value, gold occupied the third place in 2007, 
contributing 38 billion Rand or 18 per cent to total mining sales (Chamber of Mines, 
2010: 20). As a result of the worldwide demonetization of gold in the early 1970s the 
nature of demand for gold changed. Compared to the dominance of central banks in the 
last 30 years, the COM estimates that in 2000, jewelry represented 75 per cent of the 
demand (compared to 11 per cent of investment and bar hoarding) (ibid: 34). South 
African gold production lost ground internationally as well and is now the third largest 
producer behind China and the USA (ibid). The fall in average grade mined cannot be 
reversed but the renewed interest since October 2008 in gold as a hedge against inflation 
in the wake of expansive monetary interventions in advanced economies, reflected in 
record-high prices (Müller, 2010: 51), is likely to slow down the relative decline of gold 
in terms of value in the South African minerals mix.  
In addition to its own decreasing output, the relative importance of gold also 
declined because of the impressive growth of pgm. Between 1980 and 1990 the 
production of pgm increased by 24.1 per cent and between 1990 and 1999 by another 
58.3 per cent (Jones, 2002: 87). Demand was largely driven by the jewelry industry, 
followed by the automotive industry and investment and accompanied by prices soaring 
more than fivefold (ibid). By 2007, the pgm have continued their success, accounted for 
78 billion rand or 37 per cent of sales and are by now firmly established as the largest 
component of the South African mining industry (Chamber of Mines, 2010). This will 
continue for the foreseeable future as South Africa is endowed with 87 per cent of the 
world’s platinum group metals reserves. The second most important commodity after the 
pgm is coal with sales worth 44.2 billion rand or 20 per cent (ibid), followed by gold, iron 
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ore, diamond in fifth place and a number of other minerals (such as Manganese, Chrome, 
Vanadium, Zirconium, Titanium etc.).   
4.1.2 Mining capital and the slow rise of BEE capital  
The restructuring and delisting of the mining industry that ended the dominance of the 
traditional mining houses was accompanied by government policies which impacted on 
the structure of ownership and control, altering the distribution of assets and income yet 
again in the direction of particular groups. In the second half of the 20th century the 
Afrikaners’ control over private industry had increased largely as a consequence of 
government policies, from 6 per cent in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1975 or to 45 per cent if 
state corporations are included (O'Meara, 1996: 80). 
A few and far between deals of share ownership transfer from white to black were 
conducted in the early 1990s but black business organizations, notably the Black 
Management Forum and Nafcoc (National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry) started pushing for an explicit policy (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 31). Even 
though the origins of BEE as a formal policy can be traced back to 1993, it was not until 
the 1998 Employment Equity Act (requiring companies to implement an affirmative 
action approach in labor recruitment and training policies), the Competition Act and the 
Skills Development Act (both in 1998 as well), followed by the 2000 Preferential 
Procurement Framework Act and the 2003 National Black Economic Empowerment Act 
(codifying BEE, providing a generic scorecard to measure BEE in a company or sector 
and a set of codes of good conduct) that the first key pillars of legislation affecting BEE 
were enacted (ibid; Hamann, Khagram and Shannon, 2008: 26).  
The recorded BEE deals suggest three distinct periods. The first ‘voluntary phase 
of empowerment’ (Butler, 2007: 16) that ran from 1996 to 1998 saw deals valued at about 
R20 billion and came to an end with a slump in equity prices (Nattrass and Seekings, 
2010: 32). Many of these early BEE deals involved borrowing large sums of money to 
facilitate the purchase of equity in an established company which proved unsustainable in 
the wake of the emerging market crisis of 1998, reducing BEE ownership of total JSE 
market capitalization to roughly 2.2 per cent from a previous 7 per cent (Handley, 2008: 
71; Butler, 2007: 16). A prominent example was the purchase of Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investments (JCI) by Khumalo from Anglo American in 1996. The share 
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price had collapsed just over a year later and the company had to sell some of its best 
assets back to Anglo American (Tangri and Southall, 2008: 704).  The second ‘period of 
hiatus’ (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 32) between 1999 and 2001 was only worth about 
R10 billion. The most recent period starting in 2003 saw an explosion of deals of about 
R60 billion per year between 2003 and 2007 and coincided with an impressive rise in 
stock market values (ibid). The impact of the recent financial and economic crisis on BEE 
is hard to assess at this time. The performance of the mining sector in the context of the 
mining charter might however be indicative.  
The development of a post-apartheid mining policy started with the Mineral 
Policy Process Steering Committee in 1995 which was mandated to conduct an extensive 
consultation process, leading to a green and later a white paper on minerals and mining 
policy in 1998. In the year 2000, the government published its draft Mineral 
Development Bill which resulted, after two years of acrimonious negotiations between 
the government and the mining industry, in the 2002 Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA). The old system allowed private ownership of mineral rights 
which had led (amongst others) to the domination of the industry by few companies. 
Under the new system, the existing rights holders have to re-apply for exploration or 
mining rights. The licensing of these rights was made contingent upon fulfillment of BEE 
criteria and preference given to historically disadvantage persons (Hamann, Khagram and 
Shannon, 2008: 28-29). As the bill represented a shift from the previous system of dual 
ownership of mineral rights to state sovereignty, the established companies were initially 
‘unhappy with the bill’ (ibid.) but had made peace with it when it passed into law in 
October 2002. The passing of the bill was preceded by the leaking of a draft copy which 
initiated a massive sell-off at the JSE. Within two days after publishing the 
‘Government's un-negotiated wish list’ (McKay, 2008), which included the transfer of 51 
per cent of all mining assets to historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs), the 
value of JSE mining shares fell by staggering R52 billions (Financial Mail, 2009). Both 
government and business, having been engaged in intense negotiations, were suspected of 
leaking the document ‘in order to place the other under pressure’ but insisted equally that 
there ‘weren't any malign political aims in the distribution of the leaked charter’ (McKay, 
2008). Either way, it spurred the passing of the bill which was specified and implemented 
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through the so-called ‘Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
South African Mining Industry’ (together with the MRPDA generally referred to as the 
mining charter). The new regulatory regime replaced the 1991 Minerals Act and 
bestowed custodianship of all South Africa's mineral and petroleum resources onto the 
state and imposes various socio-economic objectives on applicants for mining rights. In 
order to judge a company's past and present transformation efforts, a scorecard has been 
introduced which assesses nine aspects, namely human resource development, 
employment equity, migrant labor, mine community and rural development, housing and 
living conditions, procurement, ownership and joint ventures, beneficiation, and reporting 
(DME, 2002). The mining charter requires companies to meet all nine criteria, therefore 
rendering an entity either compliant or non-compliant. One of the key objectives is the 
transfer of 15 per cent ownership of mining companies to HDSA by 2009 and 26 per cent 
by 2014 (ibid). The previous BEE programs have been criticized on the ground that they 
were in fact not broad-based and that ‘a strange discrepancy exists between the 
motivations given by the ANC and the implementation of BBE programs by the ANC. 
The motivations are always on behalf of all 40 million blacks, but the implementation of 
BEE is almost exclusively restricted to the black elite – and to a lesser extent to the black 
middle class’ (Terreblanche, quoted in Hamann, Khagram and Shannon, 2008: 27). The 
broadening of BEE coupled with negotiated measures was ‘a crucial development for the 
mining industry as well as for the state's broader BEE programme’ (Hamann, Khagram 
and Shannon, 2008: 30). The mining charter marked the first instance that a major 
national sector reached agreement on how to include HDSAs in the future of an industry. 
The date of implementation was fixed at May 1, 2004 and it was agreed amongst the 
stakeholders to ‘meet after five years to review the progress and to determine what 
further steps, if any, need to be made to achieve the 26% target’ (DME, 2002). The five 
year period elapsed and on November 2, 2009, at the 120th annual general meeting of the 
COM, Susan Shabangu said that the review was completed and to be released in due 
course (without specifying when that could be) and that the ‘initial observations, 
however, are that we have not lived up to the spirit and intent of the Charter’ (quoted in 
The Citizen, November 3, 2009). Half a year later, the final report has not yet been 
published but a leaked draft has been circulating in the media in May 2010. It suggests 
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that only 9 per cent of the industry was owned by HDSAs and that while 84 per cent of 
the mining workforce was black, the senior management still consisted of 83.7 per cent of 
whites (MacNamara, 2010: 4). The charter provided a deadline for changes to be agreed 
upon by March 31. This has been pushed back for three months as the government and 
the industry are working out compromises. According to people involved in the talks, the 
26-per-cent-by-2014 rule is going to stay and debates revolve around other empowerment 
measures such as the ratio of HDSAs in management by a certain date, how much equity 
employees should own, the workings of preferential procurement and community 
upliftment (ibid). While the government is unhappy about the limited achievements, 
industry leaders are arguing that the given time period is too short and ‘quickly creates 
problems’ because it is not possible to ‘'fast-track' enough people into 75 per cent of 
management roles’ (Stuiver, quoted in MacNamara, 2010: 4) in order to deracialize 
management. Criticism has also been raised vis-à-vis the ‘check the boxes’-approach 
which is scoreless and produces two categories only, compliant and non-compliant 
companies. Coupled with that is the call for a more flexible approach with different 
timetables for different targets as well as a sliding scale (as opposed to yes-or-no 
categories) in combination with incentives for overachievement exceeding the minimum 
requirement (ibid). The little information that is available as well as the confidential 
management of the review process and the concomitant negotiations indicate, that the 
government and the mining industry are determined to not repeat the mistake of eight 
years ago, when an indiscretion dealt a massive blow to mining stocks.  
4.2 Labor  
This section breaks partially with the parts on labor in the previous two chapters as the 
black trade union movement has now become incorporated into both the tripartite 
government alliance and corporatist structures such as Nedlac. It continues the sections 
from the first two periods in the sense that key features of the post-apartheid labor 
systems are discussed, notably the development from excess demand for labor 
(particularly in gold mining) towards a shortage of skilled labor in the mining industry as 
a whole and the continuation of the migrant labor system as well as new patterns of 
exclusion. 
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4.2.1 The role of organized labor in the tripartite alliance and beyond 
As was touched upon above, labor organized in non-racial trade unions, most notably 
Cosatu played a crucial part in the struggle for democracy.18 During the 1970s and 1980s, 
the labor movement had associated, indeed equated, the capitalist economic system with 
apartheid and was determined to overturn both of them simultaneously but changed its 
approach by the 1990s towards ‘seeking incorporation into the new governing coalition in 
an effort to steer the economic program towards redistribution’ (Bassett and Clarke, 2008: 
789). After the 1986 general strike, the government in alliance with big business provided 
such opportunities in the various platforms for tripartite business-labor-government 
negotiations for labor reform (Iheduru, 2002: 54-55). As such the corporatist policy had 
changed from exclusive to inclusive in the sense that the black unions were, for the first 
time in the history of South Africa, included in the policy making process, albeit with 
limited impact (ibid: 54). In July 1991, Cosatu entered the so-called ‘tripartite alliance’ 
with the ANC and SACP, thereby increasing its policy relevance. Before the unbanning 
of the liberation movements in 1990, the union federation (together with other social 
forces) had already been the opposition on the ground, continued to be an important 
factor in the years of negotiations and expected to ‘wield real policy influence after 1994’ 
(Bassett, 2005: 66). Its views were central in the ‘highly consultative and collective 
process’ (Naidoo, 2003: 6) that led to the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), representing the general consensus of the liberation movement, which was shortly 
thereafter abandoned in favor of the Growth Employment and Redistribution plan 
(GEAR). The release of GEAR angered both alliance partners, the SACP and Cosatu, for 
its content, the process that had led to the new program and the fact that the government 
declared it 'non-negotiable'. As it became clear that GEAR would fail to live up to its 
promises on growth and job creation, by the end of the 1990s tensions grew between the 
alliance partners and the alliance seemed to be ‘no more than an electoral machine that 
comes to life at election time’ (Webster, 2001: 85).  
The other way by which Cosatu attempted to influence the government's 
                                                 
18 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was established in 1985 following talks 
between competing unions and federations. At its launch it represented less than half a million workers 
organized in 33 unions but has since grown rapidly and now counts more than 2 million members. 
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economic policies was through participation at the National Economic Forum (NEF) 
which later evolved into Nedlac (the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council) (Bassett, 2005: 66). Nedlac started operations in 1995 with the ambitious 
objective to seek ‘consensus and agreements between mandated parties on social and 
economic policy and to consider all proposed  labour legislation and social and economic 
policies before they went to parliament’ (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010: 42). Considering 
that ‘any assessment of the Nedlac role since its formation in 1995 would – in part at 
least – be bound to reflect one's overall perspective on the South African economy, 
politics and society’ (Parsons, 2007: 13), there is nonetheless general agreement that 
Nedlac did not succeed to become a forum for social dialogue over growth strategies. 
Having been an ‘active force behind the creation of, and an active participant’ (Southall 
and Webster, 2006: 141) in Nedlac, initially Cosatu made some inroads into labor market 
regulation through the Labour Relations Act (LRA) and the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA). However, the imposition of GEAR by the government 
sidelined and marginalized Nedlac reducing it to a ‘much narrower forum discussing 
predominantly labour-related issues; a form of limping and limited corporatism’ (Nattrass 
and Seekings, 2010: 44) rather than forming the institutional basis for a consensus-driven 
growth or development coalition. In this sense, labor ‘won the battle (with the LRA and 
the BCEA) but effectively lost the war’ (ibid: 43). Suttner (2010: 20) concludes that 
while initially Cosatu (and the SACP alike) were ‘still vibrant and full of interesting ideas 
and people’ they were later pushed to the sidelines and ‘treated like 'small boys'’ by the 
early 21st century. Despite these growing tensions, Cosatu opted to stay in the alliance 
and throw its weight behind the ANC in all the later general elections as well, guided by 
the not incorrect assumption that they would enjoy less influence outside the ANC-led 
alliance than inside. After it had been grappling for more than a decade with ‘what might 
be termed its 'ANC problem'‘ (Bassett and Clarke, 2008: 790), struggling to translate its 
close ties with the ANC into a commonly agreed socioeconomic reform program, key 
Cosatu members concluded that the only way to challenge prevailing economic policies 
was to ensure ‘that a more sympathetic leader succeeded Mbeki’ (ibid). Such an 
opportunity arose when Mbeki dismissed Zuma as his state deputy president (while 
remaining ANC deputy president with curtailed powers) on the basis of the Shabir Shaik 
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trial19. During the subsequent leadership struggle over the ANC and the Presidency, the 
left wing faction of the alliance, notably Cosatu and the SACP, threw their weight behind 
Zuma and successfully provided the necessary support during the ANC presidential 
election at the Polokwane conference in December 2007 which saw the defeat of Mbeki 
by Zuma.20 Even though the assessments of the rise of Zuma and the fall of Mbeki cover 
a broad spectrum, Southall (2009: 318-330) identifies no less than eight differing, at 
times conflicting readings, ranging from the restoration of democracy (by dispensing the 
sitting president from power by political rather than unconstitutional means) to a 
communist putsch. Despite being different the various readings share an understanding 
that the change in leadership represents a major turning point. Yet, this does not imply a 
structural change of the same magnitude as the rise of the Pact, Apartheid or ANC 
government in the 19420s, 1940s or 1990s respectively. Indeed, some considerable 
doubts can be raised in particular with regards to the boost the left wing faction is 
perceived to have enjoyed. A number of commentators noted that Zuma himself has been 
cautious to confirm a substantial shift to the left and indeed never ‘uttered a word against 
GEAR’ (van der Walt, 2006) which led Gumede (2007) to comment that ‘the major 
difference between Mbeki and Zuma is more one of style, rather than substance’. The 
first year of the Zuma Presidency seems to confirm Basset and Clarke's (2008: 787) 
observation that the failed 'insider politics' (Cosatu trying to influence government policy 
within the tripartite alliance from within rather than from the outside) had been 
reinforced. Indeed, Southall (Southall, 2010) notes that the coalition of the ‘left and the 
politically aggrieved that brought Jacob Zuma to power is now openly fragmenting, and 
Zuma seems at a total loss at how to deal with the process. As a result, there is a 
widespread sense of a vacuum at the centre of his government, with important policy 
matters drifting and the different tendencies fighting’. The domestic uncertainty around 
                                                 
19 Shabir Shaik is a Durban-based businessman who was charged and found guilty on fraud and corruption 
charges in 2005. Zuma himself was not on trial but his relationship with the accused entailed the passing of 
wealth to Zuma that couldn't be explained on a contractual or other legal basis, implicating a fraudulent and 
corrupt relationship between the two. In the aftermath of the trial Zuma was formally charged with 
corruption as well but the charges were declared unlawful in 2008. 
 
20 For a detailed account as well as the role of Cosatu and the SACP see Concerned Africa Scholars, 2010; 
Southall, 2009; Basset and Clarke, 2008. 
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who reigns in economic policy has come at the same time as the international debate 
about the architecture of the financial system has opened up significant amounts of space 
for discussions over South Africa's economic constitution. Draper and Dawe (2010) 
suggest two broad tendencies contesting: on the one hand the ‘disciplined left’, favoring a 
stronger role for state-owned enterprises (SOE), limited nationalization, less orthodox 
monetary policy and deliberate exchange rate management in support of interventionist 
industrial and potentially protectionist trade policies;  and on the other hand the ‘orthodox 
right’, supporting market-led reforms including privatization of SOE, no nationalization, 
more orthodox monetary policy, no exchange-rate intervention and micro-economic 
reforms including trade liberalization.21 Within the government, the latter is being 
supported by the treasury, the Reserve Bank and possibly the national planning 
commission while the former is evident in the trade and industry economic development 
departments, backed by COSATU and the SACP. As of now it is hard to predict an 
outcome of this complex mingling of actors, interests and institutions. 
4.2.2 Features of the post-apartheid labor system 
4.2.2.1 From excess demand for low-wage to shortage of skilled labor  
Shortages of unskilled, low-wage African labor had been a critical problem for the 
mining industry in general and the gold mines in particular, leading Leys (1975: 198) to 
contend that ‘the history of Southern Africa in the last 85 years [1890-1975] is essentially 
a series of attempts, by political violence, to produce docile, cheap, black labour’. Even 
though slightly exaggerated his basic notion is correct. Indeed, as shown in the previous 
chapter, the mining industry (and the overwhelming rest of the economy as well) was, by 
the 1970s and 1980s, becoming ever more conscious about the harmful consequences of 
‘many decades of deliberately diminishing the quality of work done by the majority of 
the labour force’ (Feinstein, 2005: 250-251). Shortages of unskilled labor have effectively 
ceased to exist as the unemployment rate has risen sharply and industry has become more 
capital intensive. Even though labor market data for the post-1994 period in South Africa 
                                                 
21 In addition to these two principal contending tendencies, Draper and Dawes (2010) see another group, 
spearheaded by the Black Management Forum and ANCYL leader Malema, that seems to be favoring 
accumulation of state-linked or -owned assets for the purpose of maximizing patronage and political power 
but without a coherent or obvious economic policy program. 
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are problematic for various reasons (such as differing sampling, non-coverage of former 
homelands in some surveys, small samples, etc.) it is possible to describe broader and 
long-term labor market trends rather than specific numbers (Kingdon and Knight, 2005: 
2). A comparison between labor market statistics in 1995 and 2002 indicates that while 
the working age population grew by about 2.2 per cent per annum, the economically 
active population (labor force) grew by about 4.8 per cent per annum resulting in an 
employment expansion that has been, in net terms, relatively poor, and increased the rate 
of the expanded definition of unemployment from 30 to 40 per cent and that of the 
narrow definition of unemployment from 17 to 29 per cent (Burger and Woolard, 2005: 
5-6). By the first quarter of 2010 the official unemployment rate was down again to 25 
per cent (StatsSA, 2010b) while the unofficial rate is likely to remain significantly higher. 
On the demand side the mining industry has experienced large declines in employment 
shares over the same period. The number of workers employed decreased by 18 per cent 
from 593'000 (equivalent to 6 per cent of the total South African workforce) in 1995 to 
481'000 (4 per cent) in 2002 (Bhorat, 2004: 952). In the first quarter of 2010, this number 
stood at 296'000 (2.3 per cent) (StatsSA, 2010b) more or less exactly equivalent to a 
reduction of the workforce by 50 per cent compared to 15 years ago, a decline which 
according to Burger and Woolard (2005: 17) ‘has evidently come at the cost of unskilled 
labourers’. Between 1995 and 2002, the proportion of skilled labor in the mining industry 
remained constant whereas the proportion of semi-skilled workers increased and that of 
unskilled labor decreased by 7 percentage points respectively (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 
2005: 23). The infinite supply of unskilled, low-wage labor has thus ceased to be of 
critical importance and was replaced by rising demand for semi-skilled labor. In the wake 
of the recent global economic recovery after the 2009 recession, the mining industry is 
facing once again another labor shortage, this time in the form of skills shortages which 
according to a Landelahni survey (2010: 2) ‘could hamper future growth’. Considering 
that the South African mining industry has an aging workforce, notably in respect of 
engineers and artisans, the current skills shortage is, ceteris paribus, not likely to dwindle 
in importance over the  next 10 to 15 years (ibid: 7).  
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4.2.2.2 The continuation of the migrant labor system and new patterns of exclusion 
One of the most striking features in the relationship between the state and the mining 
sector is the migrant labor system for the simple yet conclusive reason that it has been 
surviving ever since it had evolved in the mid-19th century. By the late 1980s, the 
stabilization of the workforce had gathered momentum as a result of the growing 
influence of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and, partly, industry initiative. 
The union was able to consolidate its success partially in the early 1990s when single-sex 
houses were converted into family units and living-out allowances broadened 
(Bezuidenhout, 2008: 182). Nonetheless, the plan to replace the migrant with a stabilized 
workforce lost momentum and did not materialize as the mining industry experienced 
economic difficulties in the 1990s and labor militancy markedly declined (the latter 
largely as a result of political transformation, retrenchments and the move of key labor 
representatives into politics and the private sector, notably Motlatsi, Ramaphosa, Golding 
and Motlanthe) (Crush and Dodson, 2007: 437). The industry reduced labor costs through 
a number of processes usually referred to as 'casualization' (see below) and by securing 
their continued access to foreign labor markets. In 1997, a Draft Green Paper on 
International Migration by the government proposed a fundamental overhaul of the 
migrant labor system. The proposal was successfully contested by the Chamber of 
Mines22 and the ‘status quo was embedded in successive proposals for new legislation, 
culminating in the Immigration Act of 2002’ (ibid: 438). The act provides companies the 
opportunity to apply for a corporate work permit to employ a predetermined number of 
foreign workers (instead of separate permits for each individual worker) and maintains 
the bilateral labor agreements by allowing corporate entities to regulate the recruitment 
and employment of foreign workers with their respective governments directly (ibid).  
Additionally, the industry sought to reduce its labor cost through casualization. 
Bezuidenhout (2008: 186) differentiates analytically between three distinct processes that 
overlap significantly in practice and are mutually reinforcing: casualization, 
externalization and informalization. Casualization refers to deviations of full-time 
contracts, implying part-time, fixed-term, casual or piece work. Externalization describes 
                                                 
22 For a review of the strategies deployed by the mining industry in the policy formulation process see 
Crush and Tshitereke (2001). 
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the interposition of a third party in the recruitment process leading to triangular contracts 
of employment with the mines as the end-user, so to say, of labor, the employee who 
offers his or her labor and an intermediary broker, agency or subcontractor. The upshot 
for the employer and the downside for labor is the resulting informalization of 
employment relationships which, as a result of its growing complex nature, makes it 
‘almost impossible to enforce regulations designed for standard employment 
relationships (ibid: 187). This may therefore imply clandestine employment with the 
resulting loss of power of illegally employed workers to challenge the prevailing working 
conditions. Particularly externalization contrasts sharply with the efforts in the first two 
decades of the 20th century when the COM was finally able to get a hold over the local 
labor market and consolidate a centralized recruiting system under its control (see above). 
Even though the proportions differ across different mines and minerals, by 2005 some 28 
per cent of the total mining industry workforce was employed by outside contractors 
(ibid: 190).  
4.3 The state of democracy 
As shown above, apartheid came under increasing and sustained pressure in the second 
half of the twentieth century both from within and from without. Serious signs of 
disintegration had already surfaced in the 1970s and the 1980s could be dubbed in 
retrospect a lost decade for South Africa as she stagnated economically and didn't 
advance in the single most important political matter, democratic elections open to all 
races. Notwithstanding the interesting question about the causes behind the eventual fall 
of apartheid and the negotiated transition, this chapter focuses more on what evolved 
after the seminal political change and how this affected both macro-economic and 
mining-industry specific policies. The most particular changes discussed in the following 
section include the irrelevance of inner-white cleavages, the rise of the ANC, its meaning 
for macro-economic policy making in post-apartheid South Africa and the debate around 
the nationalization of mines.  
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4.3.1 The end of the old white hegemony and the new irrelevance of inner-
white cleavages 
At the end of 1989 and after general elections, de Klerk (State President and leader of the 
NP) decided to open up negotiations over a democracy with the ANC and shortly 
thereafter unbanned the liberation movements. After four years of negotiations, South 
Africa's first (interim) democratic constitution was enacted in December 1993 and 
followed by the first elections in April 1994. The ANC won the election with 62 per cent; 
the NP came second with 20 and the Inkatha Freedom Party third with 10 per cent of the 
votes (African Election Database, 2010). After the final constitution was adopted by the 
National Assembly on May 6, 1996 the NP left the Government of National Unity 
(GNU). It reconstituted itself in 1997 as the New National Party but was inexorably 
heading south in terms of its percentage of votes. In 2005 and after two defeats at the 
ballot boxes in 1999 and 2004 National Assembly elections (in the latter case, the party 
was reduced to a mere 1.65 per cent) the party disbanded and its members of parliament 
crossed the floor to join the ANC (Kane-Berman, 2005). As a result, one of the most 
important political cleavages of the pre-1994 history of South Africa has vanished for 
good. The English-Afrikaans division, which had led inter alia to the Great Trek, intense 
frictions and even several wars, had simply and in an unspectacular manner evaporated 
following the first democratic elections. This is of course not to say, that these 
animosities are not existent anymore. Indeed, it is safe to assume that the English-
Afrikaans cleavage will survive for quite some time in one form or another. However it 
no longer has an impact on the political system and therefore falls out of the scope of this 
thesis as it becomes irrelevant for state-business relations in the mining sector. In the 
following, the attention will thus be turned away from the now insignificant inner-white 
cleavages and towards the new power in government, the ANC. 
4.3.2 Electoral success and political dominance of the ANC 
A cause as well as a result of the fall of apartheid was the simultaneous rise of the ANC 
from a liberation movement to a governing party holding a more than comfortable 
majority in parliament ever since free elections. As ‘the historic standard bearer of 
democracy, the party of the racially-oppressed black majority, of the working class and 
the wider poor’ (Letsholo, 2005: 5), the ANC capitalized on its liberation credential in the 
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first elections in 1994 with 62.25 per cent. In the years 1999 and 2004 the party could 
even extend the lead to 66.35 and 69.69 per cent respectively, securing a two-thirds 
majority. At the last National Assembly elections in 2009, the party lost percentage points 
for the first time, though still securing a reassuring 65.90 per cent (African Election 
Database, 2010).  
Given this overwhelming majority, it is no understatement to describe the ANC as 
being politically dominant. Despite its central role in South African politics, scholars 
have struggled to characterize its internal workings. According to Butler (2007: 35), the 
politics of the ANC have since the early 2000s become ‘increasingly unpredictable’. This 
uncertainty was owed to a large degree to an intense, internal power struggle over the 
party leadership between two camps led by Zuma and Mbeki respectively (see above). 
The two junior partners in the tripartite alliance (ANC, SACP and Cosatu) have depicted 
Zuma as ‘part of a socialist project’ and ‘involved themselves deeply in this rising against 
the ANC presidency [of Mbeki]’ (ibid). The role of the alliance partner and their 
influence on governmental policy has since become a hotly debated issue (de Klerk, 
2010: 31 and Suttner, 2010: 24) and intensified with Zuma's inauguration as President of 
South Africa in May 2009 and the more definite reshuffling of cabinet than under 
interim-President Motlanthe (now Deputy President under Zuma). The question is, 
whether the SACP and Cosatu are in fact ‘driving the Zuma project’ (Suttner, 2010: 24) 
as well as how and to what extent they are able to establish their vision of a ‘radical, 
working-class led developmental state’ (Nzimande, 2009). Needless to say this would 
result in a much greater involvement of the state in the economy and reflect a rupture 
with the macro-economic policies of the Mbeki-era. By mid-2010 however this did not 
seem to have materialized and Cosatu and the SACP do not enjoy more privileged access 
than before.  
4.3.3 Macro-economic policy in post-apartheid South Africa 
Despite being one of Africa’s oldest liberation movement the ANC didn't have clearly 
formulated economic policies as late as the early 1990s but instead relied on ‘an 
emotional attachment to the principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter’ (Williams and 
Taylor, 2000: 24), which was rather vague but contained some prominent redistributionist 
appeals. 
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In February 1990, Mandela asserted that ‘the nationalisation of the mines, banks 
and monopoly industry [in South Africa] is the policy of the ANC and change or 
modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable’ (cited in (Nattrass, 1992: 64)). 
Inconceivable as it seemed, change did occur nonetheless. The first signs of what would 
later become a policy shift were evident in a resolution on economic policy prepared for 
(though not adopted at) the 1991 ANC National conference (Lodge, 1999: 8) and the 
concessions that the ANC made at CODESA23 (Handley, 2008: 74). In the first instance, 
the ANC still called for a mixed economy with a large role for the state and redistribution 
but new emphasis was put on the importance of generating economic growth. While 
CODESA was primarily concerned with political matters, the future government was 
committed to a number of key economic regimes, most importantly the independence of 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and its priority on price stability as well as a 
financing facility with the IMF which obliged the new government to moderate macro-
economic management (Michie and Padayachee, 1997: 32).  
In the early 1990s, the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) was the closest 
to an economic policy think tank that the ANC had and, along with Cosatu, it supported 
‘'closed economic Keynesian' policies’ (Handley, 2008: 75). The first comprehensive 
statement from the ANC on economic policy came with the RDP in February 1994. 
According to Handley (2008: 76), this (February 1994) RDP Base Document drew on 
numerous sources but predominantly on the work of the MERG in the sense that it listed 
‘a large number of social and economic inequalities that needed to be addressed by the 
new government, but provided few suggestions as to how to prioritize these given a 
limited budget’. After the election and a number of drafts later, an RDP White Paper was 
published in September 1994, which revealed a shift away from the MERG position. 
Fiscal discipline had ascended from a means to achieve development to an objective in its 
                                                 
23 CODESA, short for Convention for a Democratic South Africa, was a negotiating forum, established by 
the end of 1991 and aimed at producing a new constitutional dispensation for a post-apartheid South Africa. 
All political parties with a proven support base could send representatives (though some parties decided not 
to participate, including the CP, AZAPO, the PAC and far-right groups). There were two rounds of 
CODESA-talks. CODESA I laid an important foundation for future multiracial talks and decided that a 
second round of talks, CODESA II, would be held in March 1992. CODESA II soon reached a deadlock 
and eventually failed over important issues, notably an interim government and constitution. Talks resumed 
later within the framework of the Multi-Party Negotiation Process and were brought to a successful end. 
(SAHistory, n.d.) 
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own right, the interventionist role of the state in the economy had been cut back and 
reduced to a ‘'neutral' source of management’ (Williams and Taylor, 2000: 31). Critics 
have argued that ‘the RDP WP [White Paper] represents a very significant compromise to 
the neo-liberal, 'trickle down' economic policy preferences of the old regime’ (Adelzadeh 
and Padayachee, 1994: 2) and therefore went too far. The markets on the other hand were 
surprised and pleased by the ANC in office as by 1995 exports had responded well to the 
new environment and business confidence surged to a ten-year high (Handley, 2008: 77). 
Volatility of the rand in February 1996 showed that all was not entirely well. The chance 
sighting of an ambulance in the vicinity of Mandela's Cape Town residence, leading to 
rumors that Mandela was ill, triggered a run on the currency (Handley, 2005: 225). The 
replacement of Chris Liebenberg by Trevor Manuel as Finance Minister and the NP's 
withdrawal from the GNU further increased business fears about political instability 
(ibid).  
In February of the same year the South Africa Foundation, representing big 
business, had produced its own growth document, entitled Growth for All (GFA), which 
rested on five pillars (law and order; macroeconomic stability and financial liberalization; 
reduction of budget deficit, tax cuts and reforms; deregulation, privatization as well as 
increased wage flexibility in the labor market; trade liberalization and encouragement of 
foreign capital inflow) (SA Foundation, 1996: 11). These pillars were conceptualized as 
equal in importance yet two elements stood out as central: the call for greater wage 
flexibility in order to ensure increased employment and the demand for a reduction of the 
budget deficit (by decreased government expenditure) in order to signal sustainable 
macroeconomic stability to investors (especially foreign ones) (Lundahl, 1999: 218). 
Naturally, the Growth for All strategy did not appeal to the trade unions who produced a 
counter strategy along Keynesian lines, called Social Equity and Job Creation. The 
government in turn released its own new macroeconomic strategy GEAR, short for 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme in June 1996. The program was 
justified as a continuation of the RDP by other means even though it exhibited a 
‘commitment to conservative fiscal policies, trade liberalisation and a shift from 
consumption to investment spending’ (Williams and Taylor, 2000: 33) and largely 
followed the suggested solution of the South African Foundation (Lundahl, 1999: 219). 
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As such it also highlighted the extent to which the government had come to see the 
importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as its adherence to ‘such neo-
liberal tenets as reduction of the deficit; rapid tariff reductions; exchange control 
liberalisation; privatisation; and even reform of the labour market (although it contained 
no programme for how to achieve this)’ (Handley, 2005: 227). The new framework 
stunned the political left within the ANC alliance as it was regarded as offering 
‘conclusive proof that the neoliberal path to development was finally entrenched in 
government thinking’ (Williams and Taylor, 2000: 33). On the other hand, the market-
oriented approach elevated inflation targeting (formalized in February 2000) and the use 
of interest rates above employment creation and an active role of government in 
stimulating investment and growth. It thereby ‘becomes one [the role of the state] that 
attracts foreign exchange and stimulates interest in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’ 
(Roberts, 1997: 68) and found appraisal for being ‘investor friendly and responding to 
many of the concerns expressed by business’ (Williams and Taylor, 2000: 34). The 
launching of GEAR did not actually end the RDP but from 1996 the separate RDP office 
was disbanded and the program deemphasized in favor of GEAR which occupied center 
stage.  
In the light of poor initial conditions, GEAR achieved impressive macroeconomic 
stabilization (OECD, 2008: 19) and real GDP growth accelerated to 3 per cent on average 
per year over the period from 1995 to 2004 (which compared favorably to the annualized 
0.8 per cent growth of the preceding decade) (Du Plessis and Smit, 2006: 28). However, 
per capita growth averaged at 1.1 per cent per year only and unemployment, inequality 
and poverty continued to rise (Hausmann, 2008). The recognition that the fruits of 
substantial economic achievements have not been shared widely enough and that those 
who had suffered most under apartheid were continuously failing to improve their living 
standards led the government to propose the third major development strategy since 
1994, the so-called Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) 
in 2006. Guided by its mandate to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014, the 
government consulted with a range of stakeholders and identified six binding constraints 
preventing South Africa from achieving elevated levels of economic growth (The 
Presidency, 2006: 3-4). These constraints include volatility and level of the currency; the 
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cost, efficiency and capacity of the national logistics system; shortage of suitably skilled 
labor amplified by the impact of apartheid spatial patterns on the cost of labor; barriers to 
entry, limits to competition and limited new investment opportunities; regulatory 
environment and the burden on small and medium enterprises (SMEs); deficiencies in 
state organization, capacity and leadership. AsgiSA thus targeted ‘massive expansion of 
infrastructure and skills […] to boost employment by prioritising the tourism and 
business process outsourcing sectors, both labour-intensive export sectors with 
opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses’ (Gelb, 2007: 27). The initiative has 
been welcomed by the SACP and (albeit to a lesser extent) Cosatu who are both ‘embracing 
the notion of a 'developmental state', which they take to mean an interventionist State 
machine that can actively shape the capitalist economy – hopefully in the interests of the 
masses’ (van der Walt, 2007: 2). Nonetheless, AsgiSA also drew criticism similar to that 
directed at the GEAR program ten years ago in that it follows the same ‘trickle-down 
theory of growth leading to redistribution’ (Ronnie cited in Bell, 2006) and that ‘having 
social democratic aims within a neo-liberal system is contradictory’ (Bell, 2006). In the 
meantime, the six constraints have been surmounted somewhat by the urgent priority of 
the energy crisis, conflicts within government concerning the best economic strategy that 
continue unabated and a new government in office. Despite remaining the ‘clearest 
overall strategy for South Africa's economic development over the medium-term’ 
(OECD, 2008: 18) 'clearest' in this instance is not clear enough as the role of the initiative 
remains rather murky and ‘the silence around AsigSA has been deafening since President 
Jacob Zuma's government took office in May 2009, and the programme appears to have 
died a quiet death [… being] dead all but in word’ (Lunsche, 2010: 43). A new attempt at 
developing a long term plan is currently being pursued by the Minister of National 
Planning, Trevor Manuel. To that end a green paper dating from September 2009 ( (The 
Presidency, 2009: 17) proposes a National Planning Commission in order to mobilize 
society around a commonly agreed set of long term goals, ensure greater coherence in 
government's work and longer term planning. As the country's past growth performance 
is examined and the underlying policy framework revisited under the Zuma 
administration, the concept of the 'developmental state' ‘has become a buzzword for 
certain officials and political figures’ (Poon, 2009: 2) and enjoyed a boost amidst the 
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global economic crisis but did not reduce uncertainty in economic policy making.  
The policy shift from the more 'redistributionist' RDP at the beginning of the 
democratic era to the more 'neo-liberal' GEAR and AsgiSA was generally regarded as 
having worked well for and in favor of the business community (Handley, 2008: 92). The 
results however do look mixed if pitted against the GFA document. The government 
succeeded impressively in reducing the fiscal deficit and the public debt to GDP, 
facilitated amongst others by the modernized SA Revenue Service, resulting in greater 
efficiency, a wider tax base and greater taxpayer compliance (Gelb, 2007: 19). Despite 
being one of the most important areas to business, the broader business community saw 
little positive progress in the labor framework (Handley, 2008: 91). The trade and 
currency liberalization attracted a mixed verdict. While the government's achievements 
on trade liberalization were assessed more positively, the lifting of exchange controls was 
argued to leave room for much further improvement (ibid). Even though some 
privatizations did occur (most notably Iscor and partially at least, Telkom), in general, 
privatization in post-apartheid South Africa had been slow, ‘with few visible results and a 
general feeling among observers and donors that governments' commitment to the 
process was generally half-hearted’ (Jerome, 2004: 3). By the end of 2006, 43 per cent of 
the country's capital stock was in the hands of the state and municipal authorities while 
the SOEs alone controlled around 19 per cent, compared to 22 per cent in 1995 and 20 in 
2000 (OECD, 2008: 65). In addition to these four key reform areas proposed in the GFA 
strategy, competition policy and BEE (see above) were two more policy areas of greater 
importance to business-government relations and in both instances reforms were 
introduced on the initiative of the state (Handley, 2008: 92).  
Thus the initial business hysteria at the beginning of the democratic era about a 
radically redistributive ANC gave away to surprise and relief that the new government 
‘had proved amenable to many of business' views on macroeconomic management’ 
(ibid). Business undoubtedly influenced this process but not primarily through a 
concerted strategy by resourceful ‘pro-neoliberal civil society groups’ aiming to swamp 
‘any lingering socialist tendencies within the ANC’ in an ‘ideological tidal wave’ of 
‘corporate scenario planning’ (Williams and Taylor, 2000: 26-28). Handley (2005: 211) 
instead suggests that business' influence was much more indirect and derived mainly 
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from two sets of sources: First, the international consensus after the Soviet collapse 
around the neo-liberal reform agenda and second, indirect signals from the marketplace 
by such means as the value of the currency or investor and business confidence.  
4.3.4 Nationalization of mines in the making or just a storm in a teacup? 
The lack of a transparent and coherent economic policy in combination with politicians 
‘more frequently invoking the ANC 1955 Freedom Charter – with its reference to 
nationalising the country's mining industry – than AsgiSA’ (Lunsche, 2010: 43) have 
provided a fertile ground for a renewed debate about nationalization, which has been 
spearheaded by the ANCYL (Mail and Guardian, 2009). According to Julius Malema, 
ANCYL President, at the moment ‘when the imperialist forces are accepting the failures 
of capitalism, we should ask whether the time has not arrived for the government to make 
sure that the state owns the mines and other means of production as called for in the 
Freedom Charter’ (ibid). Unsurprisingly the Youth League has come to the conclusion 
half a year later that the debate is not ‘whether nationalisation should happen or not, it is 
on how best we nationalise mines in South Africa’ and that ‘investors, businessmen, 
government bureaucrats and mining practitioners should begin to adjust to the reality that 
the democratic state is going to have greater control and ownership of minerals and the 
actual process of mining in South Africa’ and that it ‘will happen not in the distant future’ 
(ANCYL, 2010a; ANCYL, 2010b).  
The surging ahead by the ANCYL has ignited a debate which slowly gathered 
pace and reactions were not long in the coming. Mineral Resources Minister Susan 
Shabangu declared that the ‘nationalisation of mines is not government policy. In my 
lifetime there will be no nationalisation of mines’ (Mail and Guardian, 2010). In an 
address to the COM, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe assured the mining sector 
somewhat ambiguously that it should ‘take comfort in knowing that there are no 
immediate plans from the state to nationalise the mines’ (Motlanthe, 2009) and Jeremy 
Cronin, deputy general secretary of the SACP and Deputy Minister of Transport, 
reasoned that ‘extensive state ownership of the mining sector would on its own not 
change any of the underlying systemic problems in our broader economy’ and that unless 
it was part of a much more fundamental transformation of the economy ‘it would also not 
change the semi-peripheral status of South Africa in the global economy -  it might even 
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worsen this status’ (Cronin, 2009).   
Both sides of the nationalization debate agree on the continuing challenge to 
address historical inequalities through the participation of the masses in the fruits of the 
nation's wealth and adhere to the overall thrust of the Freedom Charter. The question is 
not so much about what but how to achieve it. Indeed, a form of nationalization has 
already occurred silently and unspectacularly as the MPRDA had vested custodianship of 
all minerals in the South African state and the call for nationalization of mines should 
therefore be evaluated against the effectiveness of this legal framework to meet the 
objectives set out in the Freedom Charter (Ngungunyane, 2010).  
In this light, the nationalization debate could be seen as a proxy debate for the 
more general economic policy direction between the three sections discussed above (the 
‘disciplined left’, the ‘orthodox right’ and the ‘predatory patronage maximizers’). Given 
the overwhelming though ambiguous rejection from the side of the government, the 
implementation of a 'nationalization' of the ANCYL sort, seems unlikely but should 
nonetheless be prematurely dismissed as a mere storm in a teacup either.   
4.4 Conclusion 
In comparison to the 1970s, the post-apartheid period seems to indicate yet another shift 
in the balance between mining capital and the state. The corporate restructuring and 
delisting from the JSE are probably the most seminal changes affecting the state-mining 
business relationship since 1994. The traditional mining houses ceased to exist as such 
and were transformed into much more streamlined operations by shedding non-related 
assets, diversifying, going global and focusing on core competencies. In consequence, the 
mining houses were no longer controlled by a small number of South African families but 
instead owned by over 60 per cent by foreigners. In sum, these developments decreased 
the leverage of the state over the mining companies. On the other hand, the contribution 
of the mining industry declined when measured against its contribution to GDP and 
employment. Nonetheless it remains crucial largely due to the industry’s many and 
diverse linkages with the rest of the economy, due to its role as an employer (500’000 
directly and another 500’000 indirectly) and as a foreign exchange earner (between 30 to 
50 per cent). The decline of gold production continued unabated (though temporarily 
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reversed in the wake of the latest financial and economic crisis, if not in terms of volume 
certainly in terms of value) but was more than offset by the rise of other minerals notably 
pgms, coal, iron ore, and other minerals.  
 The impact of the decline of gold production was more severely felt on the labor 
market as the workforce in the mining industry halved over the course of 15 years from 
1995 to 2010. In combination with growing unemployment hovering between roughly 25 
per cent officially and 40 per cent in an expanded definition, one of the major concerns of 
the mining industry for a very long period, the supply of unskilled, low-wage labor 
ceased to exist. Instead, as late repercussions of apartheid policies such as the color bar 
and bantu education, the new shortage is that of skilled labor which is affecting the 
mining industry to the point that it could hamper future growth.  
 In contrast to the color bar, the migrant labor system has survived the long 1970s 
and the mining industry was able to preserve it against government plans that sought to 
overhaul it. Concomitantly, the stabilization of the workforce has only seen partial 
success and new patterns of exclusion have been introduced through casualization, 
externalization and informalization of the labor conditions.  
 Organized labor (most notably in the form of Cosatu) has found itself in a position 
where it could pursue a strategy of incorporation into both the new government coalition 
and tripartite labor, state and business forums. Despite various advancements the strategy 
to shift economic policies towards a more redistribution through incorporation largely 
failed, which led the unions to believe that the only way to challenge the prevailing 
economic framework was through a change in leadership in the ANC and the state. Even 
though a coalition of the left and politically disgruntled had successfully supported Zuma 
in his bid to power this change in leadership did not actually represents a shift to the left. 
 Likewise, the macroeconomic post-apartheid policies have seen a gradual shift to 
more business friendly policies based on sound macro-economic fundamentals, notably 
price stability, reduction of deficit and debt, exchange control as well as liberalization, 
privatization and tariff reductions. In the case of the introduction of GEAR this was 
perceived by some as the definite proof that the state has firmly adopted the neoliberal 
path to development. Lately however an increased usage of developmental state rhetoric 
can be observed in general and more particularly in the debate around a South African 
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developmental state and the National Planning Commission. In what direction a possible 
new shift might be heading remains unclear (see above). The paradigm shift of the ANC 
from nationalization in the early 1990s to a more and more neoliberal framework was 
largely influenced by the international consensus after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
around the neoliberal reform agenda and indirect signals from the marketplace such as 
the value of the currency or investor and business confidence. It seems therefore highly 
unlikely, despite a modest relaxation of the neoliberal reform agenda, that a 
nationalization of the ANCYL sort will be considered a serious option.  
 However, other strategies of transformation might be pursued more vigorously in 
the context of the mining charter whose review has not yet been published despite having 
been due and indeed completed a year ago. A leaked draft indicates that the industry falls 
short of the targeted 15 per cent ownership of HDSAs by 2009, when only 9 per cent 
seem to have been achieved as well as shortcomings in the area of community 
empowerment and working conditions.  
 The recent developments in post-apartheid South Africa therefore suggest no 
further juncture but a continuation of the long 1970s further shifting the balance of 
power in favor of mining capital. This notion therefore rests largely on the three 
arguments that firstly, the processes of corporate restructuring and offshore listings 
reduced the state’s leverage considerably while secondly, the industry was able to 
conserve and continue the migrant labor system despite attempts to overhaul it by the 
state and thirdly, the macro-economic policies in general which were emphasizing growth 
over redistribution. Two developments that work against this shift in the balance of 
power include the skill shortage and the failure on the part of the industry to comply with 
the mining charter. Particularly the latter contains a latent potential danger for the mining 
sector as it increases the pressure on the government to ‘do something’ in order to satisfy 
the calls (be they now populist or expressions of real grievances) for redistribution of 
assets and incomes from the nation’s mineral wealth, including major transfers of 
ownership and changes in the racial profile of management. BEE policies that result in 
only modest changes will most likely be met with much black opposition, particularly if 
it continues to disproportionately benefit politically well connected individuals. If 
furthermore the mining industry does not comply with the mining charter by 2014 (as it 
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seemingly hasn’t by 2009), this could provoke a backlash carrying the weight to undo the 
advantages the industry was able to secure over the last 15 years.  
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5 Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been to trace the development of the state-mining capital 
relationship over an extended period of time in order to embed the current nationalization 
of mines debate in a broader historical context. The paper set out to confirm or dismiss 
Yudelmann’s argument that neither state nor capital have been able to dominate each 
other wholly but retained their respective relative strength and independence. This most 
central characteristic of state business relations was found to be valid until fifteen years 
after the end of apartheid. Nonetheless the balance of power between state and mining 
capital has experienced a number of shifts which suggest a periodization with two critical 
junctures, one in the 1920s and one in the long 1970s. Recent developments in post-
apartheid South Africa seem, as of now at least, to represent more a continuation of the 
shift that materialized in the long 1970s rather than a new conjuncture of its own or a new 
one in the making (see above).  
 The first critical juncture of the 1920s saw a mining industry that was determined 
to a large degree by the huge amounts of capital and labor required for the extraction of 
the geologically not easily accessible gold, the single most important mineral of the time. 
Together with the internationally fixed price of gold, the obvious area for cost reduction 
was labor, making an efficient and effective management thereof all the more important. 
Owed to this centrality of labor, the second chapter has in some detail outlined the 
origins, development and eventual consolidation of the vertical (job color bar) and 
horizontal (migrant labor system) controls. Capital engaged in the South African 
economy has been divided into national (mainly non-mining) and international (mainly 
mining) capital based on their respective social base and the nature of their inducement. 
This division overlapped with the inner-white ethnic cleavage between Afrikaners and 
English. The former ascended politically to power in the context of the Pact government 
in 1924. Based on the arguments that one, mining capital has lost the struggle over the 
color bar and two, the political rise of Afrikaner nationalists led to a shift of power from 
mining to non-mining capital, the 1920s were classified as a juncture that saw the 
balance of power between state and mining capital working against the latter.  
 The second critical juncture was characterized most importantly by the apartheid 
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system which was approaching its own inherent frontiers and eventually disintegrated as 
a result of its contradictions. The three areas discussed (capital, labor and the state) 
followed the same lines as chapter two but led to the conclusion that the long 1970s 
marked a turnaround shift in the state-mining capital relations in favor of the mining 
industry. This notion was informed by the fact that major apartheid economic institutions 
and policies generally and more specifically the job color bar were finally abolished. At 
the same time the migrant labor system was kept in place and the growing convergence of 
attitudes towards the role of the state in the economy among English and Afrikaans South 
Africans (notably capitalists) provided a stronger basis more generally for the advance of 
pro-growth rather than redistributionist macroeconomic policy.  
 The fourth chapter has covered the post-apartheid period since 1994. While it was 
rather difficult to dismiss or confirm another juncture entirely, the discussion of mining 
capital, labor and state related aspects in this period suggested no new or changed 
juncture. Instead, the processes of corporate restructuring and offshore listings, the 
preservation of the migrant labor system and the development of macro-economic 
policies in general indicated that the post-apartheid period was a continuation, indeed 
confirmation of the 1970s juncture further shifting the balance of power in favor of 
mining capital. However the failure or unwillingness on the part of the mining industry to 
comply with the mining charter, notably the transfer of ownership and management was 
identified as a major caveat which carries a degree of potential conflict that could well 
override the gains made by the mining industry and lead to a future reassessment of the 
early 21st century as the beginning of a new juncture in the making.  
 Overall, it has been shown that neither the state nor mining capital has been able 
to dominate the other wholly and that they both retained their respective relative strength 
and independence. The historical development of their relationship across two critical 
junctures in the 20th century and the recent developments in post-apartheid South Africa 
lend credible support to this assertion. Thus, pitting these findings against the 
nationalization of mines as brought forward by the ANCYL answers the research 
question stated at the outset and raises other questions. Without even taking into 
consideration further crucial aspects of nationalization such as practicability, related costs 
and not to mention the required capabilities, the historical account of state-mining capital 
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alone would suffice to put the ANCYL’s call in the realm of fantasy and utopia. It seems 
particularly unclear how a nationalization of mines could achieve better than other 
means, if achieve at all, a number of the otherwise more than valid goals as defined by 
the ANCYL. These include namely the transformation of the accumulation path of the 
South African economy; to safeguard sovereignty; to bolster industrialization, job 
creation and beneficiation; to transform unequal spatial development patterns; to increase 
the state’s fiscal capacity and ensure better working conditions (ANCYL, 2010b).  
  The combination of unlikely nationalization (informed by the historical account 
of the balance of power between the state and mining capital) and adamant calls for 
nationalization by the ANCYL thus raises the question whether the latter have more to do 
with ANC internal struggles and the not so far ahead policy conferences in the next three 
years (the national general council in September 2010, the national policy conference in 
2011 and the national conference of the ANC in 2012). Or has the ANCYL’s recent 
attention to nationalization been sparked by apparently little progress of the mining 
industry in the transformation process? And if so, does this indicate an ever growing 
impatience on the part of the ANC over the slow pace of transformation that could 
provide the basis for a shift in political power and potentially initiate a new juncture to 
the detriment of mining capital and in favor of the state possibly even on behalf of the 
masses which after all, apart from (at times indelicately low) wages, have seen more dust 
than glitter?  
 The history of the state-mining capital relationship in general and the recent 
developments do not indicate future shifts in the balance of power. There is a great deal 
of uncertainty with regards to the mining charter and how the industry has complied. It is 
likely that should a shift occur it would emanate out of this review process. Admittedly, 
the mid-term review process has neither been on time nor transparent but it is hard to 
imagine how the 2014 review of the mining charter (completing the 10 year cycle the 
industry was given to adapt to the requirements) could not have some sort of 
consequences. Future research into the assessment of the state-mining capital relationship 
should therefore focus appropriate attention to this review process.  
 There is a further dimension to the state-mining capital relationship which has not 
been attended to in detail but whose importance will continue to grow in the democratic 
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era. It is the question of how the people as a whole could benefit best from the country’s 
huge mineral wealth. Conventionally the discussion tended to see if not the state, than the 
society as a whole on the one hand and the mining industry on the other hand to be 
inextricably in opposition to each other. However, this thesis has shown that such a 
departing point had always been and continues to be impracticable and unsustainable. 
Maybe the time has come to think about this differently. How can the central 
characteristic of the state-mining capital (which some see as an anathema and others as a 
blessing) be approached to make it work for the benefit of all South Africans and the 
development of a more sustainable and equitable development path (rather than simply 
overturning it for example by way of nationalization)? 
 Future research will also have to deal more in detail with the impact of the recent 
global financial and economic crisis on the state-mining capital relationship, particularly 
with regards to BEE. The 1998 emerging markets crisis had exposed the unsustainable 
financial structuring of most BEE deals during the first voluntary phase of black 
empowerment and drastically reduced black ownership on the JSE (from 7 per cent to 2.2 
per cent). How the recent crisis has affected the ownership structure in the mining sector 
in detail remains unclear. The leaked mining charter draft review so far speaks of 9 per 
cent ownership in the hands of historically disadvantage South Africans. However it is 
not clear how recent the data is and how accurately it reflects the current situation.  
 Thus, while this thesis has developed a historical understanding of the state-
mining capital relationship in South Africa reaching into the democratic era and provides 
a coherent narrative of its central characteristic (that is that neither the state nor mining 
capital has been able to dominate the other wholly), there are a number of aspects that 
could not be covered and to which further research could add valuable insights. This 
paper carries the hope that it can provide a minutest assistance in understanding how to 
move this relationship forward and to the benefit of the people as a whole. 
 
  
108 
 
6 Bibliography  
Adam, H. (1971) 'The South African Power Elite: A Survey of Ideological Commitment', 
in Adam, H. (ed.) South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Adelzadeh, A. and Padayachee, V. (1994) 'The RDP white paper: Reconstruction of a 
development vision?', Transformation, vol. 25, pp. 1-18. 
African Election Database (2010) Elections in South Africa, [Online], Available: 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html [3 May 2010]. 
Alexander, P. (2000) Workers, War & the origins of apartheid: labour & politics in South 
Africa 1939-38, Cape Town: David Philip. 
ANC (1949) Programme of Action: Statement of Policy adopted at the ANC Annual 
Conference, 17 December, [Online], Available: 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/progact.html [12 May 2010]. 
ANCYL (2010a) ANC Youth League Statement On President Zuma's Parliamentary 
Response On The Nationalisation Of Mines Debate, 16 February, [Online], Available: 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=160843&
sn=Detail [23 March 2010b]. 
ANCYL (2010b) 'Debate: Nationalisation of the Mines. Towards the transfer of Mineral 
Wealth to the ownership of the people as a whole', Umrabulo, no. 33, 2nd quarter. 
Barber, J. (1999) South Africa in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bassett, C. (2005) 'Labour and Hegemony in South Africa's First Decade of Majority 
Rule', Studies in Political Economy, vol. 76, pp. 61-82. 
Bassett, C. and Clarke, M. (2008) 'The Zuma Affair, Labour and the Future of Democracy 
in South Africa', Third World Quarterly, 29, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 787-803. 
Beinart, W. (2001) Twentieth-Century South Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bell, T. (2006) Gear was a reversal of RDP; Asgisa is more of the same, 10 February, 
Business Report, [Online], Available: 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=3105404 [29 May 2010]. 
Bezuidenhout, A. (2008) 'New patterns of exclusion in the South African mining 
industry', in Habib, A. and Bentley, K. (ed.) Racial Redress and Citizenship in South 
Africa, Cape Town: HSRC Press. 
Bhorat, H. (2004) 'Labour Market Challenges In The Post-Apartheid South Africa', South 
African Journal of Economics, vol. 72, no. 5, December, pp. 940-977. 
109 
 
Bhorat, H. and Oosthuizen, M. (2005) The Post-Apartheid South African Labour Market, 
Working Paper 05/93. Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of 
Cape Town. 
Bienefeld, M. and Innes, D. (1976) 'Capital Accumulation and South Africa', Review of 
African Political Economy, vol. 3, no. 7, September, pp. 31-55. 
Bozzoli, B. (1975) 'The Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing in 
South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, April, pp. 194-214. 
Bozzoli, B. (1978) 'Capital and the State in South Africa', Review of African Political 
Economy, vol. 5, no. 11, January, pp. 40-50. 
Bunting, B. (1964) The Rise of the South African Reich, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
Available: http://www.anc.org.za/books/reich1.html [10 May 2010]. 
Burawoy, M. (1976) 'The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative 
Material from Southern Africa and the United States', The American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 81, no. 5, March, pp. 1050-1087. 
Butler, A. (2007) 'The state of the Africna National Congress', in Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., 
Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. (ed.) State of the Nation: South Africa 2007, Cape Town: 
HSRC Press. 
Carmody, P. (2002) 'Between Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy 
of Restructuring in South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 
June, pp. 255-275. 
Carter, G.M. (1955) 'Union of South Africa: Politics of White Supremacy', Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 299, pp. 142-150. 
Chamber of Mines (2010) History of the Chamber of Mines, [Online], Available: 
http://www.bullion.org.za/About/History.htm [12 May 2010]. 
Chingaipe, H. and Leftwich, A. (2007) The Politics of State Business Relations in 
Malawi, Discussion Paper 7, Research Programme Consortium for Improving Institutions 
for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG), [Online], Available: http://www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp7.pdf 
[27 March 2010]. 
Clark, N.L. (1994) Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Coakley, G.J. (2000) 'The Mineral Industry of South Africa', in USGS U.S. Geological 
Survey Minerals Yearbook 2000, Reston: USGS. 
Congress of the People (1955) The Freedom Charter, 26 June, [Online], Available: 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html [12 March 2010]. 
110 
 
Cronin, J. (2009) 'Should we nationalise the mines?', Umsebenzi Online, vol. 8, no. 20, 
November. 
Crush, J. and Dodson, B. (2007) 'Another Lost Decade: The Failures Of South Africa's 
Post-Apartheid Migration Policy', Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, vol. 
98, no. 4, pp. 436-454. 
Crush, J., Jeeves, A. and Yudelmann, D. (1991) South Africa's Labor Empire: A History 
of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Davenport, T.R.H. (1963) 'The South African Rebellion, 1914', The English Historical 
Review, vol. 78, no. 306, January, pp. 73-94. 
Davies, R., Kaplan, D., Morris, M. and O'Meara, D. (1976) 'Class struggle and 
periodisation of the state in South Africa', Review of African Political Economy, vol. 3, 
no. 7, September, pp. 4-30. 
de St Jorre, J. (1976) 'Inside the Laager: White Power in South Africa', Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 55, no. 1, October, pp. 169-186. 
de Vletter, F. (1987) 'Foreign labour on the South African gold mines: New insights on an 
old problem', International Labour Review, vol. 126, no. 2, March-April, pp. 199-218. 
Denoon, D.J.N. (1967) 'The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6', Journal of African History, 
vol. VII, no. 3, pp. 481-494. 
DME (2002) Scorecard for the broad based socio-economic empowerment charter for the 
South African mining industry, [Online], Available: 
http://www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/minerals/scorecard.pdf [13 March 2010]. 
DME (2005) South Africa's Mineral Industry 2004/2005, Pretoria: DME. 
Dollery, B. (1990) 'Labour Apartheid In South Africa: A Rent-Seeking Approach To 
Discriminatory Legislation', Australian Economic Papers, vol. 29, no. 54, pp. 113-127. 
Draper, P. and Dawe, N. (2010) 'Economic policy battle lines drawn', Mail and Guardian, 
12 April. 
Draper, P., Kiratu, S. and Cézanne, S. (2010) The Role of South African FDI in Southern 
Africa, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. 
Du Plessis, S. and Smit, B. (2006) Econonmic Growth in South Africa since 1994, 
Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 1 / 2006: University of Stellenbosch. 
Dubow, S. (2000) The African National Congress, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton 
Publishing. 
Erwin, A. and Webster, E. (1978) 'Ideology and Capitalism in South Africa', in 
111 
 
Schlemmer, L. and Webster, E. (ed.) Change Reform and Economic Growth in South 
Africa, Johannesburg: Raven Press. 
Everatt, D. (1992) 'Alliance Politics of a Special Type: The Roots of the ANC/SACP 
Alliance, 1050-1954', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, March, pp. 19-
39. 
Feinstein, C.F. (2005) An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination 
and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Financial Mail (2009) More CHALLENGES than ever BEFORE , 3 April, [Online], 
Available: http://free.financialmail.co.za/projects09/topempowerment/ktec.htm [31 May 
2010]. 
Fine, B. and Rustomjee, Z. (1996) The political economy of South Africa: from minerals 
energy complex to industrialisation, London: Hurst. 
Gelb, S. (2005) 'South-South Investment: The Case of Africa', in Africa in the World 
Economy - The National, Regional and International Challenges, The Hague: Fondad. 
Gelb, S. (2007) 'Macroeconomic policy in South Africa. From RDP through GEAR to 
ASGISA', in Gunnarsen, G., Mac Manus, P., Nielsen, M. and Stolten, H.E. (ed.) At the 
end of the rainbow? Social identity and welfare in the new South Africa, Translated from 
Danish by L. Dalgaard. Copenhagen: Africa Contact. 
Giliomee, H. (1995) 'Democratization in South Africa', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
110, no. 1, Spring, pp. 83-104. 
Giliomee, H. (2003) The Afrikaners: Biography Of A People, London: C. Hurst. 
Greenberg, S.B. (1980) Race and state in capitalist development: South Africa in 
comparative perspective , Johannesburg: Raven Press. 
Gumede, W. (2007) 'Zuma's victory may trigger the break-up of the ANC', The Guardian, 
19 December. 
Haggard, S., Maxfield, S. and Schneider, B.R. (1997) 'Theories of Business and 
Business-State Relations', in Maxfield, S. and Schneider, B.R. (ed.) Business and the 
State in Developing Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University. 
Hamann, R., Khagram, S. and Shannon, R. (2008) 'South Africa's Charter Approach to 
Post-Apartheid Economic Transformation: Collaborative Governance or Hardball 
Bargaining?', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 21-37. 
Handley, A. (2005) 'Business, government and economic policymaking in the new South 
Africa, 1990-2000', Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 211-239. 
Handley, A. (2008) Business and the State in Africa: Economic Policy-Making in the 
112 
 
Neo-Liberal Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hanson, H. (1996) ''Mill Girls' and 'Mine Boys': The Cultural Meanings of Migrant 
Labour', Social History, vol. 21, no. 2, May, pp. 160-179. 
Hausmann, R. (2008) Final Recommendations of the International Panel on ASGISA, 
Research Working Papers 08-032. Cambridge: Harvard University. 
Hazlett, T.W. (2008) Apartheid. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, [Online], 
Available: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Apartheid.html [5 February 2010]. 
Henshaw, P.J. (1996) 'Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Production, 
Capital Investment and Agricultural Markets, 1931-1961', The Historical Journal, vol. 
39, no. 1, March, pp. 197-223. 
Henshaw, P. (1998) 'The 'Key to South Africa' in the 1890s: Delgoa Bay and the Origins 
of the South African War', Journal of Southern Afircan Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, September, 
pp. 527-543. 
Hirschmann, D. (1990) 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, March, pp. 1-22. 
Horwitz, R. (1967) The Political Economy of South Africa, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
Iheduru, O.C. (2002) 'Social Concertation, Labour Unions and the Creation of a Black 
Bourgeoisie in South Africa', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 
47-85. 
Iheduru, O.C. (2008) 'Why 'Anglo licks the ANC's boots': Globalization and State-Capital 
Relations in South Africa', African Affairs, vol. 107, no. 428, pp. 333-360. 
Jeeves, A. (1985) Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for 
the Gold Mines' Labour Supply 1890-1920, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Jerome, A. (2004) Privatisation and Regulation in South Africa. An Evaluation, Centre 
on Regulation and Competition 3rd International Conference on Pro-Poor Regulation and 
Competition: Issues, Policies and Practices, 7-9 September 2004, Cape Town. 
Johannesburg: National Institute for Economic Policy. 
Johanningsmeier, E. (2004) 'Communists and Black Freedom Movements in South Africa 
and the US: 1919-1950', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, March, pp. 
155-180. 
Johnstone, F.A. (1976) Class, race and gold: a study of class relations and racial 
discrimination in South Africa, Lanham: University Press of America. 
Jones, S. (2002) 'The mining sector, 1970 – 2000', in Jones, S. (ed.) The Decline of the 
113 
 
South African Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jones, S. and Müller, A. (1992) The South African Economy, 1910-1990, London: 
Macmillan. 
Kane-Berman, J. (2005) ANC and former National Party now have much in common, 
[Online], Available: http://www.sairr.org.za/press-office/institute-opinion/anc-and-
former-national-party-now-have-much-in-common.html/ [March 30 2010]. 
Kaplan, D. (1976) 'The Politics of Industrial Protection in South Africa, 1910-1939', The 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, October, pp. 70-91. 
Karis, T. and Carter, G. (1977) From Protest to Challenge: a documentary history of 
African politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Stanford: Hoover Institute. 
Katz, E.N. (1999) 'Revisiting the Origins of the Industrial Colour Bar in the 
Witwatersrand Gold Ming Industry, 1891-1899', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 
25, no. 1, pp. 73-79. 
Katzenellenbogen, S.E. (1982) South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Railways, 
Labour and Trade in the Making of a Relationship, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Kinder, H. (2006) dtv-Atlas der Weltgeschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 
38th edition, München: dtv. 
Landelahni (2010) Fast Fact: Mining Research Report 2010, Johannesburg: Landelahni 
Business Leaders. 
Leftwich, A. (2009) Analysing the Politics of State-Business Relations: A methodological 
concept note on the historical institutionalist approach, Discussion Paper 23a, Research 
Programme Consortium for Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG), 
[Online], Available: http://www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp23a.pdf [22 March 2010]. 
Legassick, M. and Wolpe, H. (1967) 'The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South 
Africa', Review of African Political Economy, vol. 7, no. Special Issue on South Africa, 
pp. 87-107. 
Letsholo, S. (2005) How the ANC Won the 2004 Elections: Perspectives on Voting 
Behavious in South Africa, EISA Occasional Paper Number 31. Johannesburg: EISA. 
Levy, N. (1982) The foundations of the South African cheap labour system, Londen: 
Routledge and Kegan. 
Leys, R. (1975) 'South African Gold Mining in 1974: 'The Gold of Migrant Labour'', 
African Affairs, vol. 295, no. 196-208, April, p. 74. 
Lindblom, C. (1977) Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books. 
114 
 
Lipton, M. (1980) 'Men of two worlds: Migrant labour in South Africa', Optima, vol. 29, 
no. 2&3, pp. 77-201. 
Lipton, M. (1985) Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84, Aldershot: Gower. 
Lipton, M. (2007) Liberals, Marxists, and Nationalists: Competing Interpretations of 
South African History, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lodge, T. (1999) 'Policy Process within the African National Congress and the Tripartite 
Alliance', Politikon, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 5-32. 
Louw, L. (2010) Idiot's Guide to Nationalisation, 2 February, [Online], Available: 
http://www.freemarketfoundation.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleType=Publication&Articl
eID=1533 [23 March 2010]. 
Lundahl, M. (1999) 'The new South Africa: growth or stagnation?', in Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
S. (ed.) The African economy, London: Routledge. 
Lunsche, S. (2010) 'AsgiSA's quiet death', The Wits Business School Journal, vol. 1, no. 
20, pp. 43-44. 
Macdonald, A.F. (1953) 'Politics in the Union of South Africa', Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 288, no. 1, July, pp. 140-152. 
MacNamara, W. (2010) 'Fierce debate over transfer of power. Financial Times Special 
Report „South Africa: Finance and Investment“', Financial Times, 21 April, pp. 1-4, 
Available: http://media.ft.com/cms/db67fada-4c1e-11df-a217-00144feab49a.pdf [12 May 
2010]. 
Mafeje, A. (1978) 'Soweto and its aftermath', Review of African Political Economy, vol. 
5, no. 11, January, pp. 17-30. 
Magubane, B.M. (1996) The making of a racist state: British Imperialism and the Union 
of South Africa, 1875-1910, Trenton: Africa Research and Publications. 
Mail and Guardian (2009) Cosaut backs MAlema's call for nationalisation of mines, 3 
July, [Online], Available: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-03-cosatu-backs-
malemas-call-for-nationalisation-of-mines [17 March 2010]. 
Mail and Guardian (2010) 'Nationalisation of mines is not govt policy', 2 February, 
[Online], Available: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-02-02-nationalisation-of-mines-is-
not-govt-policy [13 March 2010]. 
Malherbe, S. and Segal, N. (2003) 'South Africa: After Apartheid.OECD Development 
Centre and Centre for International Private Enterprise.', in Oman, C.P. (ed.) Corporate 
Governance in Development: The Experiences of Brazil, Chile, India and South Africa, 
Paris: OECD and CIPE. 
115 
 
Marais, H. (2001) South Africa: Limits To Change. The Political Economy of Transition, 
Revised edition, Cape Town: UCT Press. 
Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (1987) The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in the 
Twentieth-Century South Africa, Longman: London. 
Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (1992) 'Introduction', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 
18, no. 1, March, pp. 1-18. 
Marx, A.W. (1992) 'The State, Economy, and Self-Determination in South Africa', 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 107, no. 4, Winter, pp. 655-675. 
May, J. (1990) 'The migrant labour system: changing dynamics in rural survival', in 
Nattrass, N. and Ardington, E. (ed.) The pollitical economy of South Africa, London: 
Oxford University Press. 
McKay, D. (2008) Time to rechart, 21 September, [Online], Available: 
http://www.miningmx.com/mybk08/762046.htm [18 March 2008]. 
Michie, J. and Padayachee, V. (1997) The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition, 
London: The Dryden Press. 
Morrel, R. (1988) 'The Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Afirca in 
the 1920s', The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 
619-635. 
Morris, M.L. (1976) 'The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture: Class 
Struggle in the Countryside', Economy and Society, vol. 5, no. 3, August, pp. 292-343. 
Morris, M. (1982) 'The Development of Capitalism in South Africa', in Murray, M.J. (ed.) 
South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. 
Motlanthe, K. (2009) Addresws by the Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, at the 
Chamber of Mines of South Africa AGM dinner, Johannesburg Country Club, 2 
November 2009, Pretoria: The Presidency. 
Müller, S. (2010) 'Chancen für Edelmetalle in der Markterholung', Handelszeitung, 26 
May, p. 51. 
Murray, M.J. (1982) 'The Development of Capitalist Production Processes: The Mining 
Industry, the Demand for Labour and the Transformation of the Countryside 1870-1910', 
in Murray, M.J. (ed.) South AFrican Capitalism and Black Political Opposition, 
Cambride, MA: Schenkman. 
Naidoo, R. (2003) The union movement and South Africa's transition, 1994 - 2003, Paper 
presented to a Centre for Policy Studies seminar, 23 June. 
Nattrass, N. (1991) 'Controversies about Capitalism and Apartheid in South Africa: An 
116 
 
Economic Perspective', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, December, 
pp. 654-677. 
Nattrass, N. (1992) 'The A.N.C.'s economic policy: a critical perspective', in Shrire, R. 
(ed.) Wealth or Poverty: critical choices for South Africa, Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press. 
Nattrass, N. (1994) 'Economic Restructuring in South Africa: The Debate Continues', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, December, pp. 517-531. 
Nattrass, N. and Seekings, J. (2010) State, Business and Growth in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, 15 March, [Online], Available: http://www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp34a.pdf. 
Ngungunyane, M.Z. (2010) 'The Nationalization of mines debate: Another Perspective', 
Umrabulo, no. 33, 2nd quarter. 
Nzimande, B. (2009) Building working class hegemony on a terrain of the national 
democratic struggle. SACP MEssage to 10th Cosatu Congress., 21 September, [Online], 
Available: http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=docs/suppmsgs/2009/cosatu.html 
[15 March 2010]. 
OECD (2008) OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa Economic Assessment, Paris: 
OECD. 
O'Meara, D. (1996) Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the 
National Party 1948-1994, Randburg: Ravan Press. 
Oppenheimer, H.F. (1956) 'Industrial Relations in a Multi-Racial Society', African 
Affairs, vol. 55, no. 221, October, pp. 313-319. 
Parpart, J.L. (1986) 'The Household and the Mine Shaft: Gender and Class Struggles on 
the Zambian Copperbelt, 1926-64', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, 
October, pp. 36-56. 
Parsons, R. (2007) 'The Emergence of Institutionalised Social Dialogue in South Africa', 
South African Journal of Economics, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Poon, D. (2009) South Africa's Developmental State Makeover, Working Paper Series 
2009-04. Pretoria: TIPS. 
Prothero, R.M. (1974) 'Foreign Migrant Labour for South Africa', International 
Migration Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 383-394. 
Reddys, E.S. (1985) India and the struggle against apartheid, October, [Online], 
Available: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/solidarity/india-sa.html [23 March 
2010]. 
Reedy, E.S. (1987) 'Defiance Campaign in South Africa, Recalled', Asian Times, 26 June. 
117 
 
Renders, L. (2004) 'The Anglo-Boer War in retrospect', in Shannon, T.F. and Snapper, J.P. 
(ed.) Janus at the Millennium: Perspectives on Time in the Culture of the Netherlands, 
Lanham: University Press of America. 
Reno, W. (1998) Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Roberts, A.D. (1986) 'Portuguese Africa', in Roberts, A.D. (ed.) The Cambrige History of 
Africa, Volume 7 c. 1905 - c. 1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, S. (1997) 'Monetary policy within macroeconomic policy: an apprasial in the 
context of reconstruction and development', Transformation, vol. 32, pp. 54-78. 
Ross, R. (1999) A concise history of South Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
SA Foundation (1996) Growth for all: an economic strategy for South Africa, 
Johannesburg: South African Foundation. 
Samuels, L. (1955) 'Economic Change in South Africa', in Samuels, L., Fourie, F. and 
Hobart Houghton, D. (ed.) South Africa's Changing Economy, Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations. 
Schlemmer, L. (1980) 'Change in South Africa: Opportunities and Constraints', in Price, 
R.M. and Rosberg, C.G. (ed.) The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial 
Domination, Berkley: University of California Institute of International Studies. 
Simons, H.J. and Simons, R.E. (1969) Class and colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Sithole, J. and Ndlovu, S. (2006) 'The Revival of the Labour Movement 1970-1980', in 
Theron, B. (ed.) The Road to Democracy, Volume 2, 1970-1980, Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
Smith, I.R. (1990) 'The Origins of the South African War', South African Historical 
Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 24-60. 
Southall, R. (2009) ''Understanding the 'Zuma Tsunami'', Review of African Political 
Economy, vol. 36, no. 121, pp. 317-333. 
Southall, R. (2010) 'Jacob Zuma: a year of drift', OpenDemocracy.net, vol. 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/roger-southall/jacob-zuma-year-of-drift, May. 
Southall, R. and Webster, E. (2006) 'Unions and parties in South Africa: COSATU and 
the ANC in the wake of Polokwane', in Buhlungu, S. (ed.) Trade Unions and Democracy: 
Cosatu workers' political attitudes in South Africa, Cape Town: HSRC Press. 
StatsSA (2010a) Gross Domestic Product, fourth quarter 2009, Pretoria: Statistics South 
Africa, Available: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04414thQuarter2009.pdf [15 March 
118 
 
2010]. 
StatsSA (2010b) Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 1,2010, Pretoria: Statistics 
South Africa. 
Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa (1981) South Africa: Time 
Running Out, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Suttner, R. (2010) 'The Zuma era in ANC history: New crisis or new beginning?', 
Concerned Africa Scholars, vol. 84, Winter, pp. 12-33. 
Tangri, R. and Southall, R. (2008) 'The Politics of Black Economic Empowerment in 
South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 699-716. 
te Velde, D. (2008) 'Measuring State-Business Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa', in 
Leftwich, A., Sen, K. and te Velde, D. (ed.) The Economics and Politics of State-Business 
Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Manchester: IPPG, University of Manchester. 
Terreblanche, S. and Nattrass, N. (1990) 'A periodization of the political economy from 
1910', in Nattrass, N. and Ardington, E. (ed.) The Political Economy of South Africa, 
Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
The Presidency (2006) Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 2006: 
Annual Report, Pretoria: The Presidency. 
The Presidency (2009) Green Paper: National Strategic Planning, Pretoria: The 
Presidency. 
Thompson, L. (1990) A history of South Africa, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Trapido, S. (1971) 'South Africa in a comparative study of industrialization', Journal of 
Development Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, April, pp. 309-320. 
Turrell, R.V. (1987) Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields, 1871-1890, 
Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press. 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution, 17th Session (1962) Resolution 1761 [On the 
policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa], 6 November, 
[Online], Available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/192/69/IMG/NR019269.pdf?OpenElement [14 
March 2010]. 
UNCTAD (2010) World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, 
New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications. 
van der Walt, L. (2006) 'After 10 years of GEAR: COSATU, the Zuma Trial and the Dead 
End of Alliance', Zabalaza, vol. 7. 
119 
 
van der Walt, L. (2007) 'Asgisa: A Working Class Crtitique', Zabalaza, no. 8, December, 
pp. 2-3. 
van Wyk, D. (2010) Debate on Nationalising the Mines in South Africa, 6 February, 
[Online], Available: http://www.marxist.com/south-africa-mines-nationalisation-
debate.htm [23 March 2010]. 
Walker, I.L. and Weinbren, B. (1961) 2000 casualties, Johannesburg: South African 
Trade Union Council. 
Walshe, P. (1970) The rise of African nationalism in South Africa: the African National 
Congress 1912-1952, London: Hurst. 
Walshe, P. (1970) The rise of African nationalism in South Africa: the African National 
Congress 1912-1952, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Walters, S.S. and Prinsloo, J.W. (2002) 'The impact of offshore listings on the South 
African Economy', South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September, pp. 60-71. 
Webster, E. (2001) 'The Alliance Under Stress: Governing in a Globalising World', in 
Southall, R. (ed.) Opposition in South Africa's New Democracy, Johannesburg: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung. 
Williams, M. (1975) 'An analysis of South African Capitalism - Neo-Ricardian or 
Marxism?', Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, vol. 1, no. 4. 
Williams, P. and Taylor, I. (2000) 'Neoliberalims and the Political Economy of the 'New' 
South Africa', New Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 21-40. 
Wilson, F. (1972) Labour In The South African Gold Mines: 1911-1969, Cambridge: 
Cambrige University Press. 
Wilson, M. and Thompson, L.L. (ed.) (1969-1971) The Oxford History of South Africa, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Wolpe, H. (1972) 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation 
to apartheid', Economiy and Society, vol. 1, no. 4, November, pp. 425-456. 
Worden, N. (2000) The Making of Modern South Africa, 3rd edition, Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Yudelman, D. (1982) 'Lord Rothschild, Afrikaner Scabs and the 1907 Strike: A State-
Capital Daguerrotype', African Affairs, vol. 81, no. 323, pp. 257-269. 
Yudelman, D. (1984) The emergence of modern Souh Africa: state, capital, and the 
incorporation of organized labour on the South African gold fields, 1902-1939, Cape 
Town: David Philip. 
